939 F.3d 824
6th Cir.2019Background:
- Logan applied for work at MGM and signed an employment form requiring any employment-related lawsuit be filed within six months of the employment action.
- She resigned December 4, 2014, claiming constructive discharge due to discrimination.
- Logan filed an EEOC charge on July 8, 2015 (216 days after resignation) and received a right-to-sue letter in November 2015.
- She sued MGM under Title VII on February 17, 2016 (440 days after resignation); MGM moved for summary judgment relying on the six-month contractual limit.
- The district court granted summary judgment for MGM; Logan appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that contractual shortening of Title VII’s limitation period (outside arbitration) is unenforceable because it conflicts with Title VII’s substantive protections and pre-suit EEOC scheme.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parties may contractually shorten the Title VII limitations period for filing suit | Logan: No—Title VII’s limitation is substantive, part of EEOC pre-suit scheme, and cannot be prospectively waived | MGM: Yes—parties may agree to shorter limitation periods; Michigan law enforces such clauses | Held: No—contractual shortening unenforceable for Title VII claims; Logan entitled to statutory (300-day) period |
| Whether precedent upholding contractual limits (Wolfe, Thurman, Heimeshoff, Morrison) controls | Logan: Those cases are distinguishable (Wolfe: full-faith/conflict context; Thurman: §1981 not Title VII; Heimeshoff/§1981/ERISA differ; Morrison: arbitration context) | MGM: Relies on those decisions to support enforceability of contractual limits | Held: Court distinguished those cases and declined to extend their rationales to Title VII outside arbitration |
| Whether Title VII’s EEOC deferral/300-day mechanism and national uniformity bar state-law contractual alterations | Logan: EEOC process and 300-day deferral are integral to Title VII’s enforcement and national policy | MGM: Contract should control between the parties despite EEOC process | Held: EEOC pre-suit scheme and need for uniform national enforcement make contractual alteration impermissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (Title VII enforcement scheme is national and state limitations should not frustrate it)
- Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Congress selected cooperation and voluntary compliance via EEOC processes)
- EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988) (explains 180/300-day charge-filing rules and work-sharing agreements)
- Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904) (when statute creates cause and fixes limitation, limitation treated as substantive)
- Brooklyn Savs. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (substantive statutory rights affecting public interest generally not prospectively waivable)
- Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (state agency 60-day deferral affects federal limitation calculations)
- Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99 (2013) (upheld contractual limitations in ERISA plan context)
- Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (arbitration of federal statutory claims is generally permissible)
- Boaz v. FedEx Customer Info. Servs., Inc., 725 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.) (contractual shortening of FLSA/EPA limitations invalid)
- Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. en banc) (arbitration agreement limits scrutinized; some arbitration timing provisions upheld)
- Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, 397 F.3d 352 (6th Cir.) (applied contractual limitations to §1981 claims; not binding for Title VII)