Belluomini v. Zaryczny
7 N.E.3d 1
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- In April 2008 Catherine Zaryczny sent a letter to Chicago Police Superintendent Jody Weis alleging police officers participated in a "rent a cop" scheme and other election-day criminal conduct; the letter included an unsent draft to the U.S. Attorney and requested investigation by prosecutorial agencies.
- Zaryczny also signed an affidavit/complaint with CPD (IAD) reporting specific officers and incidents from a 2007 aldermanic election; CPD opened an investigation and documents were also given to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s office.
- Eight police officers (plaintiffs) sued Zaryczny for slander per se, alleging her complaints imputed criminal conduct and harmed their reputations; the plaintiffs amended their complaint multiple times and attached CPD records.
- Zaryczny moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-619, claiming absolute privilege for statements made to law-enforcement officials to institute criminal proceedings; the trial court initially denied the motion but later granted reconsideration and dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice.
- The appellate issue is whether Zaryczny’s statements were absolutely privileged (thus barring the defamation suit) and whether the trial court properly granted reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Zaryczny’s allegations are absolutely privileged | Plaintiffs: statements to CPD/IAD were to an administrative body (IAD) and thus only entitled to qualified or no privilege; complaints concerned employment discipline not criminal prosecution | Zaryczny: letter to Superintendent Weis sought criminal investigation and referrals to prosecutors; statements were made to law-enforcement authorities to institute criminal proceedings and are absolutely privileged | Court: Held statements were absolutely privileged because they were made to the superintendent (a quasi‑judicial actor) to institute criminal proceedings and subsequent IAD communications were part of the same quasi‑judicial investigative continuum |
| Whether communications with the State’s Attorney establish intent to seek criminal proceedings | Plaintiffs: ASA McCarthy’s affidavit did not identify the officers or show Zaryczny communicated about them specifically | Zaryczny: provided information to prosecutorial offices and sought referrals; continuity of communications shows intent to trigger criminal investigations | Court: Found the totality (Weis letter, referral requests, communications with prosecutors) sufficient to show purpose of instituting criminal proceedings; appellate court accepted this context |
| Whether absolute privilege should be limited for complaints about law-enforcement officers | Plaintiffs: argue for a different rule when complainant reports against police officers to internal supervisors (citing older/administrative cases) | Zaryczny: no special rule for officers; privilege applies where statements are made to institute criminal proceedings regardless of subject’s employment | Court: Declined to create a special rule; distinguished cases where communications were purely administrative and affirmed absolute privilege here |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion or otherwise erred in granting reconsideration | Plaintiffs: motion lacked newly discovered evidence or legal error warranting reconsideration | Zaryczny: urged legal error in prior ruling; reconsideration allowed correction of law application | Court: Reviewed de novo and held trial court correctly reconsidered and applied law to find absolute privilege; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 291 Ill. App. 3d 559 (definition and scope of absolute privilege)
- Barakat v. Matz, 271 Ill. App. 3d 662 (absolute privilege limited to legislative, judicial, quasi‑judicial proceedings)
- Zych v. Tucker, 363 Ill. App. 3d 831 (distinguishing internal affairs reports that are not quasi‑judicial from those that are)
- Morris v. Harvey Cycle & Camper, Inc., 392 Ill. App. 3d 399 (statements to law‑enforcement to institute criminal proceedings are absolutely privileged)
- Vincent v. Williams, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1 (absolute privilege for communications aimed at criminal prosecution)
- Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 966 (absolute privilege in context of criminal‑prosecution‑oriented communications)
- Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112 (standard of review for section 2‑619 motions)
- Duresa v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 348 Ill. App. 3d 90 (purpose and review standard for motions to reconsider)