Bell v. Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30

In February 2018 Clinton Bell applied for a Georgia weapons carry license and swore he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor domestic-violence offense.
A criminal-history report provided to DeKalb County Probate Judge Bedelia Hargrove showed only a 1986 arrest for “pointing or aiming a gun,” with no disposition information.
Judge Hargrove denied Bell’s application because the report did not rule out a disqualifying conviction (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) / OCGA § 16-11-129(b)(2)(E)).
Bell sued for a writ of mandamus; the trial court and Court of Appeals upheld the denial.
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding the statute requires issuance of a license unless facts establish ineligibility or the judge affirmatively determines the applicant is unqualified.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a probate judge may deny a weapons-carry application solely because the criminal-history report fails to show the outcome of an arrest that might be disqualifying	Bell: No — OCGA § 16-11-129(d)(4) mandates issuance unless facts establish ineligibility or the judge determines applicant is unqualified; uncertainty is insufficient	Hargrove: Yes — judge may deem the report “incomplete” or not “appropriate” and deny on that basis to protect public safety	Held: No — mere speculation or an incomplete report does not “establish” ineligibility or support a determination applicant is unqualified; judge must issue license unless an exception clearly applies; mandamus ordered
Whether the statute requires a probate judge to make a threshold determination that the law-enforcement report is “appropriate” before issuing a license	Bell: No — "appropriate report" describes the law-enforcement agency’s duty; judge lacks discretion to reject reports for incompleteness	Hargrove/Ct. of Appeals: Yes — judge must assess whether the returned report is appropriate before acting	Held: No — the statute assigns the content/requirement of the report to the law-enforcement agency; judge cannot create an additional exception by deeming a report inappropriate

Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (statutory text controls when clear; plain-meaning construction)
Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268 (construing “shall” as mandatory)
Hertz v. Bennett, 294 Ga. 62 (mandamus requires clear legal right or gross abuse of discretion)
Selph v. Williams, 284 Ga. 349 (mere speculation cannot support factual findings)
Davis v. Davis, 262 Ga. 420 (speculative findings unsupported by evidence are erroneous)
Moore v. Cranford, 285 Ga. App. 666 (earlier statutory scheme required affirmative finding of qualification)
Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283 (expressio unius est exclusio alterius; courts should not create unlisted statutory exceptions)
Ellis v. Ellis, 290 Ga. 616 (factfinder authorized to resolve evidentiary conflicts)
Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853 (context can affect whether “shall” is mandatory)
Blalock v. Cartwright, 300 Ga. 884 (issues not raised before an intermediate appellate court may be deemed abandoned)