Ashraf Abdelmoneim Mahmoud v. Valerie Garcia Jackson
05-21-00302-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 16, 2022Background
- Jackson filed for a protective order alleging years of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse by her husband Mahmoud; she sought protection after a February 14, 2021 incident she described as a four‑hour sexual assault.
- At the April 6, 2021 bench hearing both parties testified; the trial court found family violence had occurred, was likely to occur again, and there were reasonable grounds to believe Jackson was a victim of sexual assault.
- The trial court ordered no contact with Jackson, restricted Mahmoud’s possession/access to their minor child, required Mahmoud to vacate the marital residence, attend a battering intervention program, parenting/education courses and counseling at the Center for Health and Sexuality, and awarded Jackson $4,186.00 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
- Mahmoud appealed, challenging legal and factual sufficiency of the family‑violence and sexual‑assault findings, several protective order conditions (including exclusion from the home and child‑access restrictions), and the attorney’s fees award.
- The court of appeals affirmed the protective order except it (1) deleted paragraph 20 prohibiting Mahmoud from “attending or going near the extracurricular activities of the child” as impermissibly vague, and (2) reduced the attorney’s fee award by $194.07 for insufficient proof supporting non‑attorney staff billing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jackson) | Defendant's Argument (Mahmoud) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that appellant committed family violence and that future violence is likely | Jackson asserted repeated physical, sexual, and emotional abuse over years, culminating in Feb. 14 assault, supporting finding and future‑risk inference | Mahmoud denied abuse, characterized sexual conduct as consensual "kinky" activity, and argued a single incident was insufficient or not severe enough | Affirmed: evidence legally and factually sufficient; past incidents plus Feb. 14 permit finding that future violence is likely |
| Whether there were reasonable grounds to believe victim of sexual assault under art. 7B | Jackson testified she was forced to have sex and physically assaulted when she refused | Mahmoud denied sexual assault and lack of force; argued absence of criminal conviction and specific proof | Affirmed: court may find reasonable grounds absent conviction; testimony provided more than a scintilla and not against great weight of evidence |
| Inclusion of minor child protections and paragraph barring attendance at extracurricular activities | Jackson sought child protection implicitly; court may protect family members once family violence found | Mahmoud argued Jackson did not request child be included and paragraph 20 is vague/unspecific for contempt enforcement | Partially affirmed: court may include child under §85.022; but paragraph 20 deleted as impermissibly vague for contempt enforcement |
| Requirements to attend battering intervention, counseling, and exclusion from marital residence | Jackson urged remedial measures to prevent future violence and protect victim | Mahmoud argued insufficient evidence to order these remedies absent family‑violence finding | Affirmed: §85.022 authorizes such remedial conditions; evidence supports exclusion and program/counseling orders |
| Attorney’s fees award reasonableness and evidentiary support | Jackson presented attorney declaration and itemized invoices showing hours, rates, and tasks | Mahmoud did not challenge fees at trial but argued fees unreasonable and insufficient proof for non‑attorney billing | Partially affirmed: overall fee award reasonable under Rohrmoos; reduced by $194.07 because record lacked required proof to support legal‑assistant billing |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (legal‑sufficiency standard for reviewing evidence)
- Lei Yang v. Yuzhuo Cao, 629 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021) (standards for reviewing sufficiency of protective order findings)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004) (definition of "more than a scintilla")
- Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) (factual‑sufficiency review principles)
- Four J’s Cmty. Living Ctr., Inc. v. Wagner, 630 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021) (setting aside verdict when appellant lacked burden)
- Teel v. Shifflett, 309 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (past violent conduct as evidence of future risk)
- Boyd v. Palmore, 425 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (likelihood finding may rest on past acts)
- Martin v. Martin, 545 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017) (single incident can support future‑risk finding, especially when defendant denies it)
- McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1986) (factfinder may disbelieve testimony; credibility determinations)
- Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1997) (contempt requires decree terms to be clear, specific, and unambiguous)
- Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019) (attorney‑fee proof requirements for reasonable fee awards)
- El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) (lodestar and fee‑proof elements)
- Land v. Land, 561 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018) (proof required to recover fees for non‑attorney staff)