American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Service Impasses Panel, Civil Action No. 2020-2683

Council 222, a union representing HUD employees, negotiated with HUD over a successor collective bargaining agreement; after mediation failed the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) declared an impasse and issued a decision (HUD and Council 222 Term Agreement) on August 12, 2020 imposing terms.
Council 222 previously sued to challenge an earlier FSIP "ground rules" decision; that case was dismissed as moot after the parties continued bargaining.
Council 222 filed this suit alleging the FSIP members were appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to vacate the CBA decision and bar the Panel from acting without properly appointed members; HUD intervened.
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because FSIP orders are not directly reviewable and must be channeled through the statutory administrative scheme (FLRA review then court of appeals).
The court concluded Council 222's complaint attacks a specific FSIP decision, is therefore an impermissible attempt at direct review, and dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; it also applied the Thunder Basin factors and found preclusion appropriate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court has jurisdiction to hear Appointments Clause challenge to an FSIP decision	Council 222: the suit challenges the Panel's constitutionality, not the Panel's substantive decision; NATCA II permits district review of such constitutional claims	Defendants: the suit seeks to vacate a specific FSIP order and thus is a direct challenge precluded by the statutory review scheme (FLRA then court of appeals)	Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: complaint targets a specific FSIP decision and is not reviewable in district court
Whether the NATCA II exception (allowing district suits not identifying a specific decision) applies	Council 222: its claim falls outside direct-review bar because it challenges Panel authority generally	Defendants: complaint expressly identifies and attacks the HUD and Council 222 Term Agreement and alleges injury from its terms	NATCA II inapplicable: complaint identifies and seeks to void a specific FSIP decision
Whether the Thunder Basin preclusion analysis bars district adjudication	Council 222: impliedly contends judicial review should be available (but did not prevail on exceptions)	Defendants: statutory scheme provides meaningful review (FLRA + court of appeals); the claim arises within the scheme and is within agency expertise	Thunder Basin applied: all three factors favor preclusion, so administrative route is exclusive

Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass'n v. FLRA, 977 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (FSIP orders are not directly reviewable in district court)
Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Fed. Serv. Impasses Panel, 437 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Panel decisions generally not subject to direct judicial review)
Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Fed. Serv. Impasses Panel, 606 F.3d 780 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (limited exception where complaint does not challenge a specific Panel decision)
Council of Prison Locs. v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (statutory review through FLRA and court of appeals is the prescribed path for contesting Panel orders)
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (discusses administrative review scheme and agency expertise)
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (framework for evaluating when statutory scheme precludes district review)
Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) (agency-review principles for constitutional claims arising in statutory schemes)
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (test for whether claims must be channeled through a statutory administrative and judicial review scheme)