Angelina Nunes v. Carrie Stephens, 983 F.3d 1108

In 2016 Stanislaus County’s Child Protective Services investigated injuries to minors D.X. and L.X.; the County produced the children’s juvenile records to its outside counsel (ASVG) during related civil litigation (the Separation Case).
Plaintiffs (Nunes and Alves) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after learning the County and its attorneys accessed and disclosed the juvenile records without prior juvenile-court authorization as required by Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827.
Plaintiffs alleged violations of federal and state privacy rights (including medical privacy under HIPAA) and brought a Monell claim against the County for its policies/customs enabling such disclosures.
Defendants moved to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds; the district court denied qualified immunity, treating the claim as a Fourth Amendment privacy violation and relying on Gonzalez v. Spencer.
The Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that Gonzalez did not clearly establish a constitutional privacy right in juvenile records and therefore defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; the court did not decide the merits of whether a constitutional privacy right exists.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a constitutional right protecting juvenile records was clearly established such that defendants lack qualified immunity	Gonzalez v. Spencer established that unauthorized access/disclosure of juvenile records violates constitutional privacy rights	Gonzalez is an opaque, two‑page opinion that did not identify or clearly establish a constitutional right; precedent did not place the issue beyond debate	Held: Not clearly established; qualified immunity applies to the individual defendants
Whether defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment substantive privacy rights	Unauthorized access pursuant to § 827 is a Fourth Amendment (informational) privacy violation	Defendants disputed that § 827’s violation equates to a clearly established constitutional violation and preserved defenses	Held: Court declined to reach the merits; remanded with qualified immunity for the individual defendants (Monell claim against County remains pending)

Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam opinion addressing unauthorized access to juvenile file but issuing opaque reasoning that did not clearly establish a constitutional right)
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (clearly‑established‑law standard requires controlling authority or robust consensus; avoid high‑level generalities)
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (qualified immunity two‑part test and requirement that unlawfulness be clearly established)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts have discretion which qualified‑immunity prong to address first)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (officials are entitled to fair notice; ambiguous precedent cannot clearly establish law)
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (an official is not deprived of immunity where reasonable officials could disagree about legality)
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 for customs or policies causing constitutional deprivations)
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recognition of informational‑privacy interests under the Fourteenth Amendment)
In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999) (describes the balancing of governmental interests when addressing informational‑privacy rights)
Endy v. County of Los Angeles, 975 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2020) (reiterates that informational‑privacy rights are conditional and subject to governmental interest balancing)