Argabrite v. Neer
149 Ohio St. 3d 349
| Ohio | 2016Background
- In July 2011 Pamela Argabrite was seriously injured when a fleeing suspect (Andrew Barnhart) in a police pursuit crashed head-on and the suspect died.
- Argabrite sued five officers (Miami Township PD: Neer, Stites, DiPietro; Montgomery County Sheriff’s Dept.: Ball, Adkins), alleging negligence and that officers’ pursuit made them liable because their conduct was willful, wanton, reckless, or malicious.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for officers relying on a Second District rule (Whitfield/Lewis) that officer pursuit is not proximate cause of third‑party injuries unless conduct was “extreme or outrageous.”
- Second District affirmed; Ohio Supreme Court accepted discretionary review to resolve the standard governing officer liability in third‑party injuries during chases.
- The Supreme Court rejected the no‑proximate‑cause rule as inconsistent with R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (employee immunity unless acts were malicious, in bad faith, or wanton/reckless) but nonetheless held, on the correct statutory standard, that no genuine issue of material fact existed that any officer acted maliciously, in bad faith, or wantonly/recklessly, and affirmed summary judgment for all officers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal standard for officer liability in third‑party injuries from a pursuit | Whitfield/Lewis rule: officers not proximate cause unless conduct was extreme/outrageous | Officers: immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) controls; Whitfield standard applies to proximate cause | Court: reject Whitfield no‑proximate‑cause rule as inconsistent with R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b); statutory wanton/reckless standard governs immunity determination |
| Whether statutory immunity (R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)) protects officers here | Argabrite: officers acted willfully/wanton/reckless so immunity lost | Officers: no evidence of malicious, bad faith, or wanton/reckless conduct; entitled to immunity | Held: applying statutory test, no reasonable juror could find malicious/bad‑faith/wanton or reckless conduct; officers immune |
| Whether factual record raises genuine issue re: violation of pursuit policy equating to recklessness | Argabrite: experts say officers violated policy, showing recklessness | Officers: policy violations at most show negligence; recklessness requires knowledge that conduct would in all probability cause injury | Held: policy violations do not alone establish wanton/reckless knowledge; record lacks evidence officers knew conduct would probably cause injury |
| Whether summary judgment nonetheless appropriate after rejecting no‑proximate‑cause rule | Argabrite: remand to apply statutory standard and develop fact issues | Officers: summary judgment proper because record lacks proof of wanton/reckless conduct | Held: Court reviewed record de novo and granted summary judgment for each officer under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (no genuine factual dispute) |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitfield v. Dayton, 167 Ohio App.3d 172 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (articulated rule that officer pursuit is not proximate cause absent extreme or outrageous conduct)
- Lewis v. Bland, 75 Ohio App.3d 453 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (earlier adoption of no‑proximate‑cause rule)
- Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351 (Ohio 1994) (R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) immunity applies to police officers)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 2012) (definitions and standards for wanton/reckless and wanton misconduct under immunity statute)
- Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 (Ohio 1983) (definition of extreme/outrageous conduct in tort context)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (U.S. 2007) (Supreme Court recognition of the policy concern about requiring police to allow fleeing suspects to escape)