(A) A person who, while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, drives a vehicle and when driving does any act forbidden by law or neglects any duty imposed by law in the driving of the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes great bodily injury or death to a person other than himself, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction must be punished:

1. (1) by a mandatory fine of not less than five thousand one hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars and mandatory imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than fifteen years when great bodily injury results;

2. (2) by a mandatory fine of not less than ten thousand one hundred dollars nor more than twenty-five thousand one hundred dollars and mandatory imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than twenty-five years when death results.

   A part of the mandatory sentences required to be imposed by this section must not be suspended, and probation must not be granted for any portion.

(B) As used in this section, "great bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

The Department of Motor Vehicles must suspend the driver's license of a person who is convicted or who receives sentence upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to this section for a period to include a term of imprisonment plus three years.

(C) One hundred dollars of each fine imposed pursuant to this section must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the Department of Public Safety for the Highway Patrol.

SECTION 56-5-2945 does not expressly repeal the existing offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide, and construction of the statute indicates that repeal by implication is not intended. State v. Bodiford (S.C. 1984) 282 S.C. 378, 318 S.E.2d 567.

3. Lesser included offenses

Reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of felony driving under the influence (DUI), since recklessness is not required to support a conviction for felony DUI. State v. Cribb (S.C. 1992) 310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306. Indictment And Information 191(.5)

Reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of felony driving under the influence (DUI) since recklessness is not required to support a conviction for felony DUI, thus overruling prior case law to the contrary. State v. Cribb (S.C. 1992) 310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306. Indictment And Information 191(.5)

4. Jeopardy

Double jeopardy will bar conviction where the state attempts to prove felony driving under the influence with proof of a violation of the same law under which the defendant has already been convicted in magistrate's court. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26. Double Jeopardy 142

Felony driving under the influence prosecution violated defendants constitutional protection against double jeopardy where the lane change violation, which was critical to the felony prosecution, was the same offense for which defendant had previously been convicted in magistrate's court. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26.

5. Indictment

Indictment charging defendant with felony driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in death was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court; indictment contained virtually identical language to that contained in the statute defining the offense, thorough review of the record disclosed no indications of uncertainty in regard to the crime with which defendant was charged, and because she pled guilty, it was clear she was aware of the nature of the charge against her. State v. Campbell (S.C.App. 2004) 361 S.C. 529, 605 S.E.2d 576. Indictment And Information 110(47)

The indictment must state with particularity the act forbidden by law or duty imposed by law which will be relied on by the state to support the felony driving under the influence charge. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26.

6. Expert witnesses

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying as an expert a police officer who testified, in a trial for felony driving under the influence, that he observed a "gouge mark" in the victim's lane "indicating to [him] that the collision had taken place in [the victim's] lane" where the officer testified that (1) he had received 12 weeks training in the state Highway Department Academy which included specific training on determining the point of impact in an accident investigation, (2) he spent one week in on-the-road training with a municipal police force, and (3) he had been a state trooper with 4-5 months' experience at the time of the crime. State v. Goode (S.C.App. 1991) 305 S.C. 176, 406 S.E.2d 391.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying as an expert a police officer who testified, in a trial for felony driving under the influence, as to the defendant's post impact speed where the officer was a 16-year veteran with the Highway Patrol, had received advanced accident investigation and reconstruction training, and had investigated approximately 1600 accidents. State v. Goode (S.C.App. 1991) 305 S.C. 176, 406 S.E.2d 391.

A lab technologist was not qualified as an expert to testify that a person with a blood alcohol reading in excess of .100 milligrams per deciliter is considered intoxicated. Although competent to conduct tests determining blood alcohol content, the technologist admitted that he had no training whatsoever in determining the effect of alcohol upon the human system and, therefore, his testimony on the issue of intoxication was inadmissible. State v. Priester (S.C. 1990) 301 S.C. 165, 391 S.E.2d 227.

7. Multiple convictions

Three convictions for felony driving under influence (DUI) arising out of single accident subjected motorist to three separate and consecutive three-year driver's license suspensions, rather than one three-year suspension. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Automobiles 144.2(14)

A defendant's multiple convictions for driving under the influence causing death, reckless homicide, felony driving under the influence causing great bodily injury along, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; although the convictions all arose from a single incident, they were separate offenses. State v. Easler (S.C.App. 1996) 322 S.C. 333, 471 S.E.2d 745, rehearing denied, certiorari granted, affirmed as modified 327 S.C. 121, 489 S.E.2d 617.

8. Admissibility of evidence

In prosecutions for driving under the influence (DUI), when moving to admit blood alcohol test results, the State must prove a chain of custody of the blood sample from the time it is drawn until it is tested. Ex parte Department of Health and Environmental Control (S.C. 2002) 350 S.C. 243, 565 S.E.2d 293. Automobiles 425

In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence, the trial court properly allowed the state's forensic toxicologist, who qualified as an expert witness, to testify concerning the elimination rate of alcohol and the effects of benzodiazepine when used in combination with alcohol after admitting that different "benzos" have difference effects and he did not know which benzodiazepine the defendant had taken, since such factors went to the weight of the testimony, and not its admissibility. State v. White (S.C.App. 1993) 311 S.C. 289, 428 S.E.2d 740, rehearing denied. Criminal Law 486(7)

In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence, the State sufficiently established the chain of custody of the defendant's blood sample where each person who handled the blood sample testified at trial, and a lab technologist testified that the samples she picked up from the nurses' desk at the hospital were identified by the receiving nurse as the defendant's and were clearly labeled with his name. State v. Priester (S.C. 1990) 301 S.C. 165, 391 S.E.2d 227.

9. Term of imprisonment

Probation, a suspension of the period of incarceration, is part of a criminal defendant's "term of imprisonment," as is actual incarceration, parole, the suspended portion of a sentence, and supervised furlough. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Sentencing And Punishment 1165; Sentencing And Punishment 1167; Sentencing And Punishment 1168

"Term of imprisonment," as used in portion of felony driving under influence (DUI) statute which provides that driver's license of any person convicted thereunder shall be suspended for period to include any term of imprisonment plus three years, means non-fine part of criminal sentence, and includes suspended portions, probation or parole periods, and supervised furlough; it is not limited to period of actual incarceration; overruling Davis v. South Carolina Dep't of Public Safety, 328 S.C. 578, 493 S.E.2d 871. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Automobiles 144.2(14)