Baaron, Inc. v. Davidson
2017 Ohio 7783
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Baaron, Inc. (TDP Contracting) appealed a trial-court award of attorney fees to Norma Davidson after this Court previously remanded for the trial court to explain its basis for the fee award.
- Parties agreed the trial court should decide fees on the evidence presented at a September 2013 fee hearing.
- Davidson submitted: (1) an undetailed bill from her original attorney for $3,049.04, (2) a fee agreement showing her second attorney’s $125 hourly rate, and (3) an itemized hours report from the second attorney totaling 77.3 hours; Davidson (a lay witness) testified the amounts were reasonable.
- The trial court found the second attorney’s hourly rate reasonable, multiplied 77.3 hours by $125, and awarded $9,662.50 in fees; it awarded nothing for the original attorney’s work.
- Baaron challenged the fee award as arbitrary and unsupported; this Court reviewed whether the trial court followed Ohio law on proving reasonable attorney fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly awarded attorney fees to Davidson | Davidson relied on the second attorney’s itemized hours and fee agreement and her testimony that fees were reasonable | Baaron argued the award was arbitrary and unsupported because there was insufficient proof of reasonableness (hours and rate) | Reversed: trial court abused its discretion because it failed to make the required factual finding on reasonable hours and the record lacked sufficient evidence (client testimony insufficient) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bittner v. Tri–County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143 (trial court must determine reasonable hours and rate; starting point is hours × rate)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (abuse-of-discretion standard defined)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (hours reasonably expended × reasonable hourly rate is the starting point for fee calculation)
- Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161 (appellate court may not substitute its judgment for trial court on discretionary matters)
