59 F.4th 145
4th Cir.2023Background
- Allen received EEOC right-to-sue letters by August 8, 2018 and had 90 days to file a Title VII suit.
- On November 1, 2018 (day 85), acting pro se, Allen delivered to the district clerk two hand-completed complaints and two in forma pauperis (IFP) applications.
- The clerk stamped the IFP applications as “filed” but stamped the complaints as “received”/“proposed complaints.”
- A magistrate recommended denying IFP on November 8 (day 92); Allen later paid the filing fee and the district court directed the clerk to file the complaint on December 17 (day 131).
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants as time-barred, finding the complaint was not filed within 90 days; the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo.
- The Fourth Circuit held the action commenced when Allen delivered the complaints to the clerk, regardless of fee payment or IFP status, vacating and remanding the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When is a federal civil action "commenced" for limitations purposes? | Allen: delivering a complaint to the clerk (even with an IFP application) commences the action. | Defendants: action begins only when filing fee is paid or court grants IFP; until then complaint is merely "proposed." | Action commences upon delivery of the complaint to the clerk under Rules 3 and 5, irrespective of fee payment or IFP status. |
| Does 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) or seeking IFP status change commencement timing? | §1915 authorizes fee waiver but does not alter Rule 3; it does not delay commencement. | §1915’s phrase "authorize the commencement" implies judge must authorize and thus commencement awaits IFP grant or fee payment. | §1915 does not override the Rules; it permits fee waiver but does not convert filing into a condition precedent to commencement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (U.S. 2019) (explains requirement to "commence a civil action" under Title VII)
- Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 349 U.S. 46 (U.S. 1955) (clerk’s receipt of a timely notice controls even if fee unpaid)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (U.S. 2007) (statutory time limits for appeals may be jurisdictional and admit no equitable exceptions)
- Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (U.S. 1996) (filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations for federal-law claims)
- Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding complaint delivery to clerk sets filing date even when accompanied by IFP application)
- Williams-Guice v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 45 F.3d 161 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting that rule and holding IFP grant/acceptance commences the action)
- Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2010) (limitations satisfied when complaint filed even if service later)
- Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (U.S. 2008) (rejects making timeliness dependent on a condition subsequent outside parties’ control)
- Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2010) (statutory phrases must be read in context; avoid isolated readings)