Amnesty International USA v. Clapper
638 F.3d 118
| 2d Cir. | 2011Background
- Appellants challenge Section 702 of FISA as amended by FAA, arguing Fourth, First, and separation-of-powers issues; merits not reached.
- District court granted summary judgment, finding lack of standing; appeals court reverses on standing.
- FAA allows mass surveillance targeting non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. with certifications rather than individualized warrants.
- Key differences from pre-FAA FISA: no individualized targets, no probable-cause determination by FISC, and reliance on executive assessments.
- Appellants alleged reasonable fear of interception and incurred costs to avoid interception, due to the statute’s scope.
- Court analyzes standing de novo, focusing on injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge FAA Section 702 | Plaintiffs have present injuries in fact via fear and costs | FAA lacks direct or sufficiently likely injury to plaintiffs | Yes; plaintiffs have standing |
| Whether fear of future monitoring and incurred costs constitute injury in fact | Fear is reasonable and costs are linked to avoidance | Injury must be direct or highly likely, not speculative | Yes; injuries in fact established |
| Whether indirect injuries from regulated third-party monitoring sustain standing | Indirect harms from protecting confidentiality are traceable to FAA | Indirect harms are insufficient for standing | Yes; indirect injuries can support standing when causally linked |
| Whether Laird v. Tatum governs surveillance standing and creates stricter rules | Laird not controlling; distinguishable facts | Laird dictates heightened standing standards for surveillance cases | Laird not controlling; standard applied consistent with general standing principles |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three-element standing: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (probability and likelihood of future injury govern standing)
- Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (indirect injury can support standing when tied to challenged action)
- Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) (standing requires concrete injury; real-world adverseness)
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (standing requires personal stake and concrete adverseness)
- Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (chilling effects alone not standing where no concrete injury)
- Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (standing supports injuries from fear of exposure and altered conduct)