Angela Horton and Kevin Houser v. the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 692 S.W.3d 112

Plaintiffs (Angela Horton and Kevin Houser) brought common-law negligence claims against Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR) for injuries allegedly resulting from a "humped" railroad crossing accident.
KCSR argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) expressly and impliedly (via obstacle preemption) preempts such claims, asserting that only the Surface Transportation Board (STB) has jurisdiction.
The Texas Supreme Court considered both express and implied (obstacle) preemption, focusing on whether ICCTA bars state tort suits for railway crossings.
The concurring opinion (Justice Busby, joined in part by other justices) tackles the constitutional and statutory basis of implied obstacle preemption, questioning its consistency with the Supremacy Clause and modern administrative law doctrines (major questions doctrine).
The court ultimately held that ICCTA does not preempt ordinary common-law negligence actions regarding rail crossing safety and that the plaintiffs' claims can proceed in state court.
The opinion advocates for a "logical contradiction" standard for implied preemption, rather than a broad purposes-and-objectives approach.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ICCTA expressly preempts state common-law negligence claims regarding rail crossings	ICCTA does not cover or bar ordinary negligence actions for crossing safety; state law should govern	ICCTA’s exclusive jurisdiction preempts state-law remedies regarding rail transportation	No express preemption; ICCTA does not bar ordinary negligence claims
Whether ICCTA impliedly preempts (obstacle preemption) such state-law claims	Allowing suit does not obstruct Congressional objectives; no direct conflict with federal law	State court claims stand as an obstacle to Congress’s intended regulatory regime for railroads; thus preempted	No implied preemption; no obstacle to Congressional objectives found
Proper standard for implied preemption under Supremacy Clause	Preemption requires logical contradiction between state and federal law, not abstract purpose analysis	Preemption occurs if state law frustrates broad "purposes and objectives" of federal law	Court favors logical contradiction standard over broad purposes-and-objectives test
Whether administrative law principles (major questions doctrine) affect the preemption analysis	Exclusive federal agency power requires clear congressional statement; absent here	ICCTA preempts most matters affecting rail operations, delegating broad power to STB even absent explicit text	No clear statement; major questions doctrine counsels against implied exclusive agency power here

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (express and implied obstacle preemption standard)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (express preemption and interpretation of regulatory schemes)
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (criticisms and standards for implied preemption)
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (implied preemption tests: field, impossibility, obstacle)
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (reluctance to find broad preemption of state remedies)
Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 278 U.S. 24 (grade crossing regulation within state police power)
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (major questions doctrine regarding agency power)
ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co., 167 U.S. 479 (need for clear statement before delegating significant regulatory authority to agency)
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (judicial skepticism of freewheeling preemption analysis)
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (preemption and regulatory conflict)