Agustin Valenzuela Gallardo v. William Barr
968 F.3d 1053
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background
- Agustín Valenzuela Gallardo, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in 2007 to being an accessory to a felony under California Penal Code § 32 and later served 16 months in prison after a parole violation.
- DHS charged him in removal proceedings as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (“an offense relating to obstruction of justice”) because his § 32 conviction carried a term of imprisonment of at least one year.
- Historically the BIA (Matter of Espinoza‑Gonzalez) and this court (Hoang) treated “obstruction of justice” as tied to interference with an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation.
- The BIA twice revised its definition in this case: first adopting a broader standard vacated as raising vagueness concerns (per this court), then adopting a new test that included interference with proceedings “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant.
- On review, the Ninth Circuit held the statute unambiguous: “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” requires a nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding or investigation, and California § 32 is broader than that generic offense; thus § 32 is not a categorical match and removal was vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Valenzuela Gallardo) | Defendant's Argument (Barr / Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Chevron deference | BIA precedents have applied; prior panel applied Chevron here | BIA interpretation of dual‑use (civil/criminal) statute should get Chevron deference | Law of the case required applying Chevron here, but court resolved the issue at Chevron Step One (statute unambiguous) |
| Whether § 1101(a)(43)(S) requires a nexus to an ongoing/pending proceeding | Yes: historical/ordinary meaning and Chapter 73 context require a nexus | No: BIA’s later construction (and some statutes) permit reasonably foreseeable proceedings | Court: statute unambiguously requires nexus to an ongoing or pending proceeding; BIA’s “reasonably foreseeable” expansion is inconsistent with the statute |
| Whether California Penal Code § 32 is a categorical match to the INA offense | § 32 is broader because it criminalizes assistance after a felony without requiring an ongoing/pending proceeding or defendant’s knowledge of one | § 32 is substantially similar to federal accessory statutes and thus qualifies | Court: § 32 is not a categorical match to § 1101(a)(43)(S); conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA |
| Applicability of the modified categorical approach/divisibility of § 32 | § 32 might be read narrowly or divisible | Government argued comparison via federal § 3 or divisibility | Court: § 32 is not divisible (does not list alternative elements); modified categorical approach inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) (construing Espinoza‑Gonzalez to require interference with an ongoing proceeding for accessory‑after‑the‑fact to qualify)
- Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016) (earlier panel opinion remanding due to vagueness concerns and directing BIA to redefine or apply Espinoza‑Gonzalez)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
- Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (U.S. 1893) (holding obstruction requires knowledge of and nexus to a pending judicial proceeding)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1995) (confirming catchall obstruction provision requires nexus to pending proceeding)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (U.S. 2005) (distinguishing § 1512’s reach and noting foreseeability is different from lack of pending proceeding)
- Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (U.S. 2018) (interpreting § 7212 to require proceedings that were pending or at least reasonably foreseeable; not dispositive for Chapter 73 at 1996 enactment)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (U.S. 2016) (describing the categorical approach comparing elements of state offense to federal generic offense)
- Esquivel‑Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (U.S. 2017) (directing use of ordinary meaning at time of enactment when interpreting INA aggravated‑felony terms)