167 A.3d 569
Me.2017Background
- Donald Beauchene was acquitted of murder in 1970 by reason of mental disease or defect and has remained committed under 15 M.R.S. § 103 ever since.
- In 2016 he petitioned the Superior Court for discharge or modified release under 15 M.R.S. § 104‑A; the court held a hearing with three mental‑health experts and denied the petition.
- Historical and contemporaneous expert testimony described long‑standing personality/antisocial symptoms (variously labeled “explosive personality,” intermittent explosive disorder, antisocial/narcissistic features) that have persisted since 1970.
- Beauchene has a history of escape and subsequent violent convictions (New York rape, sodomy, assault convictions in 1980), and evidence showed grooming behavior, targeting vulnerable women, deceitfulness, lack of remorse, and flight risk.
- The court found his condition had changed little since 1970, concluded he continues to suffer from a legally cognizable mental disease or defect, and that he remains likely to cause injury to himself or others; it denied discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Beauchene) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: Does evidence compel finding no "mental disease or defect"? | Evidence shows only antisocial personality disorder, which is not a "mental disease or defect," so Beauchene never met the legal standard. | Court may apply legal definition to symptoms; experts agreed current symptoms match those present in 1970 and support dangerousness. | Court: Evidence does not compel contrary finding; trial court reasonably found a mental disease or defect and ongoing dangerousness. |
| Vagueness: Is 15 M.R.S. § 104‑A unconstitutionally vague? | Terms like “likelihood” and “injury” and indefinite time frame fail to give adequate notice. | Statute’s broad terms are permissible; they allow case‑by‑case factfinding by the court and give adequate notice. | Court: No obvious error; statute is sufficiently clear in the circumstances and not unconstitutionally vague. |
| Due Process: Does continued confinement violate due process? | Continued confinement is not narrowly tailored; State could use involuntary commitment statutes instead. | State may confine acquittees who remain mentally ill and dangerous; the petition standard controls release. | Court: No due process violation; confinement lawful so long as mental illness plus dangerousness persists. |
| Standard of proof and change in condition | (implicit) §104‑A does not require showing a change from time of verdict. | State emphasizes burden is clear and convincing evidence that release is safe. | Court: Acquittee bears clear and convincing burden; lack of change is probative but not required to be shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begin v. State, 153 A.3d 93 (Me. 2016) (articulates acquittee’s burden to show release is safe by clear and convincing evidence)
- Beal v. State, 151 A.3d 502 (Me. 2016) (‘‘mental disease or defect’’ is a legal concept for the court to decide)
- Green v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 750 A.2d 1265 (Me. 2000) (explains standards for release and confinement of acquittees)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (State may confine a person who is mentally ill and dangerous)
- In re Beauchene, 951 A.2d 81 (Me. 2008) (prior Beauchene decision discussing applicable definitions at time of verdict)
- James v. State, 121 A.3d 1290 (Me. 2015) (§ 104‑A does not require proof of a change in circumstances)