Bishop v. Hackel, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1989

Bishop, an inmate at Macomb County Jail, alleged Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to safety due to being housed with Floyd, a predatory inmate with sexual-violence history.
Floyd was placed in the Mental Health Step-Down Unit; Bishop was young, small, and mentally ill; upper D-Block staffed by three corrections officers per shift with one Mental Health Control officer.
On Dec 25, 2004, Bishop reported that Floyd was sexually assaulting him; Hogan relayed the report to Stanley, Anderman, and Cantea, who investigated and distributed witness forms.
Bishop claimed he told corrections officers before Dec 25 about the abuse, but he could not identify the officers or prove whom he told; the district court treated the facts in Bishop’s favor, allowing a possible finding of liability.
District court denied qualified immunity to several Deputies; the Sixth Circuit reversed as to Harrell, Anderman, and Cantea, affirming as to Stanley, and emphasized the need for individualized assessments of each Deputy’s knowledge and conduct.
The court ultimately held that Bishop raises a genuine issue of material fact as to Stanley, but not as to Harrell, Anderman, or Cantea, on the question of deliberate indifference.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the right to be free from inmate-on-inmate violence was clearly established	Bishop argues the right was clearly established given known vulnerability and risk	Defendants contend the right was not clearly established for their specific conduct	Yes, clearly established at the time of the violation
Whether Harrell, Anderman, and Cantea violated Bishop's rights by subjective indifference	Bishop alleges these Deputies knew of the vulnerability and ignored the risk	They argue insufficient personal involvement or knowledge of risk	Harrell, Anderman, and Cantea qualified immunity granted (no deliberate indifference) on summary judgment
Whether Stanley violated Bishop's rights by subjective indifference	Stanley had more extensive contact and knew Bishop's vulnerability	Stanley did not knowingly disregard an excessive risk	Stanley denied qualified immunity; material facts could support deliberate indifference (affirmed)
Whether the objective component of failure-to-protect was met for each Deputy	Bishop presents evidence of a substantial risk due to vulnerability and predatory inmate	Defendants dispute the level of risk and their knowledge	Fact-intensive; individualized assessment required; findings support risk for some Deputies, not others

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (duty to protect prisoners from violence; objective risk standard)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (clearly established standard for rights)
Leary v. Livingston Cnty., 528 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (right to be free from violence clearly established)
Doe v. Bowles, 254 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2001) (inmate rights to be protected from inmate attacks)
Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1990) (deliberate indifference can arise from failure to protect)
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) ( scope of appellate review in qualified-immunity appeals)
Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (individualized liability when multiple officers involved)
Clark-Murphy v. Kingsley, 439 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2006) (individualized assessment of liability for each officer)
Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2004) (awareness of vulnerability can support liability)
Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995) (smaller, vulnerable inmates may raise triable issues)
Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1988) (evidence of known profiles of victims can show knowledge of risk)