620 S.W.3d 915
Tex. Crim. App.2021Background
- Appellant Matthew Joseph Allen was indicted on multiple sexual-offense counts involving his minor stepdaughter A.H.; three counts remained at trial: Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Young Child (Count I, alleged Oct. 1, 2009–Aug. 15, 2012), Indecency with a Child by Exposure (Count II), and Indecency with a Child by Contact (Count VI, alleged Sept. 25, 2009).
- The jury convicted Allen on the three remaining counts; sentences were imposed for each conviction.
- On direct appeal the court of appeals affirmed the Continuous Sexual Abuse and Indecency-by-Contact convictions but reversed the Exposure conviction; it modified the contact conviction date to December 2011 (based on trial evidence).
- Both parties sought rehearing arguing §21.02(e) and double jeopardy implications; the court of appeals withdrew and reissued its opinion, again upholding convictions but identifying the continuous-abuse period as earlier (middle 2008–2009 to summer 2009).
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that §21.02(e)(2) looks to when the continuous-abuse offense “was committed” (as shown by evidence), not merely the time period alleged in the indictment, and concluded the record supports a continuous-abuse period extending through December 2011.
- Because the indecency-by-contact offense occurred within that evidence-based continuous-abuse period, dual convictions violated §21.02(e)(2); the Court vacated the Indecency with a Child by Contact conviction and dismissed a Ramos-based unanimity claim as improvidently granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Allen) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §21.02(e)(2) permits dual convictions when the §21.02(c) offense falls within the continuous-abuse time period | Dual convictions barred because the indecency-by-contact occurred within the time period alleged for the continuous-sexual-abuse count; "alleged" period controls | Look to when offenses “were committed” as shown by evidence (not merely indictment dates); dual convictions only barred if the §21.02(c) act occurred during the same evidenced continuous-abuse period | Court held “was committed” controls; evidence shows continuous abuse ran through Dec. 2011 and the contact offense fell within that period; dual convictions violate §21.02(e)(2); contact conviction vacated |
| Whether Ramos requires jury unanimity on which specific acts support a §21.02(b) continuous-abuse conviction | Allen argued post-submission that Ramos requires unanimity despite §21.02(d)’s language | State opposed; issue was allowed for briefing but procedural posture uncertain | Court dismissed the Ramos-based, post-submission ground as improvidently granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (statutory interpretation principles; examine literal text)
- Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (give effect to every word of a statute when reasonable)
- State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (statutory construction guidance)
- Hess v. State, 528 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (indictment must allege time)
- Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (conviction may rest on evidence proving a date different from the indictment allegation)
- Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (construed §21.02(e) re: attempts and dual-conviction prohibition)
- Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020) (unanimous-jury requirement for serious offenses)