Arthur Brown, Jr. v. Rick Thaler, Director, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11908

Arthur Brown, Jr. was convicted of capital murder in Texas for the June 1992 killings in Houston that left four dead, including a pregnant wife; two surviving victims identified Brown and Dudley as shooters.
At punishment, the State reintroduced guilt-phase evidence plus Brown’s prior Tuscaloosa armed robbery, jail extortion, and jail assault; defense offered Brown’s low IQ, learning disabilities, and the maturational reform theory via Dr. Lewis and school records.
Brown’s defense called only one witness at punishment; Brown declined to call his mother to testify; several sisters testified during guilt phase about coercion; defense argued mitigation but the jury found no mitigating special issues supported.
Post-trial, Brown’s state habeas petition asserted ineffective assistance for failure to fund investigation; the Texas courts denied relief, citing limited funds and strategic trial decisions.
Brown sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied a COA; the Fifth Circuit reviews the state-court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and applies deference to Strickland v. Washington standards.
The court ultimately denied Brown a COA, holding reasonable jurists could not conclude the state court’s decision was debatable under Strickland or that prejudice existed from counsel’s actions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred in addressing state-habeas proceedings as part of the § 2254(d) analysis	Brown asserts district court should scrutinize state-proceeding deficiencies for reasonableness.	Brown's view conflicts with deference standards; court should focus on the state court's merits decision.	District court properly applied deference; no reversible error found.
Whether Brown’s ineffective assistance claim was adjudicated on the merits and reviewable under § 2254(d)	Brown argues Strickland-based claims were merits adjudications requiring de novo review.	Texas Court’s merits ruling was final and reviewable under § 2254(d).	Claim adjudicated on the merits; standard applied under § 2254(d).
Whether the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable	Brown contends counsel failed to investigate mitigating evidence and that funds were inadequately provided.	Counsel reasonably limited investigation; strategic choices fall within reasonable professional judgment.	No unreasonable application; district court not debatable in its conclusion.
Whether any additional mitigation evidence would have changed the outcome	Milstein’s and Brown’s mother’s affidavits could have mitigated to life; more experts could assist.	Even if presented, evidence was not enough to establish a reasonable probability of a different result.	No reasonable probability the sentence would change; prejudice not shown.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes deficient performance and prejudice a 'reasonable probability' standard)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (strives to assess investigations and mitigation evidence under Strickland)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (limits on investigation and reasonable-strategy boundaries)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (cases for reasonable deficiency and strategy in mitigation)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (requires deference to state-court findings under Strickland)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (U.S. 2011) (limits federal review to record before state court)
Martinez v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2007) (disproves per se cause based on collateral proceedings in some contexts)
Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002) (double-edged mitigation considerations in evaluating prejudice)