TMEP § 1210.01(b)
To support a refusal to register a mark as primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(3) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(3), the examining attorney must show that:
In re Miracle Tuesday, LLC, 695 F.3d 1339, 1343, 104 USPQ2d 1330, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1350–54, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1490–95 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Les Halles De Paris J.V., 334 F.3d 1371, 67 USPQ2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See TMEP §1210.01(a) for more information regarding determining relevant purchasers.
Prior to the amendment of the Trademark Act by the NAFTA Implementation Act, it was not necessary to show that the misrepresentation was likely to be a material factor in the consumer’s decision to buy the goods or use the services to establish that a mark was primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive. However, in In re California Innovations, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that in view of the NAFTA amendments, a showing of public deception is required to establish that a mark is unregistrable under §2(e)(3) of the Trademark Act. 329 F.3d 1334, 1339, 66 USPQ2d 1853, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See TMEP §1210.05(c) for further information regarding the distinction between marks comprising deceptive matter under §2(a) of the Act and marks comprising primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive matter under §2(e)(3) of the Act, and TMEP §§1210.05(c)–c)(ii) regarding the showing that a misrepresentation of the origin of the goods or services is likely to affect the purchaser’s decision to buy the goods or use the services.