Benoit v. City of Boston
477 Mass. 117
| Mass. | 2017Background
- Benoit, a Boston EMS paramedic injured his ankle at work (Sept. 2011) and received workers' compensation as the city is a self-insurer.
- The city suspended Benoit without pay after his indictment (Oct. 2012) under G. L. c. 268A, § 25 (suspension statute).
- The city stopped workers' compensation payments; Benoit contested the termination at the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA), which ordered payments restored (Oct. 2014).
- The city appealed the DIA order and did not comply; Benoit filed enforcement actions in Superior Court under G. L. c. 152, § 12(1).
- Superior Court judges dismissed Benoit’s enforcement actions, holding the suspension statute barred receipt of workers' compensation; Benoit appealed and the SJC reviewed de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether workers' compensation is "compensation" under G. L. c. 268A, § 1(a)/§ 25 | Workers' compensation is not "compensation" within the statute and thus may be received while suspended | The suspension statute's prohibition on receiving "compensation" or salary during suspension bars workers' compensation payments | Workers' compensation is not "compensation" under the suspension statute because it is not paid "in return for services rendered"; statute does not bar such benefits |
| Whether Superior Court must enforce DIA order regardless of conflict with other statutes (G. L. c. 152, § 12(1)) | § 12(1) requires the court to enforce the DIA order without regard to other statutes | The court must resolve statutory conflicts and may refuse enforcement if another statute supersedes | § 12(1) does not preclude the Superior Court from deciding statutory conflicts; enforcement is required only absent a conflicting controlling statute |
| Whether defendant waived the suspension-statute defense by not raising it before the DIA | City waived the argument by not presenting it administratively | The DIA lacks jurisdiction to decide issues outside the workers' compensation statute; defense properly raised in Superior Court | No waiver; the city appropriately raised the suspension statute in Superior Court because DIA’s jurisdiction is limited |
| Effect of resignation on suspension-bar argument (post-resignation enforcement action) | After resignation suspension ended; payments should be allowed | Suspension remains effective until lifted; payments barred even after resignation | Court did not resolve ancillary resignation timing issues given primary holding; Superior Court dismissal reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with holding |
Key Cases Cited
- Springfield v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 398 Mass. 786 (interpretation of "compensation" in suspension context)
- Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478 (workers' compensation as exclusive remedy for workplace injuries)
- Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (workers' compensation as quid pro quo for waiver of tort remedy)
- Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't. of Indus. Accs., 421 Mass. 70 (scope of workers' compensation benefits)
- Derinza's Case, 229 Mass. 435 (historical characterization of workers' compensation as insurance-like)
- Insurance Co. of the State of Penn. v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 473 Mass. 745 (insurer's direct liability for workers' compensation benefits)
- Keenan, petitioner, 310 Mass. 166 (Superior Court's role in statutory conflicts and enforcement)
- Chatham Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 362 Mass. 216 (every word of a statute must be given effect)
- Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494 (benefit as compensation where received in exchange for services)