Arnold Crossroads, L.L.C. v. Gander Mountain Company, 751 F.3d 935

Arnold Crossroads, LLC sued Gander Mountain in Missouri state court for breach of a 15-year lease; Gander removed three times to federal court, each time remanding to state court.
In 2011 the City of Arnold intervened in the state case alleging misrepresentation by Gander causing about $750,000 in damages.
Gander removed the City’s misrepresentation claim in March 2012, arguing it formed a separate removable civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
The district court remanded, concluding Gander’s removal was untimely and that removal of part of a state case is improper; it ordered remand on § 1447(c) grounds.
Gander appeals the remand order; the district court’s decision relied on untimely removal and the scope of removable civil actions.
The Eighth Circuit dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the remand was based on a procedural flaw under § 1447(c).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the City’s fraud claim is a separable removable civil action	Gander asserts City’s claim is a separable action removable under § 1441(a).	Arnold Crossroads and City contend the claim is not a separate action and must be remanded.	No, the district court’s remand basis was untimely removal rather than separability.
Whether the removal of less than the entire case is permissible	Gander argues § 1441(a) allows removal of a separable claim; district court relied on all-or-nothing removal.	City/Arnold contend only whole-case removal is allowed; partial removal is impermissible.	Remand based on untimely removal and not on allowing piecemeal removal; appellate review limited by § 1447(d).
Whether the appeal is reviewable under § 1447(d)	Gander seeks appellate review of the remand order.	City and Arnold Crossroads argue § 1447(d) bars review of remands grounded in § 1447(c).	Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because remand was based on § 1447(c) procedural defect.

Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (Supreme Court 1995) (clarifies reviewability of remand orders under § 1447(d))
Carlson v. Arrowhead Concrete Works, Inc., 445 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 2006) (remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1447(c))
Roberts v. BJC Health System, 452 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2006) (jurisdictional limits on reviewing remand orders)
Vincent v. Dakota, Minnesota, & Eastern R.R. Corp., 200 F.3d 580 (8th Cir. 2000) (independent review of the actual basis for remand order)
Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2002) (limits on review when district court grounds are cited)
Adkins v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2003) (timeliness and removal principles in § 1447(c))
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (Supreme Court 2005) (analogizes removal to supplemental jurisdiction; supports separate actions concept)
Stoll v. Hawkeye Casualty Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, 185 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1950) (garnishment as removable separate action)
Randolph v. Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 260 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1958) (garnishment removal considerations)
GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., Inc., 718 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2013) (removal of independent suits; garnishment analogies)
Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127 (11th Cir. 2013) (definition of independent civil actions for removal context)