Arteaga, Robert Michael Jr.
PD-1648-15
| Tex. App. | Dec 18, 2015Background
- Appellant Robert Michael Arteaga was convicted after a consolidated trial of 23 counts of sexual assault of a child (charged as first-degree felonies under Tex. Penal Code §22.011(f)) and multiple counts of possession of child pornography; sentences were life for assault counts and 10 years for pornography counts.
- §22.011(f) elevates child-sexual-assault from a second- to first-degree felony if the victim "was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying...under Section 25.01" (the bigamy statute). Arteaga and the victim were not married.
- At trial the jury charge defined the aggravating element not by quoting §25.01 (bigamy) but by including the Family Code consanguinity provision (Tex. Fam. Code §6.201) describing void marriages between close relatives. The jury answered a special issue finding Arteaga was "prohibited from marrying" the victim.
- Arteaga appealed, arguing (1) the court erred by using the Family Code definition instead of the Penal Code bigamy definition required by §22.011(f), and (2) the trial court improperly curtailed defense counsel’s closing argument that some people might not view the photos as lewd.
- The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed: it held §22.011(f) was ambiguous, therefore using the Family Code definition was permissible and any charge error was harmless (not egregious); it also held the trial court did not abuse discretion in limiting the prosecutor’s objection during argument because the jury determines lewdness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Arteaga) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §22.011(f)’s reference to Section 25.01 requires proof/definition of bigamy (Penal Code) rather than resort to Family Code consanguinity | The jury was properly instructed; §22.011(f) is ambiguous, legislative history supports interpreting the enhancement broadly to cover prohibited marriages, and the Family Code definition was a permissible gloss — any error was harmless | §22.011(f) plainly incorporates §25.01 (bigamy); the court should have defined the element by reference to the penal bigamy statute, not a non‑penal consanguinity statute; resort to Family Code was improper and misstates an element | Court affirmed: held §22.011(f) ambiguous, inclusion of Family Code definition was not reversible (no egregious harm) and special issue ensured element was found by jury |
| Whether using a non‑penal declaratory Family Code statute (void‑marriage/consanguinity) to define a penal element is proper | Ambiguity allows extratextual sources; inclusion was harmless and jury common knowledge sufficed | Family Code §6.201 is not a penal prohibition and does not define "prohibited from marrying" as used in §22.011(f); courts should not define penal elements with non‑penal declaratory statutes | Court affirmed use as permissible in this case (majority); dissent would reverse/reform to second‑degree convictions, holding the Family Code instruction was erroneous and egregiously harmful |
| Whether the trial court erred by forbidding defense counsel’s argument that some people (including appellant) might not view the images as lewd | The jury decides whether images are lewd; counsel was permitted to present evidence the defendant didn’t view them as lewd but could not instruct jury to apply the defendant’s subjective view as dispositive | Defense should be allowed to argue that reasonable observers (doctors, nurses, defense) might not consider the images lewd—scienter and community perception are relevant | Court affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; counsel argued permitted themes and appellant testified he did not view the photos as lewd, but the jury determines lewdness |
| Whether charge error (if any) required reformation of convictions to second‑degree offenses | N/A (State defends verdict) | If first‑degree enhancement depended on bigamy which was not proven, convictions should be reformed to second‑degree sexual‑assault convictions and new punishment hearing | Majority: no reformation; dissent: would reform to second‑degree and remand for new punishment because jury may have relied on erroneous instruction |
Key Cases Cited
- Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (statutory ambiguity standard)
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (plain‑language construction principles)
- State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (interpreting §22.011(f) in context; facial‑constitutionality discussion)
- Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1990) (scienter is required for child‑pornography possession prosecutions)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (U.S. 1982) (obscenity/child‑protection framework; scienter and state interest in protecting children)