Bernard D. Boroski v. Dyncorp International
700 F.3d 446
11th Cir.2012Background
- This case is on remand from the Supreme Court for Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. and the panel affirms the district court.
- The statutory framework concerns the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) and the Defense Base Act, focusing on how benefits are calculated using national average weekly wages (NAWW).
- Two provisions at issue are 33 U.S.C. § 906(c) (newly awarded vs. currently receiving) and § 910(f) (annual increases for total disability).
- Boroski I held that ‘newly awarded compensation’ meant the formal entry of a compensation order, while not addressing the ‘currently receiving’ clause.
- Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. resolved that ‘newly awarded’ means ‘newly entitled to compensation,’ prompting remand for further consideration of the other clause.
- The court on remand adopts the Director’s interpretation of ‘currently receiving’ as meaning ‘currently entitled to compensation,’ aligning with § 910(f) and the Act’s overall scheme.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of 'newly awarded' under § 906(c). | Boroski: 'newly awarded' = formal compensation order. | Director: Roberts governs; 'newly awarded' = newly entitled to compensation. | ‘Newly awarded’ means newly entitled to compensation. |
| Meaning of 'currently receiving' under § 906(c). | Boroski: 'currently receiving' = actual receipt of payments. | Director: 'currently receiving' = currently entitled to compensation. | ‘Currently receiving’ means currently entitled to compensation. |
| Consistency with § 910(f) and overall statutory scheme. | Boroski argues alternative interpretation aligns with different schemes and avoids harmony. | Director's view harmonizes clauses and mirrors annual increases under § 910(f). | Director's interpretation is more consistent with § 910(f) and the Act as a coherent regime. |
| Disparate treatment between claimants under the two readings. | Boroski would create unequal payments and windfalls for late payees. | Director's view avoids disparate treatment and provides uniform treatment plus interest for delays. | Director's interpretation avoids disparate treatment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (S. Ct. 2012) (clarifies 'newly awarded' means newly entitled to compensation)
- Boroski v. DynCorp Int'l, 662 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (initial interpretation of 'newly awarded' and 'currently receiving')
- Wilkerson v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 125 F.3d 904 (5th Cir. 1997) (influenced earlier view on 'newly awarded')
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court 1997) (statutory interpretation framework)
- Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court 2000) (read statutory terms in the context of the whole regime)
- Sproull v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1996) (pre-judgment interest principles for delayed payments)
- Matulic v. Director, OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998) (interest awards for delayed compensation)