MPEP § 2164.01
Any analysis of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The standard for determining whether the specification meets the enablement requirement was cast in the Supreme Court decision of Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) which postured the question: is the experimentation needed to practice the invention undue or unreasonable? That standard is still the one to be applied. See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, even though the statute does not use the term "undue experimentation," it has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See MPEP § 2164.06 for discussion of quantity of experimentation, including determining reasonableness of experimentation. See also United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785, 8 USPQ2d 1217, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in the art without undue experimentation."). A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art. In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 USPQ2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987); and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Any part of the specification can support an enabling disclosure, even a background section that discusses, or even disparages, the subject matter disclosed therein. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 77 USPQ2d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(discussion of problems with a prior art feature does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to make and use this feature). Determining enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 USPQ 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023), the Supreme Court, held that claims drawn to a genus of monoclonal antibodies, which were functionally claimed by their ability to bind to a specific protein, PCSK9, were invalid due to lack of enablement. The claims at issue were functional, in that they defined the genus by its function (the ability to bind to specific residues of PCSK9) as opposed to reciting a specific structure (the amino acid sequence of the antibodies in the genus). The Supreme Court concluded that the patents at issue failed to adequately enable the full scope of the genus of antibodies that performed the function of binding to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9 and blocking the binding of PCSK9 to a particular cholesterol receptor, LDLR.
The Court clarified that the specification does not always need to "describe with particularity how to make and use every single embodiment within a claimed class." Id. at 610-11. However, "[i]f a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class….The more one claims, the more one must enable." Id.
The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. For example, "it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality . . . running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose" and "disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset." Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, the Supreme Court found that Amgen failed to enable all that it claimed, even if allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. Id. at 613; see also Baxalta Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 81 F.4th 1362, 1367, 2023 USPQ2d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ("[t]he facts of this case are more analogous to—and are, in fact, indistinguishable from—those in Amgen. We do not interpret Amgen to have disturbed our prior enablement case law, including Wands and its factors."). Moreover, "[w]e see no meaningful difference between Wands' ‘undue experimentation’ and Amgen's ‘[un]reasonable experimentation’ standards. Id. at footnote 4. See also Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024), which explains that regardless of the technology the Wands factors should be used when assessing enablement.
A specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023) (citing Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1916)). The fact that experimentation may be complex does not necessarily make it undue, if the art typically engages in such experimentation. In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, 221 USPQ 1165, 1174 (Int’l Trade Comm'n 1983), aff’d. sub nom., Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. A.B. Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 227 USPQ 428 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. The test of enablement is not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504, 190 USPQ 214, 219 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.06 for further discussion of quantity of experimentation.
In order to determine compliance with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112(a), the Federal Circuit developed a framework of factors in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988), referred to as the Wands factors to assess whether any necessary experimentation required by the specification is "reasonable" or is "undue." Consistent with Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023), the Wands factors continue to provide a framework for assessing enablement in a utility application or patent, regardless of technology area. See Guidelines for Assessing Enablement in Utility Applications and Patents in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 89 FR 1563 (January 10, 2024). These factors include, but are not limited to:
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing the PTO’s determination that claims directed to methods for detection of hepatitis B surface antigens did not satisfy the enablement requirement). In Wands, the court noted that there was no disagreement as to the facts, but merely a disagreement as to the interpretation of the data and the conclusion to be made from the facts. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-40, 8 USPQ2d at 1403-07. The court held that the specification was enabling with respect to the claims at issue and found that "there was considerable direction and guidance" in the specification; there was "a high level of skill in the art at the time the application was filed;" and "all of the methods needed to practice the invention were well known." 858 F.2d at 740, 8 USPQ2d at 1406. After considering all the factors related to the enablement issue, the court concluded that "it would not require undue experimentation to obtain antibodies needed to practice the claimed invention." Id., 8 USPQ2d at 1407.
It is improper to conclude that a disclosure is not enabling based on an analysis of only one of the above factors while ignoring one or more of the others. The examiner’s analysis must consider all the evidence related to each of these factors, and any conclusion of nonenablement must be based on the evidence as a whole. 858 F.2d at 737, 740, 8 USPQ2d at 1404, 1407.
A conclusion of lack of enablement means that, based on the evidence regarding each of the above factors, the specification, at the time the application was filed, would not have taught one skilled in the art how to make and/or use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The Wands factors are probative of the essential inquiry in determining whether one must engage in more than a reasonable amount of experimentation. The determination that "undue experimentation" would have been needed to make and use the claimed invention is not a single, simple factual determination. Rather, it is a conclusion reached by weighing all the above noted factual considerations. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. These factual considerations are discussed more fully in MPEP § 2164.08 (scope or breadth of the claims), § 2164.05(a) (nature of the invention and state of the prior art), § 2164.05(b) (level of one of ordinary skill), § 2164.03 (level of predictability in the art and amount of direction provided by the inventor), § 2164.02 (the existence of working examples) and § 2164.06 (quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure).
The specification may require a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use the invention and what is reasonable will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sanofi et al., 598 U.S. 594, 596, 2023 USPQ2d 602 (2023). For example, "it may suffice to give an example (or a few examples) if the specification also discloses some general quality . . . running through the class that gives it a peculiar fitness for the particular purpose" and "disclosing that general quality may reliably enable a person skilled in the art to make and use all of what is claimed, not merely a subset." Id. at 611 (internal quotations omitted). However, while the specification in Amgen identified 26 exemplary antibodies that performed the claimed function by their amino acid sequences, the claims at issue were directed to a class which included "a ‘vast’ number of additional antibodies" that Amgen had not described by their amino acid sequences. Id. at 613. The Court found that Amgen sought to monopolize an entire class by their function, even though that class was much broader than the 26 exemplary antibodies disclosed by their amino acid structure. Id. at 613.
In Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2021), which the Supreme Court affirmed, the Federal Circuit explicitly applied the Wands factors to assess whether the specification of Amgen’s patent provided sufficient enablement, for purposes of 35 U.S.C. 112(a), to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention. The court relied on evidence showing that the scope of the claims encompassed millions of antibodies and that it was necessary to screen each candidate antibody in order to determine whether it met the functional limitations of the claim. Id. at 1088. Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was a lack of enablement. See also the following cases across various technology areas: McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 959 F.3d 1091, 2020 USPQ2d 10550 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 720 F.3d 1380, 107 USPQ2d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019); and Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 2019 USPQ2d 415844 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
As long as the specification discloses at least one method for making and using the claimed invention that bears a reasonable correlation to the entire scope of the claim, then the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112 is satisfied. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970). Failure to disclose other methods by which the claimed invention may be made does not render a claim invalid under 35 U.S.C. 112. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533, 3 USPQ2d 1737, 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
Naturally, for unstable and transitory chemical intermediates, the "how to make" requirement does not require that the applicant teach how to make the claimed product in stable, permanent or isolatable form. In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 521, 205 USPQ 221, 226 (CCPA 1980).
A key issue that can arise when determining whether the specification is enabling is whether the starting materials or apparatus necessary to make the invention are available. In the biotechnical area, this is often true when the product or process requires a particular strain of microorganism and when the microorganism is available only after extensive screening.
The court in In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 991, 169 USPQ 723, 727 (CCPA 1971), made clear that if the practice of a method requires a particular apparatus, the application must provide a sufficient disclosure of the apparatus if the apparatus is not readily available. The same can be said if certain chemicals are required to make a compound or practice a chemical process. In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 105, 210 USPQ 689, 691 (CCPA 1981).
If a statement of utility in the specification contains within it a connotation of how to use, and/or the art recognizes that standard modes of administration are known and contemplated, 35 U.S.C. 112 is satisfied. In re Johnson, 282 F.2d 370, 373, 127 USPQ 216, 219 (CCPA 1960); In re Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 87, 144 USPQ 637, 643 (CCPA 1965); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 USPQ2d 1436, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
For example, it is not necessary to specify the dosage or method of use if it is known to one skilled in the art that such information could be obtained without undue experimentation. If one skilled in the art, based on knowledge of compounds having similar physiological or biological activity, would be able to discern an appropriate dosage or method of use without undue experimentation, this would be sufficient to satisfy 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. The applicant need not demonstrate that the invention is completely safe. See also MPEP §§ 2107.01 and 2107.03.
When a compound or composition claim is limited by a particular use, enablement of that claim should be evaluated based on that limitation. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (claiming a chimeric gene capable of being expressed in any cyanobacterium and thus defining the claimed gene by its use).
In contrast, when a compound or composition claim is not limited by a recited use, any enabled use that would reasonably correlate with the entire scope of that claim is sufficient to preclude a rejection for nonenablement based on how to use. If multiple uses for claimed compounds or compositions are disclosed in the application, then an enablement rejection must include an explanation, sufficiently supported by the evidence, why the specification fails to enable each disclosed use. In other words, if any use is enabled when multiple uses are disclosed, the application is enabling for the claimed invention.