321 F. Supp. 3d 526
E.D. Pa.2018Background
- Adams Outdoor applied for a permit (Mar. 8, 2016) to erect an off‑premise billboard on the eastbound side of SR‑22 opposite an interchange; PennDOT denied it because the location was within 500 feet of the interchange per 36 P.S. § 2718.105(c)(2)(i) (the “Interchange Prohibition”).
- Adams sued, raising facial and as‑applied First Amendment challenges to the Act, a vagueness challenge to the 500‑foot rule, and a facial challenge to the permit provision for lacking time limits; discovery followed and cross motions for summary judgment were filed.
- Adams moved for reconsideration of the court’s prior dismissal of its vagueness claim; the court denied reconsideration for failing to show changed law, new evidence, or clear error.
- The court concluded the Interchange Prohibition is content‑neutral, narrowly tailored to traffic safety/esthetic interests, leaves open alternative channels, and thus survives First Amendment scrutiny as applied to Adams’ proposed sign.
- The court held Adams lacked standing to challenge statutory exemptions (official/on‑premise signs) because the denial was based on the Interchange Prohibition and the exemptions would not have altered the outcome.
- The court held the Act’s permit provision (36 P.S. § 2718.107) facially unconstitutional because the statute contains no deadlines for PennDOT to grant or deny permits; applying Freedman and related precedent, the permit scheme must include strict time limits. The permit requirement was severed; enforcement stayed until PennDOT adopts internal time limits. Adams’s as‑applied delay claim became moot after PennDOT denied the application.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion for Reconsideration of vagueness dismissal | Adams says court erred in relying on prior state cases and PennDOT’s interpretations; demands reconsideration | Richards: no intervening law, no new evidence, merely disagreement with prior ruling | Denied — Adams failed to show change in law, new evidence, or clear error |
| Constitutionality of Interchange Prohibition (First Amendment content analysis) | Adams: exemptions for official/on‑premise signs make Act content‑based → strict scrutiny | Richards: exemptions don’t apply to interchange rule; Interchange Prohibition applies to all signs and is content‑neutral | Interchange Prohibition is content‑neutral and survives time/place/manner intermediate scrutiny |
| Standing to challenge statutory exemptions (36 P.S. §§ 2718.104 and 2718.105(c)(2)(iv)) | Adams: exemptions create content‑based distinctions and injure Adams | Richards: Adams only deals in off‑premise signs and was denied under the interchange rule, so exemptions caused no injury | No standing — Adams’s injury traced to the Interchange Prohibition; exemptions would not redress denial |
| Facial challenge to permit provision (no time limits) | Adams: permit scheme lacks deadlines; under Freedman/FW/PBS content‑based schemes require strict procedural time limits | Richards: Act is content‑neutral so Freedman safeguards not required; no statutory time limits needed | Permit requirement (36 P.S. § 2718.107) is unconstitutional for lacking strict time limits and is severed; enforcement enjoined until PennDOT adopts internal time limits |
| As‑applied delay claim (one‑year delay) | Adams: PennDOT’s one‑year delay unreasonably suppressed speech | Richards: PennDOT acted after suit; relief is moot | Moot — denial after suit leaves no injunctive or declaratory relief to grant |
Key Cases Cited
- Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (procedural safeguards and time limits required to prevent unconstitutional pre‑judicial censorship)
- FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (licensing schemes must issue decisions within a reasonable, specified time to avoid undue delay suppressing speech)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (facial content‑based vs content‑neutral inquiry for sign regulations)
- Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994) (analysis of sign‑code exceptions and intermediate scrutiny for location‑related distinctions)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes given controlling weight unless unreasonable)
- City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D‑4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (administrative permit schemes for content‑based regulations require strict time limits)
- Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (billboards implicate traffic safety and esthetic interests justifying regulation)
- Taxpayers for Vincent v. City of New York, 466 U.S. 789 (time/place/manner regulation may be narrowly tailored to aesthetic and safety interests)