Acosta v. Local Union 26, Unite Here
895 F.3d 141
1st Cir.2018Background
- Dimie Poweigha, a member of Local Union 26, requested to inspect 37 collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) the union had with other employers because she was dissatisfied with union administration.
- Local 26 permitted inspection but prohibited Poweigha from taking notes during her review; the Department of Labor (Secretary of Labor) sued under § 104 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 414.
- The Secretary argued that the statutory right to "inspect" CBAs includes the right to take notes (effectively to make copies), which is necessary to vindicate members' rights and the Act's purposes.
- The district court granted judgment for Local 26, holding that the inspection right did not include note-taking; the Secretary appealed.
- The First Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, focusing on statutory text, contemporaneous drafting choices in the LMRDA, and canons of construction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 104's right to "inspect" CBAs includes a right to take notes/copy | "Inspect" includes note-taking; without notes inspection is effectively nullified and members can't meaningfully use the information | "Inspect" means to view/scrutinize only; no textual right to copy or take notes | No — "inspect" does not include a right to take notes or make copies under § 104 |
| Whether "inspect" should be given a different meaning across the LMRDA | Secretary: different contexts may support broader reading for § 104 | Union: identical statutory words should have consistent meanings across the Act | Court applied presumption of consistent usage; § 401(c) shows Congress rejected "copy" language, so "inspect" lacks copying right |
| Whether Congress's explicit grants of "copy"/"copying" affect interpretation | Secretary: distinction between receiving a copy and making notes matters | Union: Congress expressly granted copies to affected employees elsewhere; it omitted such language for members inspecting CBAs | Court: Congress's choice to provide copies elsewhere supports reading that § 104 inspection alone does not include copying/note-taking |
| Reliance on policy and regulatory arguments (LMRDA purposes; other provisions allowing examination) | Secretary: broader reading better serves democratic union governance and member oversight; analogous provisions permit note-taking | Union: policy balance and separate "examine" provisions with limits (e.g., just cause) do not alter § 104 text | Court: policy arguments do not overcome text and structure; separate provisions are distinct and do not control § 104 meaning |
Key Cases Cited
- Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (canon that qualifying clause ordinarily modifies nearest antecedent)
- I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Congress does not enact by silence language it previously rejected)
- Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984) (committee reports as authoritative legislative history)
- Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (identical words in a statute should normally have the same meaning)
- Knight v. C.I.R., 552 U.S. 181 (2008) (statutory phrasing choices inform statutory meaning)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) (legislative purposes do not justify interpretations that disregard statutory text)
- Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (LMRDA interpreted with deference to union internal autonomy)
- Conley v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local Union No. 1014, 549 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1977) (cited re: examination rights and note-taking under a different LMRDA provision)
- Rezende v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 869 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2017) (standard for de novo review of judgment on the pleadings)