Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86

Background

Brenda Andrew was convicted and sentenced to death in Oklahoma for murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, allegedly to collect his life insurance proceeds.
At trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence about Andrew's personal life—her sex life, attire, and parenting—which the state later largely conceded was irrelevant.
Andrew challenged this evidence on appeal and in federal habeas proceedings, arguing it was so prejudicial that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) acknowledged some evidence was irrelevant but held its admission was harmless error, upholding her conviction and sentence.
The Tenth Circuit denied habeas relief, finding no “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent that such prejudicial evidence could violate due process, as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify whether controlling law established that the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence can violate due process, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Andrew's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the admission of highly prejudicial, irrelevant evidence at trial can violate due process under Supreme Court precedent	Such evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered her trial fundamentally unfair, violating due process	No Supreme Court holding establishes a general rule for due process violation from prejudicial evidentiary errors	Supreme Court precedent (Payne) clearly establishes that admission of unduly prejudicial evidence can violate due process
Whether Supreme Court precedent (notably Payne v. Tennessee) is a “clearly established” law on this issue for federal habeas purposes	Payne and related cases establish the prohibitory principle applied to her case	Payne’s statements on due process are dicta or limited to victim impact evidence, not this case	Payne is a holding for AEDPA purposes; thus, the Tenth Circuit erred in finding no applicable "clearly established law"
Whether the OCCA’s decision was an unreasonable application of such law	State court unreasonably applied federal law by minimizing prejudice	State court reasonably applied federal law given the evidence and trial context	Supreme Court remands to Tenth Circuit to determine reasonableness under AEDPA in the first instance
Whether general or specific precedent is required to grant habeas relief under AEDPA	General principles from Supreme Court cases can suffice when clearly established	Only specific, factually on-point Supreme Court holdings count as clearly established law	General legal principles can constitute clearly established law for AEDPA if they are Supreme Court holdings

Key Cases Cited

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (holding Due Process Clause protects against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that renders a trial fundamentally unfair)
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (U.S. 1974) (due process violation by prejudicial prosecutorial remarks if they render trial fundamentally unfair)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1986) (recognizing due process safeguard from fundamentally unfair trials due to prosecutorial misconduct)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1991) (leaving open whether admission of irrelevant evidence itself violates due process)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (defining AEDPA’s deferential standard for federal habeas review)
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (U.S. 2003) ("clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA includes Supreme Court holdings)
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (U.S. 2014) (distinguishing between clearly established law and dicta for AEDPA purposes)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1994) (applying Payne’s due process principle to prejudicial evidence at capital sentencing)
Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108 (U.S. 2016) (reiterating Payne’s due process protection against unduly prejudicial evidence)