Bellard v. State
157 A.3d 272
| Md. | 2017Background
- Darrell Bellard was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder; State had filed timely notice seeking life without parole (LWOP) after repeal of the death penalty.
- In 2013 the Maryland General Assembly repealed the death penalty and amended CR § 2-304(a), removing references to jury sentencing that had applied in capital cases; § 2-304(b) remained unchanged.
- Bellard sought to be sentenced by a jury under his reading of amended CR § 2-304; the State and the trial court maintained that the statute leaves sentencing to the court where only LWOP (not death) is sought.
- The Court of Special Appeals sided with the State; Bellard petitioned for certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.
- The Court of Appeals addressed (1) whether CR § 2-304 gives a convicted first-degree murder defendant a statutory right to jury sentencing for LWOP, and (2) whether Maryland’s LWOP sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under federal or state constitutional provisions.
- The Court held: (1) CR § 2-304 does not confer a right to jury sentencing where the State seeks LWOP (trial court decides); and (2) Maryland’s LWOP sentencing scheme is constitutional and not equivalent to capital sentencing protections.
Issues
| Issue | Bellard's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CR § 2-304 grants a statutory right to jury sentencing for LWOP after repeal of death penalty | § 2-304(b) plainly contemplates jury sentencing and, read with § 6-112(c)(3), gives defendant a right to elect jury sentencing; any ambiguity should be resolved for defendant (lenity) | The 2013 amendment to § 2-304(a) (deleting capital references) shows the legislature only repealed the death penalty; prior case law and statutory context leave LWOP sentencing to the court | Court: § 2-304 is ambiguous but legislative history and precedent (Woods) show the legislature intended only to repeal death penalty; LWOP sentencing remains a court function; no statutory right to jury sentencing |
| Whether Maryland’s LWOP sentencing scheme violates federal or state constitutional protections (Due Process, Sixth, Eighth, Fourteenth) or requires jury findings per Apprendi | Scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to limit prosecutorial discretion, lacks guidance for sentencing authority, and requires jury findings for facts that justify LWOP | LWOP is within the statutory sentencing range for first-degree murder; Apprendi does not apply because LWOP is not an increased penalty beyond the statutory maximum; death penalty precedents and individualized capital-sentencing rules do not extend to LWOP | Court: LWOP is not equivalent to death; Woods and Supreme Court precedent (Apprendi, Harmelin delineation) permit court-imposed LWOP within statutory range; scheme is constitutional |
Key Cases Cited
- Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591 (Md. 1989) (where State sought only LWOP, sentencing proceeding is before the court, not a jury)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (facts that increase penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. 1991) (individualized capital-sentencing protections do not extend to noncapital mandatory LWOP)
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1972) (death penalty’s unique finality requires special procedural protections)
- Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (U.S. 1976) (qualitative difference between death and other penalties; individualized capital sentencing required)
- Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 (Md. 2001) (Apprendi does not require jury findings for penalties within statutory range such as LWOP)
- Teniente v. State, 169 P.3d 512 (Wyo. 2007) (similar LWOP scheme upheld as not unconstitutionally vague)