(b) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of this section the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.

SECTION 39-5-20 is not unconstitutionally vague, despite contention that it does not specify what acts are unlawful. Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (S.C. 1988) 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E.2d 691, on subsequent appeal 303 S.C. 10, 397 S.E.2d 774.

Issue of alleged unfair competition was matter for jury to decide based upon its assessment of testimony where, among other things, there was some evidence from which jury could reasonably infer that competitor was engaged in effort to drive outdoor advertiser out of business in particular county. Bocook Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (S.C.App. 1987) 294 S.C. 169, 363 S.E.2d 390.

Padding bills for auto repair is unfair trade practice under Act, as padding auto repair bills affects public interest because of its potential for repetition. Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., Inc. (S.C.App. 1987) 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156.

Mere breach of contract does not constitute violation of Unfair Trade Practices Act, such that nightclub operator's deliberate or intentional refusal to permit owner of coin-operated video game machines to utilize premises of its nightclub for effective display and operation of video machines in breach of its contract with owner of video machines, without more, does not constitute violation of Unfair Trade Practices Act. Key Co., Inc. v. Fameco Distributors, Inc. (S.C.App. 1987) 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E.2d 476.

To be actionable under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce must have an impact upon the public interest; the act is unavailable to redress a private wrong where the public interest is not affected. Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347, certiorari dismissed 294 S.C. 235, 363 S.E.2d 688.

Unfair deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade and or commerce have an impact upon the public interests if the acts and or practices have the potential for repetition. Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347, certiorari dismissed 294 S.C. 235, 363 S.E.2d 688.

A complaint containing allegations of unfair or deceptive acts or practices on the part of the defendant which allegedly damaged the plaintiff did not state a claim under the unfair trade practices act, where the complaint nowhere alleged any facts demonstrating that those acts or practices adversely affected the public. Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347, certiorari dismissed 294 S.C. 235, 363 S.E.2d 688.

The term "willful" as used in Section 39-5-110 creates a statutory standard of willfulness different from the common law standard and, for purposes of Section 39-5-110, conduct is willful if the defendant should have known it violates Section 39-5-20, the standard being not one of actual knowledge, but of constructive knowledge, so if, in the ordinary exercise of due diligence, a person of ordinary prudence engaged in trade or commerce could have ascertained that his conduct violates the Unfair Trade Practices Act, then such conduct is "willful" within the meaning of the statute. State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc. Today, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 124, 348 S.E.2d 381.

Violation of Section 39-5-20 by defendant corporation and 2 of its directors was willful since a person exercising due diligence to determine whether defendant corporation's membership program violated the law would have no doubt that it constituted a pyramid scheme prohibited by Section 39-5-30. State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc. Today, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 124, 348 S.E.2d 381.

Penalties were properly assessed individually against officers, directors and principal shareholders of a corporation whose membership program constituted a pyramid scheme. State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc. Today, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 124, 348 S.E.2d 381.

Shippers of furniture and household goods could not recover under supplemental agreement with an interstate motor common carrier since, even if the supplemental agreement constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice, their agreement was authorized by regulations and tariffs administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and, thus, exempted from the South Carolina unfair trade practice law by Section 39-5-40(a). Carr v. United Van Lines, Inc. (S.C.App. 1986) 289 S.C. 194, 345 S.E.2d 734.

Payees' demurrer to counterclaim in action on note should not have been sustained where the counterclaim contained allegations which, if proven, stated a claim under the Unfair Trade Practice Act and, therefore, raised issues of novel impression that required a record to be made in the lower court to enable the appellate courts to properly review them. Vaughan v. Kalyvas (S.C.App. 1986) 288 S.C. 358, 342 S.E.2d 617.

The question of whether price discrimination violates the Unfair Trade Practices Act, Sections 39-5-10 to 39-5-560, being a question of first impression in South Carolina, should not be decided on demurrer; rather, the case should be fully developed and tried on its merits. Jackson v. Atlantic Soft Drink Co., Inc. (S.C. 1985) 286 S.C. 577, 336 S.E.2d 13.

Under Section 39-5-20(a) and (b), plaintiff need not prove the elements of common law deceit in order to establish a violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, since, under the statute, there is no need to show that a claim or representation was intended to deceive, but only that it had the capacity, effect, or tendency to deceive. State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., Inc. (S.C.App. 1984) 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334.

2. Evidence

Exclusion of evidence that contractor's auditors involved in initial audits of subcontractor's accounting books and records were not licensed certified public accountants was not abuse of discretion in action between contractor and subcontractor for, inter alia, breach of subcontracts, given that auditors were not public accountants engaged to audit subcontractor, so as to trigger licensing provision in generally accepted government accounting standards (GAGAS), but rather were contractor employees exercising contractor's rights pursuant to subcontracts to inspect subcontractor's accounting books and records. Project Control Services, Inc. v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Inc. (C.A.4 (S.C.) 2002) 35 Fed.Appx. 359, petition for certiorari filed.

3. Public interest requirement

South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act's (SCUTPA) "public interest" requirement may be satisfied if the alleged unfair or deceptive acts or practices have the potential for repetition; potential for repetition may be shown (1) by showing the same kind of actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to occur absent deterrence, or (2) by showing the company's procedures create a potential for repetition of the unfair and deceptive acts. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employee Resource Management, Inc., 2001, 176 F.Supp.2d 510.

Plaintiff in a South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) action is required only to allege and prove those facts sufficient to demonstrate potential for repetition; at that point, plaintiff has proven an adverse effect on the public interest sufficient to recover under the SCUTPA. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employee Resource Management, Inc., 2001, 176 F.Supp.2d 510.

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant's conduct violated the "public interest" requirement of South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA); defendant's failure to pay what it owed under the assigned risk plan adversely affected other insurers, companies, and their insureds by way of increased premium rates, defendant's actions enabled it to compete within the employee leasing industry with the unfair advantage of having low workers' compensation premiums, defendant misled some clients as to whether they had workers' compensation insurance coverage placing company and the uninsured clients at risk, defendant deceived another insurer, and the Georgia Assigned Risk Plan when it tried to obtain new coverage in Georgia, and defendant's offer of the sale of its stock was predicated upon a grossly underestimated liability to insurer for workers' compensation premiums. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employee Resource Management, Inc., 2001, 176 F.Supp.2d 510.