Bank v. Alliance Health Networks, LLC
669 F. App'x 584
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff-appellant Todd C. Bank, proceeding pro se, sued under the TCPA and NY GBL § 399-p individually and as putative class representative.
- Defendants (Alliance Health Networks, MedSource Rx Pharmacy, Ingram Medical Administration) made a Rule 68 offer of judgment; Bank negotiated the check and the district court entered judgment satisfied on his individual claims.
- The district court held that Bank’s individual claims were moot after satisfaction and dismissed the action for lack of Article III standing to pursue class claims; Bank appealed.
- The Second Circuit reviewed de novo whether Article III jurisdiction remained once the individual claim was satisfied.
- The court concluded Bank lacked a live personal stake and therefore could not pursue the putative class claims; the district court’s judgment was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether entry of judgment satisfying Bank's individual claim under Rule 68 moots his case and eliminates Article III jurisdiction | Bank argued satisfaction of his individual judgment did not deprive court of jurisdiction over the class claims | Defendants argued the negotiated and entered judgment rendered Bank’s individual claim moot, leaving no Article III plaintiff to pursue class claims | Held: Entry of judgment and satisfaction of Bank’s individual claims mooted those claims; no Article III standing remained to pursue class claims |
| Whether unresolved class claims can independently sustain jurisdiction when the representative's individual claim is moot | Bank contended class claims should survive despite his individual claim being satisfied | Defendants contended that because Bank was the sole named representative and had no live claim, the entire action became moot | Held: Court declined to adopt a rule that unresolved class claims can alone sustain jurisdiction here; because Bank had no live claim or cognizable interest, he lacked standing |
| Whether a potential incentive award to a class representative supplies Article III standing | Bank argued he had a personal stake because he might receive an incentive award as class representative | Defendants argued such awards are discretionary, speculative, and thus not a concrete injury sufficient for standing | Held: Potential incentive awards are speculative and not sufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing |
| Whether doctrines (e.g., relation-back / prior certification) save the class action when representative's claim is mooted before certification | Bank suggested procedural or equitable doctrines might preserve class claims | Defendants argued no certification or relation-back linked Bank’s now-moot individual claim to any class claim | Held: No class certification decision or relation-back existed here; those exceptions do not apply and do not preserve jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (unaccepted offers do not moot claims; accepted/entered judgments that satisfy claims do)
- Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2015) (Article III standing analysis for mootness after offer/judgment)
- Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (certified class may obtain independent status for standing)
- Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (where representative’s individual claim is mooted prior to certification, entire action generally becomes moot)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013) (relation-back doctrine and class-certification timing can affect mootness analysis)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires concrete injury)
- W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2008) (interest in potential fee recovery insufficient alone for Article III standing)