Ashley Nettles v. Midland Funding, LLC, 983 F.3d 896

Nettles defaulted on a Credit One credit card; the cardholder agreement (which she accepted by use) contained a bilateral arbitration clause covering disputes related to the account, including collection matters.
Credit One charged off the account; the debt passed through several purchasers and ended up with Midland Funding LLC, which sued Nettles in Michigan state court.
The parties entered a consent judgment requiring $50 monthly automatic withdrawals; withdrawals stopped after three months when the law firm collecting for Midland dissolved, leaving an outstanding balance of $539.37.
Midland Credit Management (a Midland affiliate) sent Nettles a collection letter stating the balance as $643.59—about $104 more than the actual balance.
Nettles sued under the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f), seeking damages and class certification; Midland moved to compel arbitration under the card agreement. The district court denied the motion, and Midland appealed under the FAA.
The Seventh Circuit concluded Nettles lacked Article III standing because she did not allege any concrete or imminent injury from the allegedly false collection letter, vacated the denial of arbitration, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nettles has Article III standing to bring FDCPA claims based solely on receipt of an overstating collection letter	Receipt of a noncompliant collection letter (overstated balance) is a concrete injury sufficient to sue under the FDCPA	The complaint alleges only statutory violations without any concrete or particularized harm or appreciable risk of harm	No standing: plaintiff did not allege a concrete injury; case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether the arbitration clause covers Nettles’s FDCPA claim and whether arbitration should be compelled	The arbitration clause in the Credit One agreement is broad and covers disputes relating to the account, including collection matters	The district court said the claim related to the consent judgment and not the account, so it was outside the clause	Court did not reach merits of arbitrability; vacated denial of motion to compel and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (standing)

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury even for statutory violations)
Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc., 926 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) (FDCPA plaintiff must allege a concrete injury; statutory violation alone insufficient)
Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020) (procedural vs. substantive characterization does not eliminate the Article III injury requirement)
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (standing is jurisdictional and cannot be waived)
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Nicholson, 536 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite)
Hennessy Indus. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014) (FAA permits immediate appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration)
Macy v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, 897 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2018) (contrasting authority holding statutory violation alone suffices for standing under §1692g)