respectfully dissent would conclude that the damage sustained Appellant did result from dangerous condition of the city's sewer facilities.

Subsection (b)(5) the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act reflects the utility service facilities exception governmental immunity. 42 Pa.C.S. §8542(b)(5). It states although "local agency" meaning local government unit, see id. §8501 generally immune liability for injuries persons property, see §8541, exception exists where the damages question are based on "dangerous conditions of" certain facilities the local agency, such sewer facilities. Id. §8542(b)(5), quoted Majority Opinion, slip op. at 11.

Here, there no suggestion that city's lines or any other aspect sewer system itself constituted which caused loss. *2 Therefore, it seems relevant consider whether Legislature intended that phrase, "dangerous condition the facilities," (emphasis added), be read broadly to include items such as loose soil that are not part of the utility system, but near it. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Reading Area Water Authority, 937 A.2d (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), intermediate court held that the (b)(5) exception was inapplicable - and thus, water authority was immune from liability authority's employees damaged a utility line during the course excavations aimed reaching an underground water line. The court explained "in order for the utility service facilities exception apply, the allegedly dangerous condition must have derived or originated from, or had as local agency's realty." at 1175. Relying on Reading Area Water Authority, Commonwealth Court the present case emphasized that dangerous condition consisted instability the soil located underneath duct bank and, as such, it "did not originate Reading's facilities." Metro. Edison Co. City Reading, 125 A.3d 499, 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (internal citation, quotation marks, brackets omitted).

As often the case with statutory language, (b)(5) exception does not spell out with precision when damage can be viewed as having arisen from a dangerous "of" a municipality's facilities. Still, the statute not wholly without guidance, the exception does apply government "facilities" generally. The phrase chosen the General Assembly, pertains here, only implicates local agency's sewer facilities. To my mind this, minimum, gives rise uncertainty as to whether scope exception was meant include utility trench where sewer facilities are placed. Such uncertainty, turn, implicates rule that reviewing courts are to apply narrow construction immunity waivers. See Dorsey Redman, 195, 209-10, A.3d 332, (2014); Jones SEPTA, 565 211, 220, 772 A.2d 435, *3 440 (2001) (citing Finn City of Phila., 541 596, 601, 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1995) ("Because legislature's intent was provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that exceptions immunity must be strictly construed.")).

With the strict -construction mandate in mind, I find resonance in intermediate court's observation that dangerous condition was not part of the city's actual sewer line. As noted, the court relied on Reading Area Water Authoritys explanation to fall within the exception, the must have derived or originated from, or had its source as, the local agency's utility line.'

That position has been endorsed by this Court with regard other exceptions, Snyder Harmon, 522 424, 562 A.2d 307 such the real estate exception. ^[1] The majority does address this contention because, its view, the city fails to raise it. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 14 n.6. As read the city's brief, however, the assertion included, albeit perhaps inartfully. The city stresses the need for narrow construction and, this regard, emphasizes subsection (b)(5)'s use of the phrase, "A dangerous facilities." Brief for Appellee at 9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §8542(b)(5)) (bolding and italics original). The city then highlights the intermediate court's reliance on Reading Area Water Authority - specifically, that decision's explanation that the city was immunized because, "in order for the utility service facilities exception apply, the allegedly dangerous condition must have derived or originated from, or had as the local agency's realty." at 11 (quoting Reading Area Water Authority, 937 A.2d at 1175) (italics original, bolding omitted); see also Majority Opinion, slip op. at (summarizing the city's arguments). Finally - and as recognized the majority, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at n.6 the city urges this Court to disavow Miller PennDOT, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). It explains that Miller "injected confusing language into the fabric Pennsylvania's Tort Claims Act case law, holding that the [utility service facilities] exception applies `not only water pipes but also to the strip land which the [water a]uthority disturbed repair its pipe." Brief for Appellee (quoting Miller, 690 A.2d at 820). my view, this advocacy (which also appeared city's Commonwealth Court brief) preserves the issue. To the extent the majority credits the city with suggesting that excavation activity, rather than the city's realty, was the cause of the damage, see Majority Opinion, slip op. find such argument interrelated with the salient position that a dangerous condition near the line, and not the sewer line, caused the harm. *4 (1989), for example, the plaintiff alleged that the negligent failure place a guardrail along the edge of a road next a strip mine constituted a dangerous condition of the Commonwealth's property. This Court disagreed, emphasizing that dangerous condition did not have in Commonwealth's land itself. at 434, 562 A.2d at 312.2 this respect, the Court observed, when viewing the statutory language - "[a] of Commonwealth agency real estate sidewalks" 42 Pa.C.S. §8522(b)(4) the crucial word is "of." See Snyder, 522 Pa. at 434 n.5, 562 A.2d at 312 n.5. Therefore, Court explained that invoke the exception a plaintiff must demonstrate that "defect land itself cause[d]" the injury in question. at 434-35, 562 A.2d at 312 (emphasis added); see also Finn, 541 Pa. at 605, 664 A.2d at 1346 (in context of a sidewalks -exception claim, reviewing prior decisions and concluding that "[t]he common theme of all these cases that liability depends . . on . legal determination that an injury was caused by of government realty itself, deriving, originating from, or having the realty source").3 Although Snyder involved the sovereign immunity of Commonwealth, sovereign governmental immunity statutes "are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter." Finn, 601, 664 A.2d at 1344. Jones, this Court re -affirmed the analysis set forth Snyder. Thus, the Jones Court reiterated light of the "dangerous condition of phraseology, the government - owned realty question must itself be source of the injury. Jones, 565 at 226, 444 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §8542(b)(7)) (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions have reached similar interpretations similarly worded statutes. See, e.g., Wade Dep't Corr., 483 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Mich. 1992); Stevens Salt Lake Cnty., P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1970). While exception may be broad enough include situations which the physical condition facility not dangerous, see, e.g., Warden City L.A., 530 P.2d 175 (Cal. 1975) (finding the location of a sewer outfall pipe just beneath the water's surface area frequented boats constituted dangerous condition), would construe subsume dangerous conditions above utility line, even the condition stems from excavation and backfilling activities undertaken by municipality access that utility line.

Applying these established principles, the damage incurred the present case arose from the loose underneath the duct banks and, such, did not amount to a "of" the city's system for purposes of the (b)(5) exception. This circumstance, moreover, distinguishes present case from the situation Gall by Gall Allegheny County Health Department, 68, 555 A.2d 786 (1989), from which the majority draws support. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 16-17. Gall, danger stemmed contaminated water delivered water authority's facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the contamination arose because authority had negligently allowed water retaining systems and piping become infested with parasite. Gall, Pa. at 787. The plaintiffs further averred that the authority had failed to: (a) utilize scientific developments to treat cure the water; (b) properly filter water flowing through line; and (c) take frequent necessary water samples determine existence or non-existence the parasite. See It is thus apparent that Gall, the plaintiffs' allegations related aspects "of" the utility system much more so than present matter. brief, conclude that injury did not have source the city's

sewer facility itself. Thus, any negligence associated with the city's failure shore up soil upon notice that the conduit banks were danger should give rise liability on the part city. Although this result would allow the city escape liability even negligence causes harm, essence governmental immunity as established by the legislative branch our government.

Accordingly, would affirm the order Commonwealth Court.