JAMES ENDY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-55663
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
September 10, 2020
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-03344-RGK-SK. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding.
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Argued and Submitted June 3, 2020
Pasadena, California
Filed September 10, 2020
Before: Consuelo M. Callahan and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges, and Yvette Kane,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Callahan
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed the district court‘s summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought pursuant to
The panel held that the County has a strong interest in maintaining all reports of suspected child abuse in the Child Welfare Services Case Management System (CWS/CMS)—even those that result in “unfounded” dispositions—because doing so helps its child welfare and law enforcement agencies protect children from abuse and neglect. Here, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that the records of his “unfounded” allegations in CWS/CMS caused him reputational harm, or that they were used by the County to alter or extinguish his rights to employment, child placement, or child visitation. The record indicated that the County considers only “substantiated” and “inconclusive” allegations to be risk factors for child placement, but not “unfounded” ones such as plaintiff‘s. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to show that his inclusion in CWS/CMS implicated his liberty interests so as to require procedural due process.
The panel also held that plaintiff had not shown that the County publicly disseminates or misuses his information in a manner that would violate his constitutional right to privacy.
COUNSEL
Diane B. Weissburg (argued) and Jerry A. Weissburg, Weissburg Law Firm, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Scott J. Carpenter (argued) and Jill Williams, Carpenter Rothans & Dumont, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
In California, state and local agencies maintain information on child abusе allegations primarily in two statewide databases—the Child Welfare Services Case Management System (“CWS/CMS“) and the Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI“). CWS/CMS is an internal government database used primarily by county child welfare agencies to enter and manage information related to reports of suspected child abuse. In contrast, CACI is a statewide index of substantiated child abuse reports maintained by the California Department of Justice (“CA DOJ“) and “available to a broad range of third parties for a variety of purposes.” Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009). We have held that, under the Due Process Clause, an individual‘s inclusion in CACI requires that he receive notice and “some kind оf hearing” to challenge his inclusion. See id. at 1201.
This case presents us with the question of whether similar procedural protections are required for an individual‘s inclusion in CWS/CMS. In this action under
A.
In 1980, the California state legislature enacted California‘s Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (“CANRA“),
Under CANRA, designated agencies are also required to maintain an internal record of all reports of child abuse received, irrespective of their ultimate disposition.
When a county child welfare agency transmits a substantiated report of child abuse for inclusion in CACI, it must notify the individual being listed.
B.
In July 2014, DCFS received a report that Endy had sexually and physically abused his four- and five-year-old daughters, and after investigation found the allegations to be substantiated. DCFS entered the allegations into CWS/CMS, reported the substаntiated report to CA DOJ for inclusion in CACI, and filed a petition against him in the juvenile court. In December 2014, the juvenile court dismissed the allegations. A month later, in January 2015, DCFS received new allegations against Endy, which it again substantiated after investigation. As before, DCFS entered its substantiated findings on the second allegations into CWS/CMS, forwarded the reports to CA DOJ for listing in CACI, and filed a petition against Endy in the juvenile court.
In February 2015, Endy requested a hearing with DCFS to challenge his inclusion in CACI. DCFS denied the request for a hearing because Endy‘s case was still pending in the juvenile court. In June 2015, the juvenile court dismissed the second allegations with prejudice, stating that “any and all allegations as to [Endy] sexually touching these children are absolutely dismissed.” At some point after the juvenile court‘s dismissal of the allegations, Endy‘s listings were removed from CACI, and DCFS updated CWS/CMS to indicate that the allegations were “unfounded.”1 When Endy requested a hearing to challenge his inclusion in CWS/CMS, DCFS told him he had no right to such a hearing. The “unfounded” reports against Endy remain in CWS/CMS.
C.
In May 2016, Endy filed a complaint against the County and employees of DCFS for alleged due process violations under
In May 2018, Endy filed a First Amended Verified Complaint (“FAC“) alleging that the County violated his due process rights pursuant to
Again, he sought injunctive relief and damages. According to Endy, his continued inclusion in CWS/CMS stigmatized him as an alleged child abuser, caused him not to be promoted with his employer, prevented him from being able to adopt or work with or around children, violated his privacy, and caused him immense emotional distress.
The district court granted summary judgment for the County and DCFS. On Endy‘s due process claim, the district court presumed for purposes of its analysis that Endy‘s inclusion in CWS/CMS could result in stigma, but determined that Endy failеd to show that the County‘s actions had restricted any of his previously recognized rights. The district court also rejected Endy‘s state law claim that the County violated his constitutional right to privacy, noting that Endy had not shown that the County disseminated or misused his information. Finally, the district court held that the County could not be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), reasoning that no County policy or custom could be blamed for a
II.
We review the district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm the district court‘s decision if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Endy‘s first claim under
A liberty interest may be implicated “where a person‘s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what thе government is doing to him.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). However, “procedural due process protections apply to reputational harm only when a plaintiff suffers stigma from governmental action plus alteration or extinguishment of ‘a right or status previously recognized by state law.‘” Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 711). We have described this standard as the “stigma-plus test.” See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).
Endy alleges that he meets the “stigma-plus” standard because he has suffered harm similar to the deprivation of rights we recognized in Humphries. There, we found that a person‘s inclusion in CACI implicated a constitutional liberty interest due to the resulting “stigma of being listed in the CACI as substantiated child abusers, plus the various statutory consequences” involvеd, such as “the loss of significant state benefits, such as child-care licenses or employment.” Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1185, 1200.
We have yet to address whether an individual‘s inclusion in CWS/CMS implicates a similar constitutional liberty interest. We confront a subset of that question in this appeal: whether the inclusion of the “unfounded” child abuse allegations against Endy in CWS/CMS—a statewide internal database—deprives him of a “stigma-plus” liberty interest such that due process protections are required. On this record, we conclude it does not.
A.
We turn first to whether the inclusion of Endy‘s “unfounded” child abuse allegations in CWS/CMS is stigmatizing. “No doubt ... being falsely named as a child abuser on an official government indеx is defamatory.” Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004). An accusation of child sexual abuse, in particular, is far more damning to a person‘s reputation in our society than perhaps any other kind of accusation, including those in which the Supreme Court has identified stigma. Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1186; see, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 695-97 (plaintiff‘s picture appeared on a flyer of suspected shoplifters); Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434-35 (plaintiff‘s name was listed among people forbidden to buy alcohol due to excessive drinking). Accordingly, we found it obvious that the plaintiffs in Humphries suffered stigma from their listings in CACI as substantiated child abusers. See Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1186.
There are some important distinctions, however, between Endy‘s listing in CWS/CMS and the CACI listings that we found “unquestionably stigmatizing” in Humphries. See id. First, the child abuse allegations against Endy are listed as “unfounded” in CWS/CMS, unlike the
Second, the “unfounded” child abuse allegations against Endy are maintained in CWS/CMS, an internal database generally accessible only to government agencies, in contrast to the more publicly accessible CACI. As a result, Endy does not face the same exposure to reputational harm experienced by the Humphries plaintiffs—whose listings in CACI allowed potential employers, educational institutions, and “a broad range of third parties” with access to CACI to identify them as “substantiated” child abusers. Id.
Endy, however, asserts that he faces stigma by his mere inclusion in CWS/CMS because anyone with access to the database could see him listed amongst many child abusers and “would have to hunt through hundreds of CWS/CMS рages” to find the final disposition of his allegations. Indeed, there may be some stigma attached to the mere fact of being listed in any database used to maintain reports of suspected child abuse—even if the final disposition of a report is that the allegation was determined to be “unfounded.” This would be particularly concerning were such information accessible to parties who may not appreciate the meaning of an “unfounded” listing under CANRA and thus might view Endy as a child abuser by the mere fact of his inclusion in CWS/CMS.
Here, however, the record demonstrates that Endy‘s information in CWS/CMS is accessed and maintained by child welfare agencies and shared only with other governmental entities responsible for the safety and welfare of children. In effect, the entities who are able to view Endy‘s listing in CWS/CMS are those who should be familiar with the meaning of an “unfounded” allegation and the high burden that attaches to such a finding. Endy offers no evidence that those with access to CWS/CMS might misconstrue his “unfounded” listing as equivalent to a “substantiated” or “inconclusive” one. Nor does Endy present evidence that his information in CWS/CMS—which is confidential and generally prohibited from public disclosure absent court order—might be disseminated in such a manner that would result in his public branding as a child abuser. Although the statute has various disclosure exceptions,
Given the “unfounded” nature of the child abuse allegations against Endy listed
B.
Even if we assume that the County‘s continued inclusion of Endy‘s “unfounded” allegations in CWS/CMS is stigmatizing, Endy must also show that it altered or extinguished one of his known rights under the “stigma-plus” test. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. In Humphries, we found that inclusion in CACI created a “tangible burden on an individual‘s ability to obtain a right or status recognized by state law” bеcause CANRA “explicitly requires agencies to consult the CACI and perform an independent investigation before granting a number of licenses and benefits.” 554 F.3d at 1188. We also found “a tangible burden ... where the plaintiff can show that, as a practical matter, the law creates a framework under which agencies reflexively check the stigmatizing listing—whether by internal regulation or custom—prior to conferring a legal right or benefit.” Id.
Here, Endy does not point us to any statutory provision requiring agencies to consult CWS/CMS prior to conferring a legal right or benefit. Nor does Endy provide any evidence that a legal framework exists for agenсies to “reflexively check” CWS/CMS prior to conferring a legal right or benefit. In fact, the record demonstrates that, under the existing legal framework, access to CWS/CMS is limited to specific governmental entities for primarily investigative and case management purposes, and records contained within the database cannot be disclosed to non-designated entities without a court order. Nonetheless, Endy broadly argues that his inclusion in CWS/CMS has negatively impacted his rights with respect to his employment at Caltrans, visitation at his daughter‘s school, and his ability to adopt or foster a child. None of these claims is viable as Endy fails to present a triable issue that any of these consequences was a result of his inclusion in CWS/CMS.
First, Endy asserts that his inclusion in CWS/CMS caused his government employer, Caltrans, to deny him a promotion, basing his claim primarily on rumors he overheard from his coworkers. Endy does not point out any provisions in CANRA or other statutes or regulations that would permit his employer to obtain access to CWS/CMS information, nor does he proffer any evidence that a background check by his employer would lead to a release of his information in CWS/CMS. According to an affidavit from an official Caltrans representative, Caltrans does not conduct background checks on its existing employees except where “information is brought to its attention,” and does not seek the disclosure of juvenile records or child welfare information pertaining to its employees, from CWS/CMS or elsewhere. Accordingly, the record presents no genuine issue that Endy‘s employment rights were altered or extinguished by his inclusion in CWS/CMS.
Second, Endy contends that he has been unable to visit or volunteer at his daughter‘s school because of his listing in CWS/CMS. According to Endy, the principal of his daughter‘s school told him to stay away from the school at a time when his “substantiated” allegations were still pending in juvenile court. Endy does not citе any specific statutory, regulatory, or policy provisions that might explain how the subsequent “unfounded” allegations against him in CWS/CMS would result in such a denial of his school visitation rights. Although California law allows juvenile case files to be inspected by the “superintendent
Finally, Endy argues that his inclusion in CWS/CMS prevents him from adopting a child or becoming a guardian. As a preliminary matter, we recognize that the relevant legal framework may provide some support for the general claim that a person‘s inclusion in CWS/CMS might impact his child placement rights. While CWS/CMS is primarily an internal record-keeping database used by child welfare workers to manage their cases and make appropriate case decisions, it is also used to collect and repоrt information for programs “closely related to child welfare services, including foster care and emergency assistance.”
However, there is no provision in either California law or County policy that suggests that an individual might be denied his right to adopt, foster, or become a legal guardian purely on the basis of “unfounded” allegations against him in CWS/CMS. Endy claims—without citing any particular County policy or regulation—that an individual with four allegations in CWS/CMS, even “unfounded” ones, would be classified by the agency as “very high risk,” thereby disqualifying him from child placement. But according to the DCFS Poliсy Manual, “at-risk” indicators include only “substantiated or inconclusive allegations of child abuse to a child protective agency” but “not ... unfounded reports.” In short, the record suggests that an individual‘s inclusion in CWS/CMS for “substantiated” or “inconclusive” allegations could lead to an alteration of his foster or childcare rights, but not when his allegations are “unfounded.”
Nor does the record evidence support Endy‘s particular claim that his adoption or guardianship rights have been impacted by his listing in CWS/CMS. Endy alleges that a DCFS employee informed him that he could not adopt his niece or nephew, but does not clarify whether this conversation occurred before or after the juvenile court dismissed his “substantiated” allegations.
We find that Endy‘s arguments as to the “plus” prong of the “stigma-plus” test rely upon mere allegations in his complaint, which are insufficient to overcome the County‘s evidence supporting its motion for summary judgment. Because Endy fails to raise a triable issue as to whether his inclusion in CWS/CMS deprived him of a constitutional liberty interest, his procedural due process claim fails and we need not reach the issue of whether the attendant procedures were sufficient.
IV.
We briefly address Endy‘s remaining claims on appeal, all of which we find lack merit.5
A.
Endy alleges that his inclusion in CWS/CMS violates his constitutional right to privacy. Because Endy cited only one case under California law in support of this claim below, the district court treated his claim as a privacy violation claim under state law. Whether viewed under state or federal constitutional law, Endy‘s privacy claim fails.
Under the California Constitution, “[o]ne class of legally rеcognized privacy interests, described as ‘informational privacy,’ includes ‘interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information.‘” Burt v. County of Orange, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 382 (Ct. App. 2004). This “right to privacy is not absolute, and a defendant may prevail by establishing a defense, including the existence of countervailing interests that justify the invasion of a person‘s privacy.” Id.
Similarly, federal constitutional law recognizes a “right to informational privacy” stemming from “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991)). This right also “is not absolute; rather, it is a conditional right which may be infringed upon a showing of proper governmental interest.” Id. at 959. Legitimate governmental interests combined with protections against public dissemination can foreclose a constitutional violation. Nat‘l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011).
Endy‘s constitutional privacy claim fails under both state and federal law because he provides no evidence that his information has been publicly disseminated or disclosed. Rather, Endy claims that the mere inclusion of his personal information in the internal child welfare databases violates
B.
Without a showing that the County deprived his liberty interests, Endy‘s Monell claim necessarily fails. In order to establish municipal liability under
As with his procedural due process claim, Endy has not provided evidence that County policies or common practices have allowed or are likely to allow the use of his “unfounded” allegations to curtail his employment, child placement, or child visitation rights. Accordingly, we аffirm the grant of summary judgment for the County on Endy‘s Monell claim.
V.
Understandably, Endy is troubled by the knowledge that the County continues to keep an internal record of prior child abuse allegations made against him, even though these allegations were dismissed by a court of law. The County, however, has a strong interest in maintaining all reports of suspected child abuse in CWS/CMS—even those that result in “unfounded” dispositions—because doing so helps its child welfare and law enforcement agencies protect children from abuse and neglect. Here, Endy failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that the records of his “unfounded” allegations in CWS/CMS caused him reрutational harm, or that they were used by the County to alter or extinguish his rights to employment, child placement, or child visitation. The record indicates that the County considers only “substantiated” and “inconclusive” allegations to be risk factors for child placement, but not “unfounded” ones such as Endy‘s. Accordingly, Endy fails to show that his inclusion in CWS/CMS implicates his liberty interests so as to require procedural due process. Endy also has not shown that the County publicly disseminates or misuses his information in a manner that would violate his constitutional right to privacy. The district court did not err in determining that Endy has not presented any genuine issue of material fact
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court‘s grant of summary judgment.