(C) Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in this section, the adoption of a child by an adoptive parent does not in any way change the legal relationship between the child and either biological parent of the child whose parental responsibilities and rights are not expressly affected by the final decree.

SECTION 20-7-1720 did not apply to a purported consent to adoption signed by the natural father, who, in reserving the right of visitation, did not agree to relinquish all rights to the child within the meaning of SECTION 20-7-1770(b). McLaughlin v. Strickland (S.C.App. 1983) 279 S.C. 513, 309 S.E.2d 787.

2. Under former law

Where inheritance is by will, South Carolina Code Section 10-2587.13 (1962) [Section 15-45-130 [1976]], denying adopted child right to inherit from natural parents by intestacy is not controlling. Dismukes v. Carletta (S.C. 1977) 269 S.C. 110, 236 S.E.2d 421.

In view of statute providing that upon final adoption the adoptive parents have all the rights and obligations which the natural parent previously had, and that the rights and obligations of the natural parent are terminated, an enforcement decree forecloses the enforcement of any agreement between natural parent and adoptive parents regarding visitation rights of the natural parent. Lowe v. Clayton (S.C. 1975) 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582.

Although an adoption decree foreclosed the enforcement of any agreement between natural parent and adoptive parents regarding visitation rights, since the decree could not have been entered without the consent of the natural parent in a proceeding where the fraud and misrepresentations of the adoptive parents would not have been in issue, there was no basis for the plea of res judicata or estoppel in a subsequent action involving the validity of the adoption decree against the charge of fraud. Lowe v. Clayton (S.C. 1975) 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582.

Where order denying visitation rights was based upon a conclusive effect of adoption statute, but court also stated that testimony had made it clear that the adoption decree was not contingent upon any vested visitation rights, such statement was a gratuitous finding by the court and was not a basis for judgment, and thus could not form the basis of an estoppel to plead fraud in a subsequent proceeding. Lowe v. Clayton (S.C. 1975) 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582.

Legislative intent. Cox v. Cox (S.C. 1974) 262 S.C. 8, 202 S.E.2d 6.

This section [Code 1962 Section 10-2587.13] ends an adopted child's legal relationship with its natural parents and the child becomes the child of the adopting parents for all inheritance purposes, as fully as if born to them in lawful wedlock, "to the exclusion of the natural or blood parents." Cox v. Cox (S.C. 1974) 262 S.C. 8, 202 S.E.2d 6.

A final decree of adoption completely severs all ties between the adopted child and the natural parents and effectively bars any right of the child to inherit from them. Cox v. Cox (S.C. 1974) 262 S.C. 8, 202 S.E.2d 6.

Stated in Goff v. Benedict (S.C. 1969) 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269.

3. Parent

Insurance agent did not, by means of adult adoption, legally qualify as "parent" of designated producer, for purposes of reinsurance facility statute allowing a designated producer to transfer his or her designated producer status to a parent; although adult adoption rendered agent a parent for purposes of intestate succession, he did not assume "all the rights, duties and other legal consequences" connected with the natural relationship of parent and child. Gorman v. South Carolina Reinsurance Facility (S.C.App. 1999) 333 S.C. 696, 511 S.E.2d 98, rehearing denied, certiorari granted.