Barrick v. Pngi Charles Town Gaming, LLC
365 F. Supp. 3d 672
| United States District Court | 2019Background
- Michael Barrick, an assistant pit manager at Hollywood Casino (PNGI), sued for retaliation under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) after his termination; common-law and Dodd‑Frank claims were dismissed earlier and/or withdrawn.
- Barrick and a small group investigated and reported alleged illegal staff-run sports gambling; a private investigator and a West Virginia Lottery investigator were involved and the group believed the FBI may have been contacted.
- After Barrick reported alleged gambling (including that employee Champa used gambling proceeds to buy a bar abroad), the casino investigated; Immordino (accused of running pools) was fired; the investigation also revealed Barrick had taken undisclosed loans from subordinates, violating policy.
- Barrick was on a final written warning before the reporting; discovery of the loans led to termination. His father, who also reported, was not terminated and remains employed.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; court reviewed record (disputed facts viewed in plaintiff's favor) and granted summary judgment for defendants, dismissing the action with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barrick provided protected BSA report to a covered recipient (Treasury, AG, or "Federal supervisory agency") | Barrick asserts he (or investigators at his request) reported the matter to the FBI, which counts as reporting to the Attorney General for BSA purposes | Defendants argue FBI is not a "Federal supervisory agency" under BSA definitions and plaintiff did not properly report to a covered recipient | Court: dispute exists whether FBI was actually contacted, but reporting to the FBI suffices as reporting to the Attorney General (agency under AG). FBI is not a "Federal supervisory agency," but reporting to FBI meets the statute via Attorney General coverage. |
| Whether Barrick reported a possible violation covered by the BSA (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956) | Barrick says he reported that Champa used gambling proceeds to buy a bar in Laos, implicating § 1956(a) money‑laundering | Defendants focus on alleged failure to file a suspicious activity report and dispute the substance of any covered legal violation | Court: Barrick’s report about transfers and use of proceeds implicated § 1956(a), satisfying the BSA "possible violation" element. |
| Causation for BSA retaliation claim (was reporting a contributing factor?) | Barrick points to timing, alleged employer conduct toward others, and disputed facts about when loans were discovered to argue reporting contributed to termination | Defendants show Barrick was on final written warning and that independent, undisclosed loans from subordinates were discovered and would have led to termination regardless; they point to comparators who were not terminated | Court: even under forgiving contributing‑factor standard, the employer proved by clear and convincing evidence it would have discharged Barrick for policy violations; legitimate intervening event severs causation — BSA claim fails. |
| Whether Barrick engaged in protected SOX activity (reasonable belief he reported SOX‑enumerated fraud) | Barrick contends he believed the gambling constituted unlawful conduct affecting the business and reported it | Defendants point to Barrick’s testimony that he did not understand the specific SOX enumerated offenses (mail, wire, bank, securities fraud) and therefore lacked the required belief | Court: Barrick did not hold the requisite subjective (and thus reasonable) belief that his reports concerned one of SOX’s enumerated offenses; SOX claim fails. Even assuming protected activity, employer showed it would have taken the same action absent reporting. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (genuine‑issue and "merely colorable" standards for summary judgment)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (party opposing summary judgment must present more than metaphysical doubt)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. framework for SOX retaliation burden shifting)
- Feldman v. Law Enforcement Associates Corp., 752 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. discussion of causation and intervening events in whistleblower context)
- Schroeder v. Greater New Orleans Fed. Credit Union, 664 F.3d 1016 (FBI as agency under authority of Attorney General)