Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080

Background

Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death; his trial counsel presented only minimal mitigation (three short letters) at sentencing.
Postconviction (state habeas) counsel did not raise a trial-level ineffective-assistance claim about failure to investigate mental-health and substance-abuse mitigation; later Ayestas alleged those failures in federal habeas proceedings.
Ayestas moved under 18 U.S.C. §3599(f) for funds (~$20,016) for investigative and expert services to develop evidence that trial and state habeas counsel were ineffective (to overcome procedural default under Martinez/Trevino).
The District Court denied the funding request and the habeas petition as procedurally defaulted; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, applying a Fifth Circuit test requiring a showing of “substantial need” and a viable, non‑procedurally‑barred constitutional claim.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Fifth Circuit applied the correct legal standard for §3599(f) funding and whether the funding denial was judicially reviewable.

Issues

Issue	Ayestas' Argument	Davis' Argument	Held
1) Is denial of §3599(f) funding a judicial decision subject to appellate review?	Denial is a judicial ruling made in a habeas proceeding and therefore reviewable.	Funding orders may be administrative (ex parte, nonadversarial, potentially subject to AO oversight) and thus not reviewable under §1291/§1254.	Held judicial and reviewable: funding requests arise in adversarial habeas litigation and apply legal standards, so they are not mere administrative acts.
2) What standard governs §3599(f) funding: “reasonably necessary” (statute) or Fifth Circuit’s “substantial need”?	Statute requires that services be “reasonably necessary,” a lower standard than “substantial need”; district courts should assess whether a reasonable attorney would view the services as sufficiently important.	Fifth Circuit: applicants must show a substantial need and a viable, non‑procedurally‑barred constitutional claim.	Held that the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong, too‑restrictive standard; district courts must apply the statutory “reasonably necessary” standard with broad discretion.
3) May §3599(f) funding be denied solely because the underlying claim is procedurally defaulted?	No; after Martinez/Trevino, investigation might enable overcoming procedural default, so a procedurally defaulted claim can still justify funding if investigation has a credible chance to help.	Yes; funding may be denied when the constitutional claim is procedurally barred because services would be futile.	Held that categorical denial for procedural default is too restrictive; courts must consider whether funding could credibly enable overcoming default (but preserved alternative arguments for remand).
4) Is the alternative contention—that §2254(e)(2) always bars admission of evidence developed after state proceedings (so funding is never "reasonably necessary")—decided here?	Ayestas: §2254(e)(2) does not categorically bar funding; district court should assess on remand.	Davis: any post‑state investigation would be inadmissible under §2254(e)(2), so funding is unnecessary.	Court declined to resolve §2254(e)(2) issue and left it open for the Fifth Circuit on remand.

Key Cases Cited

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (permits federal review of substantial trial‑ineffective‑assistance claims when initial‑review collateral counsel was ineffective)
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extends Martinez equitable exception to Texas procedures)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (distinguishes judicial from administrative decisions for appellate review)
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) (addressing §3599 counsel appointment in clemency context and appellate review questions)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to investigate mitigation and how to evaluate strategic decisions)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (failure to investigate mitigation can be deficient performance)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (when counsel’s duty to investigate requires review of available records to find mitigation)