1. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.
2. (b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.
3. (c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.

4. (d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:

   1. (1) intentional;
   2. (2) knowing;
   3. (3) reckless;
   4. (4) criminal negligence.
5. (e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof of the culpability charged.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.