A.T. v. C.R.
88 Mass. App. Ct. 532
Mass. App. Ct. U2015Background
- An 11-year-old boy and an 11-year-old girl (classmates) had been friends; they became a brief "boyfriend/girlfriend" pair the week before incidents.
- On March 21, during a FaceTime call with a classmate present and recording, the boy made a sexualized comment about the girl's body; the recording was later shown to the girl and deleted by her mother.
- The next day the boy told the girl that if she showed the video to anyone he would "make her life a living hell."
- The boy’s sexual fantasy about the girl was recounted publicly in the cafeteria by a classmate with the boy corroborating details; he also repeatedly called her a nickname ending in "bitch."
- At a later school play the boy told the girl (and her friend) he wanted to "punch [her] in the titties;" both parties’ parents and the school became involved, and the boy was withdrawn and homeschooled; he sent an apology letter.
- The girl obtained an ex parte harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E; after an evidentiary hearing the Juvenile Court extended the order for one year; the court of appeals affirmed (with a single-justice modification reducing the stay-away distance).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was a pattern of three or more willful, malicious acts under G. L. c. 258E | The FaceTime sexual comment, the threat to "make life a living hell," and the later threat to punch her constitute three qualifying acts that, together, caused fear/intimidation | The incidents show poor juvenile judgment and embarrassment but not the malicious intent to cause fear of physical harm required by the statute; juvenile age undermines culpability | Affirmed: the court found at least three acts, intent/malice shown (including explicit statements of intent), and the course of conduct caused the plaintiff fear/intimidation |
| Whether the plaintiff actually experienced fear or intimidation (subjective test under O'Brien) | The plaintiff testified she felt unsafe and afraid; father expressed fear for her safety | Defendant denies intent; argues plaintiff did not articulate fear of physical harm and fears were generalized embarrassment | Held for plaintiff: judge credited plaintiff’s testimony that she felt unsafe and afraid; no reasonable-person element required |
| Whether the "threats" qualify as true threats or intimidation without explicit imminence | Plaintiff: threats and sexually aggressive public conduct plausibly amounted to true threats and intimidation (including a "living hell" statement) | Defendant: ambiguous or juvenile bravado lacking intent to cause physical harm cannot be a true threat | Held: statements could be true threats/intimidation; statute’s intimidation term has independent meaning; imminence not required under precedent |
| Whether G. L. c. 258E applies to juveniles this young | Plaintiff: Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles under the statute; legislature intended applicability to minors | Defendant: Age (11) and juvenile immaturity weigh against finding requisite intent; criminal/delinquency standards differ and no delinquency charges filed | Held: Statute applies; age is a factor but Juvenile Court is the proper forum and juvenile age does not place a categorical bar to relief |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (defining elements and "true threat" analysis for G. L. c. 258E)
- Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58 (discussing elements of civil harassment under G. L. c. 258E)
- Commonwealth v. Gordon, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 233 (definition of "intimidate" in related statutory context)
- Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229 (true-threat discussion; imminence not required)
- Planned Parenthood League, Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467 (defining intimidation as "putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct")
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. Supreme Court sentencing decisions about juvenile maturity cited by dissent)
- Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51 (juvenile criminal intent; courts respect legislative judgment about juvenile capacity)
- Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592 (civil burden of proof standard and procedural considerations)
