Ali v. Tolbert, 394 U.S. App. D.C. 325

Ali inherited a house in 1998 and faced foreclosure in 2000 due to arrears on a mortgage.
Ali arranged a sale of the property to Noble for $150,000, with Tolbert involved as EZ Mortgage affiliate and broker.
Closing occurred November 21, 2000; Tolbert attended, Noble did not; HUD-1 listed Noble as purchaser and Ali as seller with substantial deductions, including Noble's closing costs.
Ali signed a notarized agreement acknowledging sums received and future reimbursements, with the settlement company issuing a final balance check.
Ali subsequently filed suit in 2002; default issues against Noble arose due to service and sanctions for Noble's evasion of service were imposed in 2006.
In 2009, the district court granted Tolbert and Noble summary judgment on Count 1 (CPPA claim) and Ali appealed; Noble also appealed Rule 11 sanctions which were vacated on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Tolbert a CPPA 'merchant' for Count 1?	Ali argues Tolbert provided services related to the sale, acting as a broker aiding the transaction.	Tolbert contends he did not supply goods/services on the supply side and thus was not a 'merchant'.	Tolbert was not a merchant; CPPA does not apply to him for Count 1.
Whether Rule 11 sanctions against Noble were proper	Ali contends Noble evaded service and delayed pleading in bad faith justifying sanctions.	Noble asserts sanctions were not properly grounded in Rule 11's text.	Rule 11 sanctions vacated; potential sanctions may lie under inherent authority.
Whether summary judgment on Count 1 was proper	Ali asserts Tolbert's conduct violated CPPA as a 'merchant' in a consumer-merchant transaction.	Tolbert's conduct did not involve supplying goods/services as a merchant; no CPPA liability.	Summary judgment upheld; Tolbert not a CPPA merchant; no CPPA liability.

Burns v. George Basilikas Trust, 599 F.3d 673 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (sanctions reviewability for abuse of discretion)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (U.S. 1990) (abuse of discretion standard and Rule 11 context)
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (representations to the court focus of Rule 11)
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. 1991) (inherent authority to sanction for abuse of judicial process)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (burden on movant to show absence of genuine issue of material fact)
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1980) (bad faith standard in sanctions context)
Shepherd v. American Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (clear and convincing standard for inherent authority sanctions)
Byrd v. Jackson, 902 A.2d 778 (D.C. 2006) (merchant status requires evidence of offering foreclosure avoidance services)
Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701 (D.C. 1981) (merchant definition on supply side of consumer transaction)
Snowder v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590 (D.C. 2008) (CPPA designed to police trade practices in consumer-merchant relationships)
DeBerry v. First Gov't Mortg. & Investors Corp., 743 A.2d 699 (D.C. 1999) (CPPA merchant interpretation and scope)
Ali v. Mid-Atl. Settlement Servs., Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (district court CPPA analysis and summary judgment background)