Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Janice Brewer
855 F.3d 957
9th Cir.2017Background
- In 2012 DHS announced DACA, granting certain childhood arrivals deferred action and employment authorization but no formal immigration status; DACA recipients receive EADs coded (c)(33).
- Arizona issued Executive Order 2012-06 directing state agencies to withhold state benefits and identification from DACA recipients; ADOT changed policy to refuse DACA EADs as proof of “authorized presence” under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-3153(D).
- Plaintiffs (five DACA recipients and Arizona DREAM Act Coalition) sued, asserting Equal Protection and Supremacy Clause (preemption) claims; the district court granted summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction enjoining Arizona’s policy.
- The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, agreeing DACA recipients are similarly situated to other noncitizens who receive EADs and holding Arizona’s driver-license policy is preempted because it creates independent immigration classifications reserved to the federal government.
- The court invoked constitutional avoidance: it did not resolve the constitutionality of DACA itself but rested the decision on statutory preemption grounded in the INA and federal regulatory scheme and granted a permanent injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona’s refusal to accept DACA EADs is preempted by federal immigration law | Arizona’s policy conflicts with the federal scheme; only federal government may classify aliens; DACA recipients are treated as authorized to remain and work for certain purposes | Arizona may define “authorized under federal law” for state benefits and exclude DACA recipients because DACA confers no lawful status | Held: Preempted — Arizona impermissibly created its own immigration classification and intruded on exclusive federal authority under the INA; injunction affirmed |
| Whether DACA recipients are similarly situated to other EAD-holders for Equal Protection purposes | DACA recipients are similarly situated to other noncitizens who hold EADs and thus cannot be denied licenses absent legitimate state interest | DACA recipients differ because their relief derives from executive discretion, not statutorily authorized relief (e.g., (c)(9)/(c)(10)) | Held: Court agrees they are similarly situated in all relevant respects; Equal Protection claim is plausible, but court avoids resting decision solely on this ground |
| Whether Arizona articulated a legitimate rational basis for denying licenses to DACA recipients | Plaintiffs: Arizona’s rationales (liability, fraud, administrative burden, public safety, consistency) lack factual support and are applied inconsistently | Arizona: State interests in liability avoidance, preventing benefits misuse, administrative concerns, public safety, and statutory implementation justify distinction | Held: The proffered rationales are unpersuasive or apply equally to other EAD-holders; constitutional-avoidance led court to decide preemption instead |
| Whether the court should rule on DACA’s constitutionality | Plaintiffs do not seek to invalidate DACA; determination unnecessary | Defendants pressed Take Care Clause and separation-of-powers challenges to DACA | Held: Court declines to rule on DACA constitutionality; decision rests on preemption and related doctrines |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal government has broad, exclusive authority over immigration and alien status)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (States lack power to classify aliens for immigration purposes; relevant dicta on alien classification)
- De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (not all state enactments touching aliens are preempted; distinguishes permissible state regulation from immigration regulation)
- Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (agency nonenforcement and prosecutorial discretion are generally committed to executive discretion)
- Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state regulation of benefits/licensing that hinges on immigration classifications can conflict with federal authority)
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (classic framework on limits of executive power; referenced re: presidential authority)
- Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (contrasting circuit view that INA does not permit executive to reclassify millions as lawfully present)