Case Information
*1 Before S YKES B ARRETT Circuit Judges D URKIN , District Judge . [*]
B ARRETT Circuit Judge
. bo om line our opinion succinctly stated: no harm, no foul. Madison Avenue Asso ciates, Inc. made mistake. Debt Collection Practices requires collectors notify consumers about ‐ process statute provides for verifying a debt. Madison sent Paula Casillas a debt collection le tt er described process, but neglected to specify to communi ‐ cate writing to trigger protections. Casillas no ‐ ticed omission fi led a class action against Madison. only harm Casillas claimed to ered, however, receipt of an incomplete le tt er—and insu ffi cient establish federal jurisdiction. As Supreme emphasized Spokeo, Inc. Robins Casillas cannot claim “a bare procedural violation, divorced con crete harm, satisfy fact requirement Arti cle III.” S. Ct. (2016). Article III grants federal courts power redress harms defendants cause s, a freewheeling power hold defendants ac countable legal infractions. Because Madison’s violation statute Casillas, there no a fed eral court redress.
I.
Paula allegedly owed debt Harvester Finan cial Credit Union. Presumably acting agent credit union, Madison Avenue Associates, Inc. sent le tt er demanding payment. Debt Collection Practices requires debt collector give wri en notice consumer within fi ve days its initial communication. U.S.C. § 1692g(a). That notice must include, among other things, description two mechanisms debtor can use ver ify debt. First, consumer notify debt collector “in writing” disputes all part debt, obli gates collector obtain veri cation debt mail copy debtor. 1692g(a)(4). A failure dispute the debt within days means the debt collector will as sume the debt valid. Id. § 1692g(a)(3). Second, a con sumer make a “wri tt en request” the debt collector provide her with name and address of original credi tor, debt collector must do if a di erent creditor currently holds debt. Id. § 1692g(a)(5). Madison’s notice conveyed all of information, except neglected specify Casillas’s noti fi cation or request under those pro visions must writing .
Casillas fi led a class action against Madison because of omission. She tried—or even planned try—to dispute debt or verify Harvester Financial Credit Union actually creditor. renders debt collector liable for “fail[ing] comply with provision of [the Act],” id. § 1692k(a), and neglecting notify Casillas of writing requirement, Madison failed comply with provision of That, alleged, “constitute[d] material/concrete breach rights [Act].” She sought recover $1000 statutory penalty for herself $5000 penalty for unnamed class members, along tt orneys’ fees costs. § 1692k(a)(2)(A)–(B). The parties eventually entered joint motion class certi cation preliminary approval class se lement.
17 ‐ 3162 While motion pending, we decided Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. , (7th 2017). There, fol lowing Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo , held plainti ff cannot satisfy injury ‐ in ‐ fact element of standing simply by alleging defendant violated disclosure provision consumer protection statute. 887. dis trict court Groshek required dismiss Casillas’s complaint. had not alleged Madison’s omission ected her way. And absent an allegation Madi son’s violation caused harm or put an appre ciable harm, district court said, lacked standing sue.
II. elements are well se tt led: ff
must an injury fact is traceable defendant’s conduct and redressable favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders Wildlife U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). These requirements are rooted Article III, which limits federal court’s authority resolution “Cases” or “Controver sies.” U.S. C ONST . art. III, If does claim ered defendant caused and court remedy, there no case or controversy fed eral court resolve.
Casillas’s appeal involves fact requirement, which Supreme described “[f]irst foremost” element standing. Steel Co. Citizens Be tt er Environment U.S. (1998). An “injury fact” “an invasion legally protected interest (a) particularized (b) actual or imminent, conjectural hypothetical.” Lujan (citations quota tion marks omi ed). An need tangible 17 3162 5 “concrete,” but must be “‘real,’ ‘abstract.’” Spokeo , S. Ct. at 1548. question here whether Casillas has ered—or faced a real risk su er ‐ ing—a concrete harm.
A.
We begin by emphasizing a basic point: fact Con ‐ gress has authorized a plainti ff to sue a debt collector who “fails comply any requirement [of Debt Col lection Practices Act],” U.S.C. 1692k(a), does mean Casillas has standing. See Spokeo S. Ct. (“Con gress’ role identifying elevating intangible harms does mean ff automatically satis fi es fact requirement whenever statute grants person statu tory right purports authorize person sue vin dicate right.”). Congress has power de fi ne intangi ble harms legal injuries which seek relief, see Lujan has sought exercise power by enabling debtors hold collectors liable statutory violations. Congress must operate within con nes Article III, “requires even context violation.” Spokeo S. Ct. Thus, Casillas cannot demonstrate standing simply pointing Madison’s procedural violation. She must show violation harmed “presented ‘appreciable harm’ to underlying interest that Congress sought protect.” Groshek (citation omi ed). Debt Collection Practices seeks protect debtors “the use abusive, deceptive, unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” U.S.C. 1692(a). Section 1692g serves end by giving debtors way dispute or verify their supposed debts. And obli gating creditors tell debtors how do that, subsections (a)(4) (5) reduce risk that debtors will inadvertently lose protections given those who observe statutory requirements.
Casillas did not allege that Madison’s actions harmed or posed any real risk harm her interests She did not allege that she tried dispute or verify her orally therefore lost or risked losing statutory protections. Indeed, she did she ever even considered con tacting Madison she had any doubt about whether she owed Harvester Financial Credit Union stated amount money. She complained only notice was missing some she suggest she would ever have used. Any risk harm was entirely counterfactual: she was losing rights because there was no prospect she would have tried exercise them. Because Madison’s mistake didn’t put Casillas harm’s way, nothing more than “bare procedural vi olation.” Spokeo S. Ct. had no more use notice than she would had directions accom panying product no plans assemble. insists su ered same kind ffi cient confer Robertson Allied ‐ Solutions (7th 2018) . There, prospective em ployer violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s requirement that it provide the plainti ff copy her background check before revoked her o er employment. Id. at 693. We that the plainti ff satis fi ed the injury in ‐ fact require ment even though she had not alleged that the report was in accurate or that she could have persuaded defendant hire her if she had received it. Id. at 697. says that she ered an in fact even though she did not that she would have disputed veri fi ed if notice had been complete. plainti ff Robertson alleged defendant only violated statute but also harmed
interest statute protected. The Credit Reporting required prospective employer give applicant copy background report before took an adverse action so she would have opportunity review respond information report. If there were inaccuracies, she could identify them; if negative was accurate, could try put bad facts er light. Id. 696– 97. plainti ff employer took oppor tunity her: “[b]y withholding her background report … [the employer] limited ability review basis adverse employment decision impeded opportunity respond.” Id. 695. holding allegation satis fi ed fact requirement, emphasized “Article III’s strictures are met only when ff complains being deprived some bene fi t, but also when ff complains deprived chance obtain bene t.” plain ti Robertson made just complaint. She allege could have retained job o er if she had ac ‐ cess background report. Her lost opportunity to try to change defendant’s opinion her ffi ciently con ‐ crete confer standing. did not comparable lost opportunity.
Nor could she. Unlike Fair Credit Reporting Act, pro ‐ visions Fair Debt Collection Practices Madison violated do not protect consumer’s interest having an op portunity review respond substantive information. See id. (“An informational when plainti ff is entitled receive review substantive infor mation.” (emphasis added)). They instead protect con sumer’s interest knowing her statutory rights. And Rob ertson we expressly distinguished defendant’s obligation provide substantive its obligation give notice rights. There, prospective employer had not only failed provide plainti ff with back ground report; it had also failed provide her with wri tt en summary her rights Credit Reporting See id. We didn’t need resolve whether ff would have had if la tt er were only com plaint—so we didn’t. we observed “[t]he problem argument describes only procedural jury. [The ] not indicate how, if procedures properly been followed, might have persuaded [the employer] hire her. With without wri en notice rights, [she] would have become [] employee.” 694–95. So too here: receiving complete notice would have changed anything Casillas.
Casillas’s case like Robertson. Instead, district court recognized, like those procedural injuries consumer protection statutes are insu ffi ciently confer standing. In Groshek ex ‐ ample, the plainti ff sued prospective employer violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act. F.3d at 886. defendant had complied with the disclosing that it would obtain credit report on the applicant. it violated the Act’s “stand alone” requirement: the statute mandated that the dis ‐ closure appear on its own page, defendant had ‐ cluded other information along it. Id. 885–86. We said that plainti ff had nothing more than bare proce ‐ dural violation. Id. He hadn’t claimed that im proper format had caused him misunderstand disclo sure, he hadn’t asserted he would withheld consent if had been presented correctly, he hadn’t said he was unaware prospective employer would obtain credit report on him. Id. Instead, he had “al leged violation completely removed from any con crete appreciable risk harm.” Id. Under Spokeo we explained, was enough satisfy Article III. ; see also Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant De Pere, LLC, F.3d (7th 2016) (holding defendant’s failure truncate expiration date from plainti ff ’s credit card receipt did put material credit card fraud because he only one who ever saw receipt). Simi larly here, did even read dis closure, much less relied detriment.
Casillas’s best case Sixth Circuit, sees things di erently than do. Macy GC Services Limited Partnership defendant violated very same require ments Madison here: failed notify s they dispute their debts writing trigger protections Debt Collection Practices ‐ 3162 747, (6th Cir. 2018). Like Casillas, the plainti ff s did not al lege that they tried or had intention trying to contact the debt collector verify the debt. Id. Instead, they claimed not knowing about writing requirement “could lead least ‐ sophisticated consumer waive oth erwise not properly vindicate rights [Act].” Id. Sixth Circuit plainti ff s a because “[w]ithout about writ ing requirement, Plainti ff s were placed materially greater risk falling victim ‘abusive debt collection practices.’” (quoting U.S.C. 1692(e)).
We disagree. It is certainly true omission put those consumers who sought dispute debt risk waiving rights. But created no risk for plainti ff s case, who not try (and, ma er, expressed no plans try) dispute debt. It is enough omission risked harming someone —it must have risked harm s . As Supreme explained, “the ‘injury fact’ test requires more than cognizable interest. It requires party seeking review himself among injured.” Sierra Club v. Morton 727, 734–35 (1972). Be cause Macy didn’t require s themselves, it is inconsistent with Groshek and Meyers mention Spokeo itself. We decline follow it. also seeks help from Second Circuit, but the case she cites distinguishable. Strubel Comenity Bank plainti ff sued a bank because it provided, she signed, a credit card agreement allegedly omi tt ed several disclosures required by Truth in Lending (2d Cir. 2016). highlights one omission in particular: bank’s failure notify plainti ff “a con sumer dissatis ed with a credit card purchase must contact creditor in writing electronically.” Sec ond Circuit said consumer has interest in “avoid[ing] uninformed use credit,” id. (quoting U.S.C. 1601(a)); thus, failing notify consumer her obligations before she began exercising credit created serious she would “unwi ingly [] lose very credit rights law ords” her, id. court ff ffi ciently an in fact.
There some facial similarity between omission Strubel one Casillas’s case: both disclosures ne glected tell consumer must exercise rights writing. Second Circuit explained, disclosure Strubel supposed come beginning open ended credit relationship between bank; explained how could protect rights respect transactions that she would undertake during that rela tionship. Id. at 190–91. The faulty disclosure thus put plainti ff at some risk, because subsequent transaction might be unsatisfactory, thereby triggering her obligation object writing.
We don’t o ff er an opinion Second Circuit’s conclu sion that risk harm that plainti ff was substantial enough concrete. For present purposes, su ffi cient note that Strubel materially di ff erent this case. When plainti ff Strubel received incomplete notice, she did not yet know whether she would ever object credit card purchase. When Casillas received incomplete notice, she already knew that she would not dispute her debt. In other words, unlike Casillas, plainti ff Strubel alleged least possibility that omission would hurt her.
B. back up argument. She claims doesn’t
ma er whether she material risk harm veri cation rights because she su ff ered another kind harm was ffi ciently concrete: “informational 13 jury.” According Casillas, both Supreme Court’s prece dent ours hold deprivation of information itself harm. Thus, she says, she need anything more—for example, she lost was at of losing rights because she communicated orally Madison. As sees it, simply because Madison failed provide all information required 1692g(a)(4) (5); being deprived information itself injury. misunderstands relevant precedent.
The seminal cases addressing “informational injury” are Federal Election Commission v. Akins , U.S. (1998), Public Citizen U.S. Department Justice U.S. (1989). In Akins group voters sued compel political organi zation disclose information voters believed Federal Election Campaign required organization provide. U.S. 15–16. Court held those voters fact ffi cient confer standing— namely, “their inability obtain … that, [the voters’] view law, statute requires [the political organization] make public.” 21. Public Citizen ff sought disclosure consultations between president American Bar Association regarding poten tial judicial nominees. When Department Justice re fused provide information, sued vi olating Federal Advisory Commi ee those seeking disclosure 17 ‐ 3162 law, like those seeking disclosure under Freedom of Infor ‐ mation Act, need to show nothing more “than they sought and were denied speci c agency records.” Id. at 449. treats Akins and Public Citizen as if they se tt le ma tt er of own standing. those cases hold de nial of information subject to public disclosure one of intan gible harms Congress has power make legally cog nizable. See Spokeo , S. Ct. at (discussing “Congress’ role identifying elevating intangible harms”). Public disclosure laws—sometimes called “sunshine laws”—protect public’s interest evaluating ma ers of concern political community. And denying a request information a sunshine law necessarily implicates interest. In Akins , denial “directly related voting, most basic of political rights.” U.S. at 24–25. In Public Citizen , denial hampered ff s’ ability “participate more e ff ec tively judicial selection process.” 449.
Casillas, course, did not sought was denied information pursuant sunshine law. Indeed, seek all. See id. (explaining plain ti who “is seeking compel [the defendant] provide him information” has su ered kind concrete Akins Public Citizen recognize). Debt Collection Practices Act protects an entirely di ff erent interest, as have already said, Casillas alleged no material of harm that interest. Moreover, while plainti ff s in public disclosure cases alleged that respective defendants “impaired [their] ability use [the information] for sub stantive purpose that statute envisioned,” Robertson , at Casillas she would used information all.
Casillas’s last line defense Havens Realty Corp. Cole man (1982), which she claims stands prop osition plainti ff ers concrete “informational jury” time defendant violates statutory disclosure re quirement. There, plainti who was black, sued de fendant after falsely told her an apartment complex had no vacancies. ff had no intention actually renting an apartment; she had requested information because she suspected defendant was engaged unlawful racial steering practices. Id. 368–69. she Fair Housing Act, which “conferred on all ‘persons’ legal right truthful infor mation.” says Fair Debt Collection Practices Act likewise conferred all debtors right complete information about their rights. And Havens Realty says, enough claim was deprived information she was legally entitled—even if wouldn’t use it. bare harm receiving inaccurate incomplete harm Havens Realty
alleged. She claimed being lied because race. That invasion very interest Housing protects: freedom racial discrimination 17 ‐ 3162 the pursuit of housing. Id. Indeed, the statute itself does prohibit all misrepresentations about housing availability, but only those made “because race” some other pro tected characteristic. U.S.C. § 3604(d). In holding ff could proceed without showing any additional harm, recognized this kind racial discrimination as an intangible injury Congress has authority to identify as legally cognizable. That is obviously neither claimed nor one Fair Debt Collec tion Practices Act protects against.
C.
In sum, alleged nothing more than bare proce dural violation Fair Debt Collection Practices That is insu ffi cient purposes Article III. See Spokeo , S. Ct. 17 . And while she asks she given opportunity fi le an amended complaint on remand if we fi nd jurisdic tion lacking, she has not indicated—either here or dis trict court—what facts she would cure jurisdic tional defect. district court denied her request leave fi le amended complaint, it was right do so. See Gon zalez Koeneke v. West F.3d 801, (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] district court does abuse its discretion denying mo tion leave amend when ff fails establish proposed amendment would cure de fi ciencies identi ed earlier complaint.”).
III.
Finally, note has forfeited her separate claim incomplete disclosure violated Act’s prohi bition “unfair unconscionable means collect or tempt collect any debt.” U.S.C. § 1692f. Although her complaint presented violation separate claim, was substantively identical § 1692g claim. On appeal, has challenged district court’s dismissal 1692f claim, so forfeited challenge it. See Sansone Brennan (7th 2019).
* * * caught defendant mistake, but
one hurt her. district court’s judgment AFFIRMED. 3162
W OOD , Chief Judge , with whom R OVNER H AMILTON , Circuit Judges , join, dissenting denial en banc con ‐ sideration. From 10,000 feet above ground, decision in this case Paula lacks standing pursue claim under Debt Collection Practices (“the Act”) against debt collection fi rm Madison Avenue As ‐ sociates seems sensible enough. Article III demands in ‐ fact, causal link, redressability, Lujan v. Defenders Wildlife 555, 560–61 (1992). As our panel sees this case, founders on rst criterion: actual injury. But plot thickens when look more particularly vio lation asserted: Madison’s failure warn her, as required by U.S.C. 1692g, dispute over debt request about original creditor is ine ective unless it made writing . panel regards omission “bare procedural injury” thus one support Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins S. Ct. (2016). so concluding, this court created con fl ict with Sixth Circuit, otherwise Macy GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship (6th 2018), materially indistin guishable facts.
Recognizing was opening up this rift, panel cir culated its opinion all judges Seventh Circuit reg ular active service pursuant Local Rule 40(e); question whether important enough issue warrant ple nary consideration en banc court. A majority my col leagues answered question negative, thereby signaling their approval panel’s decision. I respectfully disagree assessment. panel’s opinion will make much more di ffi cult consumers enforce protec tions against abusive collection practices Congress conferred That alone troublesome. what ‐ troubles me even more is light this case shines on need for a clear test in this circuit distinguish between statutory protections create, on one hand, “bare procedural injury” does not support standing, and, on other hand, protections for type concrete, particu larized, actual or imminent injury meet Article III standards. In my view, rejection standing in case before us is not so self ‐ evident we should resolve it using truncated Rule 40(e) process. We should instead have full adversarial presentation before en banc court.
My concerns are both procedural substantive. I begin procedure. demanding proof injury, we need guard against pushing merits judgment into Article III injury ‐ ‐ fact inquiry; we also need ensure we are not, de facto demanding fact pleading. Supreme under scored standing/merits distinction Lexmark Int’l, Inc. Static Control Components, Inc. (2014), which it took care distinguish between adequate allegation jury fact purposes question whether asserted fell within scope statute on which relying (there, Lanham Act). 125–28. It possible point real (and thus pass Article III hurdle) but still lose on merits failing state claim relief be granted. See F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6).
We additionally need sure are not returning fact pleading regime, required even accepta ble under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) speci cally required We repeatedly stressed Federal Rules Civil Procedure use notice pleading standard, fact pleading standard. A complaint 17 3162 need include allegations about every element of a claim, as long as meets the plausibility standard established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly U.S. (2007), Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009). Finally, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal changed the rule requiring both facts reasonable infer ences those facts taken in pleader’s favor at the earliest stages litigation. Thus, example, person may plead she injured statutory violation. If she fails prove in end, court should conclude loses on merits, never Article III begin with. panel opinion takes step toward both unnecessary heightened requirements.
From substantive point view, panel said, plain ti “must show violation [of Act] harmed or presented appreciable underlying interest Congress sought protect.” Ante (cleaned up), citing Groshek Time Warner Cable, Inc. (7th 2017). I agree with statement. Where I believe panel shakier ground—shaky enough war rant full en banc tt ention—is its application stand ard.
It helpful this connection look pro vision lies center dispute:
(a) Notice debt; contents Within ve days after initial communication consumer connection with collection debt, collector shall, unless following formation contained initial communication consumer paid debt, send consumer wri en notice containing—
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the va lidity the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed be valid by the debt collector; (4) statement if the consumer noti fi es the debt collector writing within the thirty day period the debt, or any portion thereof, disputed, the debt col lector will obtain veri fi cation the debt or copy judgment against consumer and copy such ver i fi cation or judgment will be mailed consumer debt collector; (5) statement that, upon consumer’s wri tt en re- quest within thirty day period, debt collector will provide consumer with name address original creditor, if di erent from current creditor. U.S.C. 1692g(a) (emphasis added). particular, are
concerned with requirements section 1692g(a)(4) (5) consumer must communicate debt collec tor writing . Failure do anything but picky proce dural ga e. Section 1692g(b) speci es if consumer makes such wri en request, “the debt collector shall cease collection debt, disputed portion thereof,” until debt collector takes requested steps. right left alone crucial part congressionally mandated scheme eliminate abusive unfair tactics collection business. ‐
It also worth noting people might appreciate need a wri tt en record their dealings debt col ‐ lector thus without reminder they must reduce their concerns writing, they are likely forfeit im ‐ portant substantive rights Act provides them. When they receive le tt er, they are often encouraged call ‐ telephone number. someone who responds debt ‐ col ‐ lection le er in way will be put into “Gotcha!” situation. No noti fi cation in writing equals greatly diminished protec ‐ tion
It fair inference from Casillas’s complaint Madi son’s omissions at minimum put in imminent los ing many protections in are designed regu late debt collection process as it goes forward. The right veri fi cation, right name address original creditor, right cessation collection ac tivities, others, are far from bare procedural protections— they are protections serve as gateway Act’s sub stantive regime. The Supreme con fi rmed in Spokeo intangible harms de ned Congress qualify fact. S. Ct. at 1549. only type ruled out was “a bare procedural violation, divorced concrete harm.” Id. addition, limited cases already ered harm. It may “actual imminent .” citing Lujan (emphasis added). Read proper light, Casillas’s plead ings put forward enough infer imminent particular injury. panel our court reasons “[b]ecause Madison’s
mistake didn’t put harm’s way, nothing more than ‘bare procedural violation.’” Ante It said because Casillas’s pleadings did spell out various types harm that loomed because Madison’s failure to warn that communications that were in writing were waste time, and that but omi tt ed information, would (or would have considered) using procedures assert rights. surely panel means do more than alert future ff s in these cases they should plead that they would stand on their rights highlight imminent loss numerous substantive protections orded A simple amendment complaint would solve problem.
Turning substance, key di erentiating between “bare” procedural right right grounded in substantive interests lies concrete interest procedural right is designed protect. Sixth Circuit captured this insight nicely Macy where said “to determine whether procedural violation manifests fact, court properly considers whether Congress conferred procedural right order protect individual’s interests.” F.3d quoting Strubel Comenity Bank 181, (2d 2016). point simple: what, whose, interest pro cedural requirement designed serve? If procedural rule stated all notices be printed three holed paper, then might fair say purely administra tive rule implicate consumer rights. Or, Su preme observed Spokeo if envelope re fl ected mistaken zip code but le er reached consumer despite error, there no possible further one say conclusively no resulted mistake. Yet some procedures—perhaps many—exist order to protect under ‐ lying substantive interests rather than for simple administra ‐ tive convenience. As Sixth Circuit pointed out, the Ninth Circuit’s decision Spokeo on remand from Supreme helpfully describes type of procedural injury implicates harm to those concrete substantive interests:
[A]n procedural violation [of statute] itself manifest concrete injury where Congress con ‐ ferred procedural right protect ’s con ‐ crete interests and where procedural violation pre ‐ sents real concrete interest. Macy F.3d 755, quoting from Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. 1108, (9th 2017).
By way analogy, fundamental due process requires no ‐ tice and an opportunity be heard, fun reading notice listening one’s own voice, but because, Mathews Eldridge said, those rights guard against mistakes when government poised deprive someone pro tected interest. 333–35 (1976). taken extreme, even right notice opportunity be heard might be thought be “bare” procedural rights, be cause neither one assures particular outcome per son involved.
Given fact person who told objec tions sections 1692g(a)(4) (5) must be made writ ing, else they are ine ective preserve host rights un der Act, there strong case made case falls side line, on “bare proce dural” side. Unlike mistaken zip code, likelihood ongoing forfeited rights, misunderstandings, abusive practices great enough support standing. Madi son may substantive defenses apply it, so I express no view on ultimate merits this case. I also ex press no view appropriateness class certi cation. I dissent, however, decision question whether herself pleaded enough pass fact bar Article III so straightforward, Sixth Circuit’s view so misguided, should hear case en banc.
[*] Of Northern District Illinois, sitting designation.
[1] A debt collector’s liability unnamed class members “such amount court may allow … exceed lesser $500,000 per centum net worth collector.” 1692k(a)(2)(B). $5000 sought unnamed members class represents 1% Madison’s net worth. attorneys’ fees were big ticket item reason why Madison quickly agreed settle case.
[2] Madison has disclaimed position issue. has terpreted settlement agreement require Madison support argument. To avoid being accused breaching agreement, Madison declined argue lacks standing; its brief offers neutral assessment case law.
[3] insists “unsophisticated consumer” standard, have applied elsewhere our precedent, means exists whenever debt collection letter might have misled naive consumer. “unsophisticated consumer” standard rule interpreting collection letter determine whether misleading. See Williams OSI Educ. Servs., Inc ., 677–78 (7th 2007) . It rule permitting those who been injured vindicate rights those who have.
[4] Because this opinion creates circuit split, been circulated among all judges this court regular active service. See 7th R. 40(e). A majority favor rehearing en banc. Chief Judge Wood, joined Circuit Judges Rovner Hamilton, filed dissent denial rehearing en banc, attached opinion.
[5] We also note Second Circuit did not hold every omission caused plainti ff harm. bank had also failed tell she was obligated provide creditor timely notice stop auto matic payment disputed charge. Id. ’s card did o er automatic payment, so Second Circuit omission disclosure posed no her. 191–92. this respect, Strubel was similarly situated Casillas: infor mation receive would used. Second Circuit’s resolution claim supports our conclu sion lacks standing.
[6] Since Spokeo decided, we too recognized kind pub lic ‐ disclosure “informational injury” ffi ciently confer standing, albeit context common ‐ law rather than cause action. Carlson United States historian, asserted common law right access grand ‐ jury records World War II– era espionage investigation. 755–56 (7th 2016). Citing Akins Public Citizen “Carlson’s fact denial access government documents he right seek.”
[7] Church v. Accretive Health, Inc. Eleventh Circuit held Debt Collection Practices created “right to information” is analogous right protected by Havens Realty . F. App’x 990, (11th Cir. 2016) (“Just as tester plaintiff alleged stat utorily created right truthful housing information, so too has Church statutorily created right information pursuant [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act].”). It thus bare proce dural violation Act’s disclosure requirements is “concrete injury” sufficient establish standing. Church does give us pause. For one thing, it unpublished opinion does establish law even within Eleventh Circuit. For another, collector Church failed make any disclosures required § 1692g(a), we address only whether Congress has created bare right 1692g(a)(4) (5). extent Church generally recognizes bare proce dural violation disclosure requirement as injury, it odds with Groshek Robertson . Moreover, reasons we discuss above, misreads Havens Realty . Sixth Circuit expressly rejected Church see Lyshe Levy 859–861 (6th 2017), extent inconsistent our opinion case, do well.