Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway

COMPANY, FORD MOTOR Ridgway.

Jack RIDGWAY Linda No. 02-0552. Supreme Court of Texas.

Arguеd Sept. 2003. Decided Feb. 2004. Rehearing Denied June Torres, Hughes, E. Cheryl

Tina Robert P.C., Torres, Jr., San of Peter Law Office Antonio, Respondent. for Strasburger & Worthington, A.

William Houston, Price, for Amicus Curiae. delivered the PHILLIPS Chief Justice opinion of the Court. decide whether the evidence

We must response by plaintiffs offered 166a(i) summary judg- defendant’s Rule created a issue ment motion manufacturing material fact product caused in the defendant’s injuries. ‍‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍we hold that plaintiffs Because holding erred the court sufficient, we reverse the evidence was appeals, the court of judgment of judgment that the and render nothing. take

I injuries Ridgway

Jack serious sustained pick-up Ford F-150 two-year-old when his driving. he caught truck fire while was the truck’s third owner. approximately the truck first owner drove 7,000 spotlight and installed a on miles part pillar, “A” which is the front front left frame. The second owner of the door 47,000 approximately the truck drove four repaired had the truck miles and Ford dealer- at the Red McCombs times (“Red McCombs”). Antonio ship San clunking to fix a repair attempted Each during hard turns. noise that occurred also involved the repairs Three of the four attempted improve fuel poor gas mileage. truck’s month before one drove truck fire, repairs or modifica- making no tions. Ridgway was

The fire occurred when county paved on a Eady, driving home from work Blackerby, A. Michael W. Chris McCarroll, at or Kuhn, County. Driving in Bandera road Kurt Hоward Brown limit, looked into the L.L.P., Austin, speed for Petitioner. below curl- A rear-view mirror and noticed flames defect exists deviates, of the truck. Be- when a in its construc ing up around the cab truck, Ridg- quality, specifications tion from the jump fore he could out way second-degree planned output sustained burns to 20 a manner renders it percent bоdy. unreasonably dangerous. Torrington of his Co. (Tex. Stutzman, v. Ridgway and his wife Linda sued Red Grinnell, 2000); Am. v. Tobacco Co. Ford, alleging products McCombs and lia- (Tex.1997). A S.W.2d implied bility, express breach of and war- prove must that the was defective ranties, Deceptive violations of the Texas the of the left hands manufacturer Act, Af- negligence. Trade Practices and producing and that the defect was a cause summary for ter both defendants moved plaintiffs injuries. Torrington of the judgment, Ridgways the nonsuited Red at 844. McCombs, leaving only negligence their products liability against and strict claims In attempt an to defeat Ford’s mo adequate discovery, Ford. After time for tion, Ridgways affidavits presented the summary judgment Ford moved for under all truck’s and from three of the owners 166a(i) alternatively Rule and under Rule Greenlees, expert from Bill who in 166a(c). granted summary The trial court spected the truck after the accident. The judgment specifying pro- on which they explained owners when and where appeal, vision it relied. On a divided court truck, purchased many thеy the how miles judg- of affirmed the trial court’s it, any repairs drove modifications or plaintiffs’ negligence ment on claim but addition, they made. de grant- products liability. reversed on fire, scribed when he first noticed the how petition ed Ford’s to determine review reacted, injuries and the he sustained. Ridgways presented whether explained opin exрert Greenlees his than a of of scintilla evidence inspection ion was based on his visual their claim. accident, truck a visual com after the truck, undamaged

parison of a similar but II manuals, and a review of Ford service Highway trial of the Traffic We first review the court’s review National database. Based summary judgment Safety under the standаrds Administration’s 166a(i). non-movants, damage to the greatest Rule here the on the areas of spot of a “hot plaintiffs, produce summary judg must truck and an indication engine compart of the raising genuine ment evidence issue of the left center area ment,” that the fire summary judg Greenlees concluded material fact to defeat enginе compartment originated Tex.R. P. within the provision. ment under that Civ. 166a(i). that “a malfunction of elec opined A issue of material fact compartment system engine of evidence trical exists if more than scintilla this accident.” suspected having of the chal establishing the existence however, Greenlees, declined to eliminate lеnged produced. Morgan element is (Tex.2000). possible as a portions all of the fuel Anthony, 27 S.W.3d of the accident and conceded If fail ‍‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍more than a cause produce burden, not been “the actual cause of the fire has scintilla of evidence under Although Greenlees analyze yet.” determine [sic] then there is no need to whеther 166a(c) investigation might suggested that further the Rule bur Ford’s satisfied conclusion, particu- yield a more definitive den. disassembled, produced no direct larly if vehicle were cause, cir fire’s and their evidence Ridgways made no motion for further test- evidence cumstantial ing complain and did not the trial F-150 when it in the Ford defect existed adequate court failed to allow time for or exceed a manufacturer does not left the scope discovery.1 sufficient affidavit establishes Ridgway’s scintilla. determining if more than a When occurred, and Greenlees only that a fire produced scintilla of evidence has been “suspects” than that he say could no more 166a(i) responsе to a Rule motion for sum Be system caused the fire. the electrical mary the evidence must be judgment, part rule out could not Greenlees light viewed the most favorable possible as a the fuel non-movant. Johnson v. Brewer & Pritch a proof is no that identified because there (Tex.2002). ard, P.C., 193, 73 208 S.W.3d truck at the time it left the defect the repeatеdly have held that more than a manufacturer, affidavit is not Greenlees’ scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence a fact sufficient to raise issue. “rises to a level that would enable reason Ridgways argue that this The people able and fair-minded to differ sec proof is nevertheless sufficient under Pharm., their conclusions.” Merrell Dоw Torts, Third tion 3 of the Restatement (Tex. Havner, 706, Inc. v. 953 S.W.2d 711 provides: which 1997); Burroughs Crye, Wellcome Co. the harm sus- may be inferred that 497, (Tex.1995); Transp. 499 907 S.W.2d a tained the was (Tex. Moriel, 10, Ins. Co. v. 879 25 S.W.2d at the time of existing defect 1994). hand, On the other the “[w]hen distribution, proof of a sale or evidence offered to a fact is so prove vital defect, specific when the incident that

weak as to do no more than a mere create plaintiff: harmed the existence, suspicion surmise or of its was of the kind and, no evidence is more than a scintilla defect; occurs a result of a as effect, legal is no evidence.” Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d not, case, in the particular than the solely result of causes other existing at the time of product defect

Both direct and circumstantial sale distribution. may any evidence used establish Lozano, material fact. Lozano v. Products Restatement of Torts: (Tex.2001); Brouming- (1998). No Texas court has Liability '3 Fems, Reyna, Inc. v. 865 S.W.2d section, this and we do not ever cited (Tex.1993). genuine To a raise issue of it today decide whether reflects the law fact, however, material the evidence must §if law in this state. Even 3 were the suspicion. Texas, transcend mere Evidence that generally apply would any so a slight products. prod- is as make inference almost new Such new or guess legal is in effect no evidence. Loza modified ‍‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍or typically ucts have been no, 148; a dе- Browning-Ferris, repaired, making 52 S.W.3d at therefore Inc., likely at cause of an accident. fect , attorney suggested argument, Ridgways’ inspection 1. Greenlees’ affidavit stated: "The perform subject inspection could not destructive Ford was a visual Greenlees severely disassembly testing because it was only. nor alterations have on the vеhicle No damaged. performed oral been as of this time.” if drafters of the Restatement realized this not decide it is an accurate statement of limitation and noted: “The inference of Texas law. defect not be drawn ... from the Ill product-related

mere fact of a acci- case, this Under the circumstances of product may dent. ... Evidence that the Ridgways’ summary judgment proof improperly have been used or was altered no that a more than scintilla of evidence by repair people weakens the inference defect was Id. at [that defect].” there was There- the truck left the manufacturer. (citations reporters’ notes to cmt. d omit- fоre, have not met their ted). reporters’ provide notes also showing burden of issue of prod- examples several illustrate when regarding fact a manufac- material exists uct cannot be inferred without turing accordingly defect. We reverse specific product’s of a defect because of the judgment court of and ren- agе presence or the modifications judgment that the take noth- der repairs. Compare Penney v. J.C. Woodin ing. 974, 976- Pa.Super. 629 A.2d (recognizing product 77 a de- concurring Justice HECHT filed a in fect cannot be inferred a freezer cord joined. in opinion, which Justice OWEN flawlessly eight it functioned when fire), years catching before and Walker v. HECHT, joined by Justice Justice (1st Co., 116, Elec. 968 F.2d 120 Gen. OWEN, concurring. Cir.1992) (holding fact that a that mere join opinion I in and write the Court’s six-year-old caught toaster oven fire does only explain that while Texas law would support not an inference that a manufac- liability by circum- proof products allow exists), Waller, v. turing defect with Dietz cases,1 the stantial evidence in cеrtain (1984) 744, 141 Ariz. 685 P.2d 748 Re- black-letter rule of section 3 (stating that a boat that broke in half after Lia- statement of Torts: Products to an gives ten hours use rise bility accurately does not restate Texas defect). inference of a law. 3, they courts have cited section

When Section 3 states: have also noted this limitation on the Re- In- Supporting Evidence Circumstantial operation. statement’s See Jarvis v. Ford ference of Product Defect (2nd Cir.2002) Co., Motor 283 F.3d may that the harm sus- be inferred (applying a New York law similar to sec- by a plaintiff tained was caused proving a tion 3 to excuse from existing defect at the time of product defect, inferring specific instead a defect distribution, рroof of a sale or six-day-old vehicle did from defect, the incident that specific intended); Myrlak as v. Port perform plaintiff: harmed the Auth., 84, 723 A.2d 157 N.J. ordinarily a kind that oc- was of involving in a case (adopting section 3 defect; and product curs as a result of chair). Therefore, collapsed five-week-old not, case, particular section 3 is not we reiterate that because case, other than solely the result of causes applicable to the facts of this we need Co., See, Corp. Hopkins, Darryl Motor 440 S.W.2d 630 e.g., Motors v. Ford General (Tex. ‍‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍1977), Con/Chem, 1969); oth 548 S.W.2d 344 overruled on see also Kindred v. Corp., grounds er Turner v. Gen. Motors Inc., (Tex.1983) (citing 650 S.W.2d (Tex.1979) and Duncan v. 584 S.W.2d Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d (1984); Cessna Aircrаft may really inferred” means “it is product existing defect at the time of “It infer”, proper to but while this sometimes sale distribution.2 reading makes the rule stated section 3 “It be inferred” cannot mean “it is accurate, very it also makes the rule not infer”, always proper as the question the use of helpful. Few would 3(a) requires case demonstrates. Sеction prove products circumstantial evidence to only that injury-causing incident be the liability in hard appropriate cases. The thing ordinarily kind of results from a done, it issue is not whether can be but defect, not that the incident is the to section when and how. The comments thing ordinarily kind of does not re- of it 3 and the cases cited A pickup sult unless there is a defect. courts illustrate the kinds considerations suddenly bursting into flame for no discer- deciding have taken into account in wheth- nible reason is the kind of that ordi- thing pre-sale er to an inference of defect allow narily occurs as a result of product, in a these considerations are but in the sense that do defects the in rule not reflected the black-letter things. such Thus has satisfied explain itself. One looks to comments 3(a), though section even true is also rule; one does not look to comments to fires vehicles occur for find the rule. many reasons other than defect.3 3 is modeled on section 328D of Section 3(b), As for although Ridgway section can- (Second) Torts,4 the Restatement which not conclusively negate that the fire was states: solely by something other than a Res defect, Ipsa Loquitur Ford cannot point anything as Therefore, the sole cause of the fire. be inferred that harm suf- Ridgway argues, by plaintiff by negli- section him fered is caused 3 entitles to gence an that of the defendant when pickuр inference his was defective and the further inference that the defect the event is of a kind which ordi- existed when Ford pickup. narily sold the not of does occur the absence rejects Ridgway’s argument, Court not negligence; be- rule, cause of (b) the text of the but because causes, including responsible other comment repоrter’s d to section of the conduct and third notes, allowing proof products and cases persons, sufficiently are eliminated evidence; liability by circumstantial evidence limit and words, (c) stated rule. other the sec- negligence the indicated is within tion 3 rule much ap- means less than it scope duty of the defendant’s pears say. plaintiff.5 (Third) (lаst loads/pdl/tfrs/v2i4.pdf 2. Restatement of Torts: Products Lia- visited Feb. (1998). bility '3 Proceedings Meeting: at 72nd Annual Administration, Highway 3. See Ve- U.S. Fire Institute, Law 72 A.L.I. Proc. American Fires, Topical hicle Fire Research Series Henderson, (1996) (remarks of James A. 2002) (July (report- No. 4 revised Mar. introducing Reporter, Restatement ing highway vehicle fires are due 66% (Tentative Liability § Torts: Products Draft design problems mechanical or to incen- 18% 2, 1995)) ("Section quite 3 is derived No. misuse, diary suspicious origins, 8% 4% Restatement, faithfully § from 328D of the operational deficiency, and to other 3% Second, Torts.”). construction, design, and installation deficien- cies), (Second) § available at of Torts 328D 5. Restatement (1965). http://www.usfa.fema.gov/down- and a reasonаble inference provisions in the two But the differences party. possi- analogue negligent he was the are such that section 3 is not causes does not have to be bility rather a kind of res of other of section 328D but 3(a) eliminated, likeli- completely B and are less but their ipsa lite! Sections jury in sec- reduced that the parallel provisions strict than the hood must so 328D(l)(a) (b), by preponderance in a reasonably tions and at least case can find if negligence, one. It cannot be said like the of the evidence ordinarily not oc- pickups any, that fires do at door.8 lies the defendant’s defect; they cur absent a ordinari- loquitur allows an ipsa The rule of res all оf reasons.6 Nor has ly occur for sorts absent direct negligence, inference of ex- “eliminated evidence” the injury ordinarily proof, only when would responsible istence of other causes negligence, not have occurred but has say most can is that Ford fire. The negligence probable. defendant’s is He no evidence of аnother cause. offered that, circum- given has not shown an inference There is no reason to allow stances, impossible cause was freely another than products liability any If were as improbable. even section 3 An inference negligence. an inference of - 328D, Ridgway’s strictly worded as section liability really is two infer- produсts clearly fail. defective, claim would ences: that the time of sale. that the defect existed at the at ipsa loquitur Texas law of res least ipsa principle underlying res Applying the require the as strict as section 328D. We inference can be drawn loquitur, neither 328D(l)(a), first condition stated section injury evidence that the would condition stаted and instead of the second have occurred absent 328D(l)(b), require that the in section we probably that that defect exist- defect and harm have been instrumentality causing is not was sold. This ed when management and under the defendant’s says. what section control.7 explained have requirement rigid is not the “control” instrumentality must have

rule that the рosses- always been the defendant’s that it must have been sion or even time of the control at the the defendant’s if the defendant injury. is sufficient negli- at the time that the control factor from the first gence inferable occurred, so that the reason- probably defendant probabilities point to the able under the injury is shown to have been nоte 3. 6. See infra defendant.”) ‍‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍management and control of the Bell, (citing Mobil Chem. Co. v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 7. Haddock v. (Tex.1974) Oil Co. v. and Marathon (Tex. 1990) ("Res ipsa loquitur applicable 1982)). Sterner, (1) present: two factors are is such that it would character of the accident (cita- S.W.2d at 251 negli 8.Mobil Chem. absence of occur in the omitted). instrumentality causing tions gence; and

Case Details

Case Name: Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway

Court Name: Texas Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 6, 2004

Citation: 135 S.W.3d 598

Docket Number: 02-0552

Court Abbreviation: Tex.