Arthur Patterson v. Barbara Wagner, 785 F.3d 1277

Background

In 1997 Patterson, a U.S. servicemember’s dependent in South Korea, was prosecuted there for destruction of evidence in a murder investigation; he was convicted, served about a year, and left for the U.S. in 1999.
South Korea later sought to prosecute Patterson for the underlying murder; in 2009 it obtained an arrest warrant and requested U.S. extradition; the U.S. arrested Patterson in 2011 and sought extradition.
A magistrate judge found probable cause only for second‑degree murder and certified Patterson for extradition; Patterson petitioned for habeas corpus and the district court denied relief.
Patterson argued extradition is barred by (1) the U.S.–South Korea Extradition Treaty’s lapse‑of‑time provision because the U.S. statute of limitations would bar prosecution, and (2) the U.S.–Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) double‑jeopardy protection.
The court analyzed treaty text and drafting history and concluded Article 6’s “may be denied” language is permissive, leaving discretion to the Secretary of State; it also held SOFA rights are enforced diplomatically, not judicially, so SOFA cannot block extradition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Article 6 (lapse of time) of the U.S.–Korea Extradition Treaty mandatorily bars extradition when U.S. statute of limitations would bar prosecution	Patterson: Article 6 was intended to bar extradition (mandatory) when U.S. limitations would prevent prosecution	Government: Article 6’s “may be denied” is permissive; discretion resides with Secretary of State; courts cannot mandate denial	Held: Article 6 is permissive — not judicially enforceable as a mandatory bar; Secretary of State retains discretion
Whether drafting history and Senate materials convert the treaty’s permissive text into a mandatory obligation	Patterson: Senate report and hearing statements show intent to bar extradition	Government: Executive branch submissions and the treaty text support a permissive reading; extratextual materials do not override the text	Held: Extra‑textual materials reinforce permissive reading; no mandatory judicial remedy
Whether SOFA’s double‑jeopardy protection creates a judicially enforceable right to block extradition	Patterson: SOFA bars prosecution for same offense and so forbids extradition	Government: SOFA provides diplomatic remedies; does not create a judicially enforceable right to bar extradition	Held: SOFA enforcement is diplomatic, not judicial; SOFA cannot be used in court to block extradition
Whether federal courts can issue a judicial order blocking extradition based on an international agreement	Patterson: Courts should enforce treaty/SOFA rights to prevent unconstitutional or unlawful extradition	Government: Extradition decisions and treaty exceptions are for the Executive; courts’ role is limited to probable cause and interpreting treaty text	Held: Courts’ role is limited; absent a treaty provision creating a judicial remedy, international agreements do not support judicially blocking extradition

Key Cases Cited

Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (Sup. Ct.) (textual treaty interpretation principles)
Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir.) ("may be denied" construed as permissive/discretionary)
Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.) (extradition is an executive/diplomatic process; judge’s role limited)
Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir.) (judge must assess whether treaty provisions bar extradition)
Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.) (limits on judicial relief and role of Secretary of State in extradition decisions)
In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir.) (SOFA/NATO status provisions give diplomatic, not judicial, remedies)
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.) (international status agreements enforceable through diplomatic channels)
Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (Sup. Ct.) (treaty provisions can create private rights, but enforcement depends on treaty structure)