Michael J. JAMES v. STATE of Maine.
Docket No. Ken-14-189.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Aug. 11, 2015
2015 ME 111
Argued: June 17, 2015.
letter from the mother explaining her decision to not vaccinate Z.S., to be put on file with Z.S.‘s new daycare.
Harold J. Hainke, Esq. (orally), Hainke & Tash, Whitefield, for appellant Michael J. James.
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and David M. Spencer, Asst. Dist. Atty.
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Laura Yustak Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for amicus curiae Office of the Maine Attorney General.
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for amicus curiae Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
JABAR, J.
[¶ 1] Michael J. James appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) discharging him from the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and thereby returning him to the custody of the Department of Correctiоns. James contends that the court erred by discharging him from DHHS custody without finding that there was a change in the mental disease or defect that formed the basis for his initial commitment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The facts underlying this appeal are not disputed, and were discussed extensively in James v. State, 2008 ME 122, 953 A.2d 1152. In 2006, while serving a sentence at thе Maine State Prison, James was charged with ten counts of assaulting an officer. See id. ¶ 3. A Knox County jury found James not criminally responsible by reason оf mental disease or defect, and the court ordered him committed to DHHS custody. Id.; see
[¶ 3] On September 5, 2013, DHHS petitioned for James‘s discharge from its custody. The court held a contested hearing on the petition on April 10, 2014. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from Miriam Davidson, a Riverview psychiatric nurse practitioner; Dr. Alexander Raev, a Riverview psychiatrist; Dr. Arthur Dirocco, Riverview‘s director of psychology; Dr. Ann LeBlanc, a forensic psychologist; and
[¶ 4] After the hearing, the court ordered James to be discharged from DHHS custody, finding by clear and convincing evidence that he no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect. See
[James] does have substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at Riverview, that his аctivities are goal-directed notwithstanding the threats and the self-harm and the aggressive behavior, that he understands what it is he‘s [d]oing and why and that all of this activity, this unsatisfactory conduct is not . . . the result of a mental disease or defect.
[¶ 5] James was remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of his prison sentence. He appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 6] James does not challenge the factual findings made by the court in its discharge order. Instead, James argues that the court erred in ordering his discharge from DHHS custody because DHHS failed to make a nеcessary showing pursuant to In re Beauchene, 2008 ME 110, 951 A.2d 81, and LaDew v. Comm‘r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 532 A.2d 1051 (Me. 1987): that there was a “substantial change” in the particular mental disease or defect that formed the basis for the jury‘s finding him not criminally responsible in 2006. We review such questions de novo. In re Beauchene, 2008 ME 110, ¶ 7, 951 A.2d 81.
[¶ 7]
[¶ 8] Thus, the only question before the court on the section 104-A(1) discharge petition was whethеr James presents a danger to himself or others because of a mental disease or defect. See James, 2008 ME 122, ¶ 24, 953 A.2d 1152; see also Green, 2000 ME 92, ¶ 28, 750 A.2d 1265 (holding that the relevant inquiry is whether the mental disease or defect exists, and not whether the acquittee is symptomatic); In re Fleming, 431 A.2d 616, 618 (Me. 1981) (“The operative statute requires the presiding justice to . . . determine whether a petitioner is free of mental disease or defect.“). Section 104-A(1) does not require a petitioner to prove a change in circumstances from the time of the not criminally responsible verdict.
[¶ 9] Contrary to James‘s argument, LaDew provides no support for the result he seeks. In that case, a defendant who had been determined not guilty by reason оf insanity at a time when “Maine‘s insanity defense contained both a volitional and a cognitive standard” petitioned to be released aftеr a 1986 amendment to the Criminal Code removed the volitional aspect of the defense. LaDew, 532 A.2d at 1052. In affirming the trial court‘s denial of LaDew‘s petition, we said:
Rather one would reasonably expect that to be released under
15 M.R.S.A. § 104-A a BRI acquittee must show (clearly and convincingly) that the men-tal disease or defect by reason of which he was relieved of criminal responsibility no longer exists, or at least no longer poses a danger to himself or others if he is released.
Id. at 1053 (emphasis added). More than twenty years later, we applied our holding in LaDew to require another petitioner to “prove that he no longer suffered from а mental disease or defect as that term was defined in 1970 that would likely result in his being a danger to himself or others.” In re Beauchene, 2008 ME 110, ¶ 10, 951 A.2d 81 (emphasis added).
[¶ 10] Here, the trial court found that James‘s dаngerousness—which still exists—is not the result of a mental disease or defect and that, therefore, DHHS can no longer maintain James in its custody. The evidеnce supports the court‘s finding by clear and convincing evidence.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
James, 2008 ME 122, ¶ 24, 953 A.2d 1152.whether James presents a danger because of his mеntal illness or defect. Even without the complication of mental illness, James may present a danger to others, but if any such continuing dangerous behavior is not due to mental illness, or if his mental illness is not amenable to treatment, then there may be no reason for James‘s continuing commitment.