[¶ 1] Jason Begin appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) denying his petition for release from the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, to which he was committed in 2004 based on a finding that he was not criminally responsible for certain crimes by reason of insanity. Begin argues that the court erred by continuing the final hearing on his petition, excluding evidence at that hearing, and issuing a decision in the absence of any testimony from an independent psychiatrist. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s determination that he is not entitled to release pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 104-A (2015). We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In 2003, Begin was charged with theft and violation of a condition of release, for which the Superior Court (Androscog-gin County, Delahanty, J.) found him not criminally responsible by reason of insanity (NCR) in 2004. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 103 (Supp. 2002); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 39 (Supp. 2003).
[¶ 3] Between 2005 and 2015, Begin filed in the Superior Court (Kennebec County) a series of petitions for modified release treatment orders seeking further institutional privileges. See 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(2). In the resulting orders, Begin was granted some additional privileges, and periodically also had his privileges suspended or revoked. Eventually, by order dated October 3, 2013, the court (Murphy, J.) allowed Begin to enter a group residential program with continuing outpatient services from Riverview.
[¶ 4] On July 29, 2015, Begin filed the petition now at issue, requesting “a hearing on [his] fitness for release and return to permanent residency in the community pursuant to Title 15 § 104-A (1) and (2).” The court {Harden, J.) conducted a hearing at which it admitted numerous exhibits and the testimony of a Riverview staff psychiatrist, a psychiatric nurse practitioner, Dr. Debra Baeder of the State Forensic Service, four mental health workers, a detective sergeant with the Augusta Police Department, two of Begin’s employers, an elder in Begin’s church, and Begin’s mother.
[¶ 5] The court made the following factual findings, which are supported by competent record evidence. Begin, who was raised by a grandmother with schizophrenia, began exhibiting antisocial and psychotic symptoms at an early age. Since childhood, he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, mixed developmental disorder, bipolar affective disorder, evasive developmental disorder, Asperger’s Syndrome, borderline mental retardation, major depressive disorder, pedophilia, cannabis abuse, and personality disorder not otherwise specified.
[¶ 6] Although Begin denies having any violent tendencies, he has a history of perpetrating physical and verbal violence when his wishes are not met. In one such incident on January 12, 2015, Begin’s outpatient services team confronted him about suspected marijuana use or distribution. After Begin realized that the team intended to send him to Riverview while they investigated the reports, Begin brandished a knife and slashed his own arm. When Begin then “appeared to be attempting to assault” a police officer who was there to escort Begin to Riverview, the police officer shot Begin; Begin was hospitalized for some time for the injuries he incurred.
[¶ 7] The court found that Begin “has no primary psychotic disorder,” but, as a symptom of his PTSD, he experiences “tangent psychotic or quasi psychotic symptoms” when confronted with severe stress. In the midst of such reactions, Begin experiences “a high degree of cognitive distortion” and can no longer realistically or rationally perceive the circumstances. Based on the recommendations of River-view staff and the State Forensic Service, the court denied Begin’s request for re
II. DISCUSSION
[IT 8] When a person is found not guilty by reason of insanity, see 17-A M.R.S. § 39 (2015), he is committed to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services “to be placed in an appropriate institution for the care and treatment of persons with mental illness or in an appropriate residential program,” 15 M.R.S. § 103 (2015). See Taylor v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,
[¶ 9] In short, as the petitioning acquittee, it was Begin’s burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is no longer dangerous to himself or others as a result of a mental disease or defect. See 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(3); Beal,
[1110] Multiple mental health professionals testified that Begin suffers from a severe form of PTSD that causes him, when stressed, to exhibit psychotic behaviors accompanied by cognitive distortions that render him both unable to discern reality and prone to violence. This evidence supports the court’s findings that Begin is a danger to himself or others as a result of his mental disease or defect. In fact, the legal definition of “mental disease or defect” expressly refers to an impairment of the ability to perceive reality, from which the court found Begin suffers when he is under severe stress. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 39(2) (Supp. 2003); see 17-A M.R.S. § 39(2) (2015). Begin’s dangerousness is also amply supported by the evidence of numerous incidents in which he has threatened himself or others—most notably, by the incident that occurred just last year in which he brandished a knife, slashed his own arms, and lunged at a police officer.
[¶ 11] Contrary to Begin’s suggestion, a “mental disease or defect” does not refer to any particular diagnosis on any particular psychiatric axis. See, e.g., Beal,
[¶ 12] Although Begin points to evidence of his stable mental state and lack of dangerousness, the court simply was not required to believe Begin’s proffered testimony. See Roberts,
[¶ 13] We conclude that the trial court was not compelled to find in Begin’s favor on his petition for release.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 39, which sets out the affirmative defense of insanity, has been amended since the court issued its NCR judgment. P.L. 2005, ch. 263, §§ 5, 6 (effective Sept. 17, 2005) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 39 (2015)). Nevertheless, the operative language of section 39 on which we rely in this case is identical in the 2003 and 2015 versions of the statute.
Section 103 details the procedure for commitment after an NCR judgment is entered. 15 M.R.S. § 103 (2015). When the NCR judg
. The Department of Behavioral and Developmental Services was incorporated into the Department of Health and Human Services shortly before Begin’s NCR judgment was entered in 2004. P.L. 2003, ch. 689, § B-1 (effective July 1, 2004); see Beal v. State,
. "Release” refers to a "termination of institutional inpatient residency and return to permanent residency in the community,” and is ordered with conditions for outpatient treatment and supervision, and for return to the institution upon violating the conditions of release. 15 M.R.S. § 104-A(1)(A) (2015); see Beal,
. The procedural aspects of the release or discharge proceeding are governed by 15 M.R.S. § 104-A (2015), the current version of the statute. See James v. State,
. We are also not persuaded by Begin’s additional contentions, that the court’s procedure for considering his petition violated his substantive and procedural due process rights, see Green v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,