Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111

Oklahoma voters approved SQ 755 in 2010 to prohibit courts from considering Sharia Law, contingent on certification by the State Election Board.
The amendment text instructs courts to rely on specified sources and prohibits looking to international or Sharia Law, targeting religious precepts of Islam.
The Attorney General prepared a revised ballot title explaining the effect, including exposure to Sharia Law and international law, which was approved for SQ 755.
Muneer Awad, CAIR-Oklahoma executive director, filed suit to block certification, alleging Establishment and Free Exercise Clause violations and resulting harms to Muslims.
The district court granted a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction barring certification of SQ 755.
The Tenth Circuit addressed standing, ripeness, and the district court’s use of a heightened standard for preliminary injunctions, affirming the injunction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing in Establishment Clause claim	Awad asserts personal, direct injury from disfavored treatment of his religion.	Appellants contend no imminent injury and lack of concrete traceable harm.	Awad has standing; injury is imminent and traceable.
Ripe and justiciable Establishment Clause challenge	Awad's facial challenge is ripe and justiciable prior to certification.	Challenges are premature or not ripe until the measure takes effect.	Claim is ripe and justiciable; review appropriate.
Appropriate Establishment Clause test	Larson test should apply due to explicit discrimination among religions.	Lemon or Larson may be applicable; need analysis.	Larson test applies; strict scrutiny governs religious discrimination.
Likelihood of success on merits under Larson	Amendment discriminates among religions and lacks a compelling interest or narrowly tailored means.	State has a compelling interest in applying law and neutral fashion toward religion.	Amendment fails strict scrutiny; Awad likely to prevail on merits.
Balance of harms and public interest under heightened standard	injunction necessary to prevent constitutional harm and protect rights.	Voters' will and interests in enforcement argue against injunction.	Harms and public-interest factors weigh in favor of preserving rights; injunction affirmed.

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (U.S. 1982) (discrimination among religions triggers strict scrutiny)
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (U.S. 1982) (standing requires personal injury beyond disagreement)
American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010) (standing where plaintiffs encounter government-sponsored religious symbols)
Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (U.S. 2011) (detailed articulation of compelling interest requirement under strict scrutiny)
Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008) (heightened scrutiny for discrimination among religions)
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 546 U.S. 418 (U.S. 2006) (en banc; federal interest in religious practice evaluation under strict scrutiny)
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007) (heightened standard for certain injunctions)