Altin Shuti v. Loretta Lynch
828 F.3d 440
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Petitioner Altin Shuti, an Albanian lawful permanent resident since 2008, pleaded guilty in Michigan to felony unarmed robbery (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.530) and was later placed in removal proceedings as having been convicted of an "aggravated felony" under the INA.
- The INA defines an aggravated felony to include a "crime of violence" as cross‑referenced to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b): a felony that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force... may be used."
- The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded Shuti’s conviction was categorically a crime of violence and the BIA refused to address a vagueness challenge on the ground that void‑for‑vagueness doctrine does not apply in civil deportation proceedings.
- After the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness), Shuti argued the INA residual clause is likewise unconstitutionally vague; the BIA declined to reach constitutionality but the Sixth Circuit granted review of the constitutional claim.
- The Sixth Circuit held that vagueness challenges apply in removal proceedings and that the INA’s residual clause (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) read with 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)) is void for vagueness under Johnson’s reasoning, vacating Shuti’s removal order and remanding to the BIA.
Issues
| Issue | Shuti's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the INA’s residual clause (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) with 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause | The INA residual clause, like the ACCA residual clause, requires a categorical "ordinary case" risk inquiry and an imprecise risk standard, producing the same vagueness defects identified in Johnson | Johnson is limited to the ACCA; differences in text and the absence of ACCA’s enumerated list, and the civil nature of removal, mean Johnson does not extend to the INA | The INA residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson; categorical risk-based analysis invites arbitrary enforcement and denies fair notice |
| Whether vagueness doctrine applies in civil removal proceedings | Vagueness protections apply because deportation is a severe, punitive consequence implicating Fifth Amendment due process | BIA and government argued vagueness doctrine is inapplicable in civil deportation contexts | Court held vagueness doctrine applies in immigration removal proceedings; deportation’s severity requires due process protections |
| Whether any textual distinctions between the INA and ACCA save the INA clause | Textual differences ("substantial" vs. "serious," focus on "force may be used," lack of enumerated examples) do not eliminate the categorical/abstraction problem | Textual differences and narrower wording make INA less vague; other statutes with risk standards remain constitutional | Court found distinctions immaterial: the categorical approach plus qualitative risk standard produces the same constitutional defect |
| Whether Taylor and other precedents foreclose application of Johnson to the INA | Johnson’s categorical‑approach holding applies to statutes that require hypothetical ordinary‑case risk analysis; Taylor upheld a statute where risk is an element of the offense decided on real‑world facts | The government relied on Taylor (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) to argue Johnson does not control | Court distinguished Taylor as involving a real‑world, element‑based risk determination; held Taylor does not foreclose applying Johnson to INA residual clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (clarifying Johnson’s basis in the categorical approach and retroactivity)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (discussing § 16(b) categorical analysis and substantial‑risk standard)
- Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (applying vagueness principles to removal statutes despite civil label)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (noting the severe immigration consequences of criminal convictions)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (describing the "ordinary case"/categorical approach applied to residual clauses)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (explaining the categorical approach to prior convictions)