Abner Arcos Sanchez v. Attorney General United States, 997 F.3d 113

Abner Antonio Arcos Sanchez entered the U.S. as a child, received DACA in 2012, and obtained periodic renewals.
In April 2019 he was arrested on state charges; USCIS revoked his DACA in May 2019 and DHS placed him in removal proceedings for unlawful presence.
An IJ denied asylum, withholding, and CAT relief (one-year bar, social-group and likelihood-of-torture findings) and ordered removal; state charges were dismissed two weeks after the IJ decision.
On appeal Arcos Sanchez asked the BIA to remand for administrative closure so he could seek DACA renewal; the BIA denied remand relying on Matter of Castro‑Tum, which held IJs/BIA lack general authority to administratively close cases.
The Third Circuit reviewed whether 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously permit general administrative closure authority, confronted circuit splits, and (pre‑Jan 15, 2021 rule) vacated the BIA order and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously authorize IJs and the BIA to administratively close cases	The regs allow IJs/BIA to take “any action … appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of cases, which plainly includes administrative closure	Castro‑Tum and the government: the regs do not unambiguously authorize indefinite suspension; closure conflicts with the duty to resolve cases "timely"	The Third Circuit held the regulations unambiguously confer general authority to administratively close cases (rejecting Castro‑Tum’s contrary reading)
Whether the BIA properly denied Arcos Sanchez’s request to remand for administrative closure so he could seek DACA renewal	Arcos Sanchez: remand for administrative closure is appropriate while he seeks DACA renewal after state charges were dismissed	BIA/Government: denial was controlled by Castro‑Tum because no regulation or settlement expressly authorizes closure	Court vacated the BIA’s denial and remanded for proceedings consistent with the conclusion that administrative closure authority exists

Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019) (held the regulations unambiguously permit general administrative closure authority)
Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (similarly concluded regs encompass administrative closure)
Hernandez‑Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020) (reached opposite result, upholding Castro‑Tum interpretation)
Da Silva v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 629 (3d Cir. 2020) (standard: legal conclusions of the BIA reviewed de novo)
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (Supreme Court guidance on exhausting traditional tools of interpretation before deferring to agency)
Gonzalez‑Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2018) (cited as precedent recognizing administrative closure authority)