Barry v. Corrigan
79 F. Supp. 3d 712
E.D. Mich.2015Background
- Plaintiffs (four named individuals and Westside Mothers) challenge Michigan DHS’s practice of automatically disqualifying applicants/recipients from public assistance (including SNAP/FAP) based on a match in LEIN to an outstanding felony warrant and sending a boilerplate "criminal justice disqualification" notice.
- Michigan law (Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b) and DHS policy (BEM/BAM and the ‘‘fugitive felon interface’’) trigger automatic closures or denials when Bridges matches DHS client lists with MSP warrant data.
- Notices at issue gave only a short reason (“criminal justice disqualification”), appeal instructions, and DHS contact info, but omitted identifying warrant details, the basis for any "fleeing" or "actively seeking" findings, and specific steps to restore benefits.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of procedural due process (Fourteenth Amendment and 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10)), substantive SNAP rights (7 U.S.C. § 2014(a)/(b)), and preemption of Michigan law by SNAP; they also sought class certification.
- The court: (1) found standing for all named plaintiffs except that Woodward’s claims were moot and dismissed her claims; (2) certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class and an FAP subclass; (3) held that sections 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10) create private rights enforceable under § 1983; (4) granted plaintiffs summary judgment that DHS notices violated constitutional and statutory due process; and (5) granted summary judgment that Michigan’s automatic warrant-based disqualification (Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and BEM 204) violates and is preempted by the SNAP Act because it lacks required "fleeing" and "actively seeking" findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Mootness | Named plaintiffs suffered procedural and economic injuries from notices and threatened/actual benefit loss; associational standing for Westside Mothers via members | Some plaintiffs lack injury; others’ claims moot because warrants resolved and benefits restored | All named plaintiffs except Woodward had standing and nonmoot claims; Woodward dismissed as moot; Westside Mothers has associational but not independent standing |
| Class certification (Rule 23) | Common constitutional/statutory notice and policy-based claims make class ascertainable, common, typical, and adequate; Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief appropriate | Class unascertainable and injuries vary (defendant recasts injury as erroneous LEIN matches requiring individualized proof) | Court certified the modified class and FAP subclass under Rule 23(b)(2) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy established) |
| Private right of action under SNAP (§§ 2014(a), 2020(e)(10)) | Those provisions are individually rights‑focused ("household" language) and therefore enforceable via § 1983; administrative enforcement scheme does not preclude private suits | SNAP lacks explicit § 1983 right; overall statutory scheme and Secretary enforcement tools indicate Congress did not intend private suits | Court held §§ 2014(a) and 2020(e)(10) create individual rights enforceable under § 1983; enforcement scheme does not foreclose private § 1983 claims |
| Adequacy of DHS notices (procedural due process & SNAP regs) | Notices are boilerplate and omit who is disqualified, the type of disqualification, warrant/case identifiers, jurisdiction, basis for any "fleeing/actively seeking" determination, and specific steps to restore benefits; thus they fail Goldberg/Goldberg‑line standards and 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.10/273.13 requirements | Notices provided appeal procedures and contact info; recipients could contact DHS or law enforcement for details; later procedural steps supply missing facts | Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs: notices violated Fourteenth Amendment and SNAP notice/hearing regulations; ordered specific content DHS must include in future notices (detailed factual/legal bases, identifiers, how to cure, and where applicable findings that the person is fleeing and actively sought) |
| Substantive SNAP compliance / Preemption of Mich. law | SNAP § 2015(k) requires a person be "fleeing to avoid prosecution" and be "actively sought"; Michigan law disqualifies solely on outstanding warrants, adding eligibility requirements beyond federal law and thus is preempted | Michigan law is a permissible state definition/application; state law should control interpretation of "fleeing"; proposed USDA rule could clarify terms | Court held Michigan’s law and DHS policy exceed federal eligibility rules and are expressly preempted by SNAP (state may not disqualify solely on warrant existence without "fleeing" and "actively seeking" determinations) |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized injury)
- Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (public‑benefit recipients entitled to timely, adequate notice and meaningful hearing)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (statutory text must unambiguously confer individual rights to be enforceable under § 1983)
- Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (test for implied private rights under federal statutes)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (rigorous Rule 23 analysis; commonality limits)
- Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (exhaustion of state administrative remedies not a § 1983 prerequisite)
- Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (agency enforcement powers do not necessarily preclude private § 1983 suits)