Barry Jones v. David Shinn
971 F.3d 1133
9th Cir.
2020

Background

  • Barry Jones and David Ramirez were convicted and sentenced to death in Arizona and later sought federal habeas relief raising new ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claims that were not presented in state postconviction proceedings.
  • Both petitioners’ state postconviction counsel did not develop the factual records needed for the IATC claims; the cases were affected by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Martinez v. Ryan.
  • Martinez allows ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel to supply "cause" to excuse a procedural default for failing to raise an IATC claim, but Martinez is an equitable, judge-made rule distinct from statutory standards.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (AEDPA) bars consideration of new evidence not developed in state court unless the petitioner meets narrow statutory exceptions; Williams v. Taylor and Holland v. Jackson interpret that bar strictly.
  • Ninth Circuit panels in Jones v. Shinn and Ramirez v. Ryan ruled that (1) evidence developed to establish Martinez cause may be considered on the merits despite §2254(e)(2), and (2) Ramirez went further by permitting additional evidentiary development after Martinez was found satisfied.
  • The dissent (from denial of rehearing en banc) argues those panel rulings unlawfully create a judge-made exception to §2254(e)(2) that conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and Congress’s text.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Martinez’s equitable exception to procedural default permits federal courts to consider new evidence otherwise barred by §2254(e)(2) Martinez is an equitable rule excusing default; courts should be able to consider new evidence used to establish cause §2254(e)(2) is a statutory limit that bars new evidence unless its narrow exceptions are met; courts cannot judicially graft Martinez onto the statute Panel: Martinez exception applies to allow consideration of evidence despite §2254(e)(2) (Jones). Dissent: this conflicts with Williams/Holland and statutory text.
Whether evidence developed at a Martinez hearing may be used later to decide the merits of the underlying IATC claim Evidence received to prove Martinez cause should also be available to decide merits (avoids duplicative fact-finding) Evidence developed post-state proceedings remains subject to §2254(e)(2) and cannot be used on merits unless statutory exceptions are satisfied Panel: Evidence from Martinez hearing may be considered on the merits (Jones). Dissent: Holland and Williams forbid this without meeting §2254(e)(2).
Whether a petitioner who establishes Martinez is entitled to further evidentiary development on the underlying claim beyond what was used to prove cause Once Martinez excusal established, petitioner should be permitted full evidentiary development on the merits §2254(e)(2) continues to limit any additional evidentiary development; satisfying Martinez does not repeal the statute’s strict exceptions Ramirez panel: permitted additional evidentiary development after Martinez excusal. Dissent: that step improperly nullifies §2254(e)(2).

Key Cases Cited

  • Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow equitable exception allowing ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel to supply cause to excuse procedural default for IATC claims)
  • Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (Congress intended §2254(e)(2) to preserve Keeney’s definition of failure to develop the state-court record and to raise the bar for excusing that failure)
  • Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (attorney negligence in developing the state record is chargeable to the client and §2254(e)(2) bars consideration of new evidence absent statutory exceptions)
  • Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (attorney error normally does not constitute cause to excuse procedural default absent Sixth Amendment IAC circumstances)
  • Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (pre-AEDPA rule treating failure to develop state-court record akin to procedural default requiring cause and prejudice)
  • Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (reaffirming §2254(e)(2) limits on new evidence)
  • Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (held Martinez cause-question is not a "claim" for §2254(e)(2) purposes, allowing a Martinez hearing)
  • Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc plurality) (expressed concern that §2254(e)(2) could nullify Martinez and suggested evidence at a Martinez hearing might be considered)
  • Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2013) (held cause/praise may affect whether there was a failure to develop the record for §2254(e)(2))
  • Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2000) (similar reasoning regarding cause and record-development failure)
  • Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (statutory exhaustion/procedure differs from judge-made rules; courts may not create exceptions to statutory schemes)
  • McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (discussed interplay of habeas equitable doctrines and AEDPA limits)
  • Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (courts of appeals must follow controlling Supreme Court precedent even if tension exists elsewhere)
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