295 F. Supp. 3d 442
D.N.J.2018Background
- Carmen Contreras Aybar, a former U-1 visa holder, adjusted to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status after cooperating with law enforcement following a rape; she filed an I-929 petition to enable her son Dario (who was 20 when the I-929 was filed) to adjust to LPR.
- USCIS approved the I-929 but later revoked approval and denied Dario’s I-485 because Dario had turned 21 before adjudication, invoking 8 C.F.R. § 245.24(g)(2) (the “Age‑Out Rule”).
- The Age‑Out Rule requires the qualifying family relationship (here, parent–child) to continue through adjudication, meaning a beneficiary must remain a “child” (under 21) until final decision.
- Plaintiffs challenged the regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing it exceeded statutory authority (Chevron) and was arbitrary and capricious.
- The Court reviewed the agency record, applied Chevron deference, and granted defendants’ cross‑motion for summary judgment, upholding the Age‑Out Rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(3) precludes DHS from requiring a beneficiary to remain under 21 through adjudication (i.e., whether the Age‑Out Rule exceeds statutory authority) | §1255(m)(3) should be read to fix eligibility at the date the principal’s adjustment is approved, so child status should “freeze” at that earlier date | Statute authorizes adjustment only for a “child”; DHS reasonably construed the statute to require the qualifying relationship to continue through adjudication, consistent with INA practice | The Age‑Out Rule is consistent with §1255(m)(3); Chevron deference applies and the regulation is valid |
| Whether the Age‑Out Rule is arbitrary and capricious under the APA | The rule produces arbitrary, inequitable results (dependent on agency processing time) and fails reasoned decisionmaking | The rule follows statutory text, fits the broader INA framework, and is a reasonable policy choice within agency expertise | The rule is not arbitrary and capricious; agency explanation and rationale are adequate |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes two‑step deference framework for agency statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (addresses when agency interpretations warrant Chevron deference)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (sets forth arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA)
- Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (addresses child aging-out and limits of statutory protections)
- Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2005) (discusses deference to agency rulemaking under ambiguous statutory provisions)
- Si Min Cen v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2016) (statutory interpretation and Chevron analysis guidance)
- Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding denial where statutory eligibility was not met at adjudication)
- Louisiana Forestry Ass'n v. Secretary, 745 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizes deference where Congress is aware of agency practice and has not acted to change it)